Baker v. Board of Election Commissioners

68 N.W. 752, 110 Mich. 635
Michigan Supreme Court·Decided October 20, 1896·Published·Cited by 8 cases

Opinion

Montgomery, J.

The relator filed a petition as chairman of the Democratic state central committee, praying for a mandamus to compel the respondent to print the ticket certified by him as second on the ballot to be used in the ensuing election. Charles P. Russell, chairman of the state central committee of the Prohibition party, has also filed a petition, asking that the ticket certified by the officers of his committee be printed second on the ballot. W. R. Shelby, assuming to be chairman of the state central committee of the Democratic party, has also filed a petition, asking that the ticket certified by-the officers of his committee be given the same place contended for by the other petitioners, and also asking that the ticket certified by relator be not given a place on the ballot under the certification of relator as chairman, and of G. Walter Meade as secretary, of the Democratic state central committee.

It will conduce to a better understanding of the case if we state what is not in controversy between the parties. First, it is not contended but that the Baker ticket is entitled to a place on the ballot under a certification by the proper officers of the convention which placed it in nomination. Second, it is conceded that the Shelby ticket is entitled to a place on the ballot, but it is contended by relator that the ticket should not be printed under the name “Democratic.” Relator’s counsel states that he has no objection to the use of the vignette certified, but does object to the use of the name “Democratic.”

The matters in controversy are—

First, whether the ticket certified by relator is entitled to be printed as the Democratic ticket, and to be given the [638]*638place which the law gives to the party having the second greatest number of votes at the preceding general election, which was admittedly the Democratic party.
Second, if it be held that the Baker ticket is not entitled to the place, whether the Shelby ticket is, or whether the place should be given to the Prohibition party.
Third, whether the relator is entitled to have the vignette certified by the officers of his committee printed on the ballots designed for use in the city of Detroit.

The statute provides (Pub. Acts 1895, Act No. 271, § 10) that the board of election commissioners shall cause to be printed on the ballot the names of the candidates nominated by the regularly called conventions of any party, and that it shall be the duty of the state, district, or county committee of each political party to forward to the chairman of said board of election commissioners of each county in the State a copy of the vignette adopted by them, and the names of all candidates nominated at any regularly called convention at which candidates for any one of the offices mentioned in section 1 of the act shall be nominated. Section 11 provides: “It shall hereafter be the duty of the state committee of any political party or organization in this State, before each election, to prepare and adopt, by engraving or otherwise, a vignette to be printed at the top of the column of such ballot assigned to such party, as a distinctive and characteristic heading thereto. Such vignette shall not be more than one inch and a half square, and, in addition to the device adopted, shall set forth legibly the name of such party.” By section 14 it is provided that “the ticket of the party having the greatest number of votes within the county at the last preceding general election shall be placed first on the ballot, the position of other tickets to be governed relatively by the same rule.” This last-quoted provision is the one which has given rise to the controversy now before the court. It is contended that the provision is not merely directory, but was inserted for the purpose of assigning positions on the ticket which should be understood [639]*639by the voter, and that it is a matter of right to have the ticket of each party organization occupy the place provided by this statute. We think that, whether the statute providing for a distinct place upon the ballot for each of the several tickets to be voted for was designed simply to avoid confusion, or in part to furnish information to the voter, it is a provision which should be observed in making up the ticket. This being so, it, of necessity, involves some inquiry into the question as to which of the two tickets known as the Baker and the Shelby tickets can be said to be the ticket of the Democratic party, represented at the preceding election.

The reluctance of the courts to enter upon an inquiry, or to permit an inquiry by the election commissioners, into the question of fact as to which of two contending factions truly represents a political party, has been manifested in various cases. State, ex rel. Sturdevant, v. Allen, 43 Neb. 651; Phelps v. Piper, 48 Neb. 724; Shields v. Jacob, 88 Mich. 164. In Shields v. Jacob it was held that the court would not undertake to determine which of two rival conventions resulting from a split in a regularly called convention should be treated as the regular convention of the party, and a mandamus was issued requiring the election commissioners to give to both tickets a place upon the ballot. At the time that decision was rendered, however, the provision requiring that the ticket of the party having the greatest number of votes within the county at the last preceding election should be placed first upon the ballot, and that the position of other tickets should be governed relatively by the same rule, was not a part of the statute, and it was not necessary to determine which of these tickets should be placed first on the ballot. Under the law as it now exists, such an investigation seems necessary, and it would seem that the commissioners did determine the question, and place the Shelby ticket second on the ballot.

[640]*640The facts in regard to the selection of these two tickets are not in controversy. In certifying the Baker ticket, the relator accompanied his certificate to the commissioners by a petition setting out all the facts which resulted in the nomination of the ticket, together with the manner of its nomination. This petition sets out, in substance, that the petitioner is the successor of the Democratic organization which existed and was represented on the ticket two years ago; that a regularly called convention of the party was held at Bay City on the 25th of August, 1896; that at that date there was also held in the same city a convention of the Union Silver party, an organization of recent origin, which had not taken part in any preceding state election, and a convention of the People’s party; that each of the three conventions appointed a conference committee, which committees endeavored to agree on a division of the offices on the electoral and state ticket, but, being unable to do so, agreed upon a report, which was submitted to each of said conventions, which report was as follows:

“To the Democratic Convention:
“Your committee appointed to meet a like committee from the Union Silver and People’s party conventions met the committee as directed, the Democratic party, the Union Silver party, and the People’s party each being represented by five representatives. The joint committee was organized by electing C. H. McGinley chairman, and A. A. Ellis secretary.

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Baker v. Board of Election Commissioners, 68 N.W. 752, 110 Mich. 635 (Mich. 1896).

68 N.W. 752 (Baker v. Board of Election Commissioners) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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