Baker v. Baker

• Court: Montana Supreme Court
• Decided: June 10, 1982
• Docket: 81-393
• Status: Published

Opinion

No. 81-393

I N T E SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O MONTANA H F F

I N R THE MARRIAGE OF E

EVELYN I . BAKER,

P e t i t i o n e r and R e s p o n d e n t ,

-vs-

D W Y F. E E BAKER,

Respondent a n d A p p e l l a n t .

Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County o f M i s s o u l a , The H o n o r a b l e James B. W h e e l i s , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .

Counsel o f Record:

For Appellant:

Recht and Greef , H a m i l t o n , Montana

F o r Respondent :

T e r r y W a l l a c e , M i s s o u l a , blontana

Submitted on B r i e f s : March 11, 1982

Decided: J u n e 1 0 , 1982

Filed : J!J#10 1982 Mr. ~ u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n delivered the Opinion of t h e Court.

T h i s is a n a p p e a l from t h e judgment of the ilistrict

Court of t h e F o u r t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , i n and f o r t h e County

of Missoula, a r i s i n g o u t of a m a r i t a l d i s s o l u t i o n .

At t h e t i m e of t h e i r divorce, E v e l y n and Dewey B a k e r

e n t e r e d i n t o a p r o p e r t y agreement d a t e d J u n e 27, 1988. This

agreement was approved by the court and entered into the

d e c r e e o f d i s s o l u t i o n o n t h a t same d a t e . Under t h e t e r m s o f

t h e property agreement, among o t h e r p r o v i s i o n s , t h e p a r t i e s

agreed t h a t a l l family obligations of the parties incurred

b y them prior t o August 7, 1979, were t o b e t h e s o l e a n d

s e p a r a t e o b l i g a t i o n s o f t h e a p p e l l a n t husband. Obligations

i n c u r r e d s i n c e t h a t d a t e by t h e p a r t i e s i n d i v i d u a l l y were t o

be the s e p a r a t e o b l i g a t i o n s of t h e p a r t y who incurred the

obligations.

The parties agreed that the wife would have full

custody and control of the f i v e minor children, that the

h u s b a n d was t o h a v e r e a s o n a b l e v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s a n d c e r t a i n

p e r i o d s o f t i m e d u r i n g t h e summer a n d h o l i d a y s ; in addition,

t h e a p p e l l a n t h u s b a n d was t o make a r r a n g e m e n t s w i t h t h e w i f e

prior to these visitations. The husband was to pay all

m e d i c a l and d e n t a l b i l l s .

The h u s b a n d was t o c o n v e y t o the wife an apartment

complex owned by the parties in Missoula, Montana, the

income from which was to be used by her as and for the

obligation of the husband t o pay support, m a i n t e n a n c e and

care and education of the parties' minor children. The

appellant husband further agreed with regard to the

c o n v e y a n c e o f t h e a p a r t m e n t t o p r o v i d e an income t o t h e w i f e

of at l e a s t $1,000 per month. T h i s was s e t up s o i n t h e e v e n t t h e g r o s s r e n t s r e c e i v e d from s u c h a p a r t m e n t s d i d n o t

e x c e e d $1,BB0 f o r any o n e month, t h e r e s p o n d e n t w i f e would

n o t i f y t h e h u s b a n d o f s u c h d e f i c i t a n d h e was t o make up t h e

d i f f e r e n c e i n a c a s h payment w i t h i n f i f t e e n d a y s .

P u r s u a n t t o t h e p r o p e r t y a g r e e m e n t t h e a p p e l l a n t hus-

band a g r e e d t o d e p o s i t i n t h e F a r m e r s S t a t e Bank i n V i c t o r ,

Montana, t h e sum o f $ 1 , 0 0 0 and t o m a i n t a i n t h a t account in

t h e name o f the respondent wife, and t o f u r t h e r m a i n t a i n a

balance in the account of $1,000. With regard to this

agreement i t was understood t h a t t h e respondent could draw

upon t h i s a c c o u n t a t a n y t i m e t h e g r o s s r e n t s r e c e i v e d f r o m

the apartments were less than $1,000 for any one given

month. I n t h e e v e n t t h a t t h e w i f e drew on t h e a c c o u n t , t h e

husband had the obligation to return the account to its

$1,008 b a l a n c e w i t h i n t h e f i f t e e n - d a y period. In addition, t h e agreement provided t h a t a t any t i m e t h e respondent w i f e

d r e w upon the account, when the gross rents received from

the a p a r t m e n t s were equal to or exceeded $1,000, or drew

upon t h e a c c o u n t f o r t h e r e a s o n o t h e r t h a n m a k i n g up f o r t h e

reduction in the gross rents received from t h e a p a r t m e n t s ,

f o r any g i v e n month, t h e a c c o u n t i n t h e F a r m e r s S t a t e Bank

would be closed and all proceeds therein returned to the

a p p e l l a n t husband.

The i n k was h a r d l y d r y o n t h e t r i a l j u d g e ' s s i g n a t u r e

to the dissolution agreement before t h e p a r t i e s were o n c e

a g a i n back i n c o u r t . On F e b r u a r y 1 3 , 1981, the respondent

wife petitioned t h e District Court f o r a r e s t r a i n i n g order

t o p r e v e n t t h e a p p e l l a n t husband from e x e r c i s i n g h i s v i s i t a -

t i o n r i g h t s and p e t i t i o n e d t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r a h e a r i n g

on arrearages and support payments and numerous other p r o b l e m s s h e was h a v i n g a s a r e s u l t o f h a v i n g c u s t o d y o f t h e

children.

H e a r i n g s were h e l d on the wife's motion to enforce

t h e d e c r e e on May 1 5 , 1 9 8 1 and May 22, 1981, i n t h e R a v a l l i

County C o u r t h o u s e . Following t h e s e h e a r i n g s t h e c o u r t , on

June 18, 1 9 8 1 , e n t e r e d an o r d e r b a s e d upon t h e e v i d e n c e o f

the hearings. Within less than two weeks, the appellant

husband f i l e d m o t i o n s f o r a new t r i a l and f o r a l t e r a t i o n o r

amendment o f t h e o r d e r o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , both pursuant

to Rule 59, M.R.Civ.P. The husband f u r t h e r moved to set

a s i d e t h e o r d e r b e c a u s e t h e r e were no f i n d i n g s of fact or

c o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w , t o s t a y t h e e x e c u t i o n and e n f o r c e m e n t o f

the order, and to modify the support provisions of the

original order.

I t would a p p e a r t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t h u s b a n d , realizing

t h a t t h e m o t i o n s f o r a new t r i a l and f o r amendments were n o t

t i m e l y , on J u l y 22, 1981, f i l e d a n o t i c e of appeal. There-

after, on November 4, 1 9 8 1 , t h e a p p e l l a n t husband moved f o r

a s t a y of execution. T h a t m o t i o n was d e n i e d a f t e r a brief

hearing, and t h e a p p e l l a n t husband t h e n moved t h e c o u r t t o

r e e s t a b l i s h v i s i t a t i o n with h i s c h i l d r e n . T h a t m o t i o n was

h e a r d on December 2 1 , 1 9 8 1 , and a t r a n s c r i p t o f t h a t h e a r i n g

was i n c l u d e d on t h i s a p p e a l .

On August 1 3 , 1 9 8 1 , t h e c o u r t d i d enter f i n d i n g s of

f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s o f law p u r s u a n t t o t h e r e q u e s t of the

husband i n h i s J u n e 29, 1 9 8 1 , m o t i o n .

Five issues a r e presented for consideration:

1. Whether t h e o r d e r d a t e d J u n e 1 8 , 1 9 8 1 , s h o u l d be

v a c a t e d and r e v e r s e d f o r f a i l u r e t o i n c l u d e f i n d i n g s o f f a c t

and c o n c l u s i o n s o f law. 2. Whether t h e c h a n g e o f v i s i t a t i o n o r d e r e d by t h e

supplemental decree dated May 15, 1981, was supported by

f i n d i n g s o f f a c t o r by e v i d e n c e .

3. Whether t h e o r d e r o f the court establishing the

a p p e l l a n t ' s a r r e a r a g e s i n t h e amount o f $2,849 i s s u p p o r t e d

by t h e e v i d e n c e .

4. Whether the order of the court compelling the

a p p e l l a n t t o pay management f e e s i s s u p p o r t e d by t h e l a w o r

the facts.

5. Whether t h e o r d e r c o m p e l l i n g a r e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f

escrow account is an impermissible modification of the

binding agreement of t h e p a r t i e s .

Here, the decree of dissolution of marriage was

e n t e r e d on J u l y 1 4 , 1988. By m o t i o n d a t e d F e b r u a r y 1 3 , 1 9 8 1 ,

t h e w i f e s o u g h t t o e n f o r c e t h e d e c r e e a s t o t h e payment o f

c h i l d s u p p o r t and r e a l p r o p e r t y t a x e s , and a l s o s o u g h t t h a t

t h e v i s i t a t i o n p r i v i l e g e s o f t h e husband be c h a n g e d . W are e

n o t i n v o l v e d w i t h a n a p p e a l from a judgment f o l l o w i n g t r i a l .

The l a s t s e n t e n c e o f R u l e 5 2 ( a ) , M.R.Civ.P., d i s p o s e s of t h e

issue, stating :

" F i n d i n g s o f f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w a r e u n n e c e s s a r y on d e c i s i o n s o f m o t i o n s u n d e r R u l e s 1 2 o r 56 o r a n y o t h e r m o t i o n e x c e p t a s p r o v i d e d i n R u l e 4 1 ( b ) .I'

R u l e 4 1 ( b ) p e r t a i n s t o i n v o l u n t a r y d i s m i s s a l of a c t i o n s and

is not a p p l i c a b l e here. A s a r e s u l t , we c o n c l u d e t h a t u n d e r

R u l e 5 2 ( a ) f i n d i n g s o f f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w were n o t

r e q u i r e d under t h e r u l e s .

Issue two i n v o l v e s t h e change of v i s i t a t i o n by the

a p p e l l a n t husband. A s i n s o many c a s e s where t h e word " r e a -

sonable" visitation rights are put into the decree, the

interpretation of the word "reasonable" is left to two unreasonable p a r t i e s . That is t h e s i t u a t i o n h e r e , and t h e

District Court found it necessary t o modify t h e d e c r e e t o

set forth a scheduled visitation that both parties could

l i v e by.

The e v i d e n c e s u b m i t t e d a t t h e h e a r i n g s c l e a r l y shows

t h a t t h e husband a b u s e d h i s p r i v i l e g e s u n d e r t h e v i s i t a t i o n

r i g h t s set f o r t h i n the o r i g i n a l decree. The t r i a l court

m e r e l y c l a r i f i e d t h o s e r i g h t s by p e r m i t t i n g b o t h p a r t i e s t o

h a v e a l t e r n a t i v e weekend v i s i t a t i o n s and s e t t i n g a s p e c i f i c

f o r t y - d a y summer v i s i t a t i o n . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e c o u r t provided f o r t h e manner i n which t h e a p p e l l a n t h u s b a n d was t o a r r a n g e

visitations. These restrictions and clarifications were

w a r r a n t e d by t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d t o t h e c o u r t , and t h e r e

is c l e a r l y no a b u s e o f i t s d i s c r e t i o n .

The t h i r d i s s u e is d i r e c t e d t o a r r e a r a g e s which t h e

a p p e l l a n t husband a r g u e s a r e n o t s u p p o r t e d by t h e e v i d e n c e .

W f i n d t h i s a f r i v o l o u s i s s u e because t h e a p p e l l a n t admits e

that the $2,369.27 arrived at by the District Court was

a g r e e d upon a t t h e h e a r i n g s a f t e r c o n s i d e r a b l e e v i d e n c e was

placed before the court. Appellant takes issue with the

f a c t t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t f a i l e d t o g i v e him c r e d i t o f $150

for a s t o v e given t o t h e wife a t t h e time of d i s s o l u t i o n .

T h i s t y p e o f p e t t i n e s s d e s e r v e s l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n on a p p e a l .

The c o u r t had s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e b e f o r e i t a s t o t h e amount

d u e on June 1 5 , 1 9 8 1 , and t h e amount i n a r r e a r a g e . There is

ample e v i d e n c e f o r t h e c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s , and

we f i n d no a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n .

The n e x t issue is directed at the requirement that

a p p e l l a n t pay f o r p r o p e r t y management f e e s f o r t h e a p a r t m e n t

complex d e e d e d t o t h e r e s p o n d e n t . The f o u r - p l e x apartment conlplex i n v o l v e d h e r e is w i t h i n s e v e r a l b l o c k s o f t h e Uni-

v e r s i t y o f Montana and i s d e s c r i b e d a s b e i n g among t h e m o s t

r e n t a b l e t y p e of p r o p e r t y i n M i s s o u l a . Following t h e taking

o v e r o f t h e complex by t h e w i f e , t h e r e was t e s t i m o n y t o t h e

e f f e c t t h a t t h e r e were v a c a n c i e s i n t h e a p a r t m e n t s . There-

f o r e , t h e income from t h e p r o p e r t y d i d n o t come up t o e x p e c -

tations, and t h e a r r e a r a g e c o m p l a i n e d of by t h e r e s p o n d e n t

wife occurred.

The husband testified that this was very rentable

p r o p e r t y and t h e r e s h o u l d h a v e been p e o p l e i n t h e a p a r t m e n t s

throughout the time involved. In his view the vacancies

o c c u r r e d b e c a u s e o f rnisrnanagement by r e s p o n d e n t . A s one of

h i s witnesses, a p p e l l a n t had a real estate agent familiar

with t h e r e n t a l s i n Missoula t e s t i f y . H i s t e s t i m o n y was t o

t h e e f f e c t t h a t f o r a r a t h e r minor f e e , a p p r o x i m a t e l y 5 % , h e

c o u l d manage t h e p r o p e r t y and s u c c e s s f u l l y k e e p i t f u l l .

A s a r e s u l t of t h i s testimony, the court found that

the property could e a r n more u n d e r p r o f e s s i o n a l management

and, because of t h e e v i d e n c e produced by t h e husband that

this i s what he w a n t e d , the trial court directed that the

property be managed by a competent real estate person in

Missoula and that the husband pay for same. We find no

merit t o the appellant's contentions in t h i s matter.

The n e x t i s s u e is d i r e c t e d a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s re-

e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f t h e e s c r o w a c c o u n t s e t up i n t h e p r o p e r t y

settlement agreement. Appellant argues t h a t t h e c o u r t had

no a u t h o r i t y t o m o d i f y t h e t e r m s o f t h e binding separation

a g r e e m e n t u n l e s s i t found t h a t t h e w e l f a r e o f the children

was being affected or that a change of c i r c u m s t a n c e s had

o c c u r r e d s o s u b s t a n t i a l and c o n t i n u i n g a s t o make t h e t e r m s unconscionable.

The child custody and property agreement provided

t h a t t h e escrow c o u l d be c l o s e d by t h e husband i f the wife

" d r a w s on s a i d a c c o u n t f o r a r e a s o n o t h e r t h a n m a k i n g up f o r

such reduction i n g r o s s r e n t s r e c e i v e d from t h e a p a r t m e n t s ,

f o r a n y g i v e n month . . ." The r e s p o n d e n t w i f e t e s t i f i e d

t h a t d u e t o v a c a n c i e s and o t h e r economic f a c t o r s , t h e r e n t a l

income f e l l s h o r t o f t h a t a n t i c i p a t e d .

The p r o p e r t y a g r e e m e n t h e r e was w r i t t e n b y a p p e l l a n t

a n d i s s i l e n t on w h a t t h e w i f e was t o d o i f t h e h u s b a n d owed

h e r c h i l d s u p p o r t when t h e e s c r o w a c c o u n t was e s t a b l i s h e d .

In this instance, the escrow account was not established

imri~ediately a f t e r the dissolution was g r a n t e d b u t several

months l a t e r because t h e p a r t i e s were s i g n i n g m u t u a l d e e d s

and transferring property. However, the necessity t o care

f o r t h e c h i l d r e n a s p r o v i d e d by t h e d e c r e e was a c o n t i n u i n g

o b l i g a t i o n d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d i n which t h e v a r i o u s d e e d s were

being passed back and forth by the husband and wife and

their attorneys. Under these circumstances, we find no

b r e a c h by r e s p o n d e n t o f t h e a g r e e m e n t , b y w i t h d r a w i n g money

and u s i n g i t f o r t h e s u p p o r t o f t h e m i n o r c h i l d r e n . There-

fore, the court did not abuse its d i s c r e t i o n in directing

t h e husband t o r e e s t a b l i s h t h e a c c o u n t and comply w i t h t h e

terms o f t h e a g r e e m e n t .

F i n d i n g no a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n i n a n y o f t h e D i s t r i c t

C o u r t ' s a c t i o n s h e r e i n , t h e t r i a l c o u r t is a f f i r m e d . Respon-

d e n t is awarded c o s t s on a p p e a l . W e concur :