Báiz v. Insular Racing Commission

63 P.R. 463
CourtSupreme Court of Puerto Rico
DecidedApril 26, 1944
DocketNo. 8805
StatusPublished

This text of 63 P.R. 463 (Báiz v. Insular Racing Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Puerto Rico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Báiz v. Insular Racing Commission, 63 P.R. 463 (prsupreme 1944).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Todd, Jr.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

The only question involved in this case is whether §177 of the Political Code and paragraph 13 of §34 of the Organic Act forbid that the plaintiff receive compensation for services rendered as veterinarian of the Insular Racing Commission during the period in which said plaintiff was an employee, of the Department of Health of Puerto Rico. In a suit for a declaratory judgment the lower court held that plaintiff had no right to receive said compensation, supporting its ruling on the basis of (a) the doctrine established in the case of López v. Martorell, 59 P. (2d) 176, and (b) on the fact that the Insular Racing Commission is one of the bodies to which the above-cited §177 of the Political Code, as amended by Act No. 124 of August 8, 1913 (Laws of 1913-14, p. 43 )1 makes reference.

[465]*465Appellant’s chief argument to the effect that the Insnlar Racing Commission is not an organism dependent of the government because its funds are derived from the bets which are made at the race tracks is without merit.. The phrase “que dependa del gobierno” as used in §177 of the Political Code does not necessarily mean that the hoard, commission, or organism be financially dependent on the Insular Government for its functioning. The true scope and meaning of that phrase is found in the English text of the statute which merely says “dependency thereof.” That is to say, the prohibition includes any regular officer or employee of the Insular Government whose salary is fixed by law — as in the case of appellant who held the office of Health Inspector — who may seek to receive any additional pay or compensation for any personal or official service whatsoever from any board, commission, or organism which is also a dependency of the Insular Government. We entertain no doubt that the Insular Racing Commission is a dependency of the Insular Government, inasmuch as it owes its existence to an act of the legislature 2 by virtue of which its members are appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate of Puerto Rico; it must adopt and use an official seal of which the courts take judicial notice; its income is covered into the Insular Treasury and kept in a special fund, and all the functions thereof are regulated by said act.

[466]*466The funds of the Racing Commision are made up of 5 per cent of the 30 per cent discounts which may be made in the race tracks from the gross bets “in the subscription funds, pools, ‘mutuels’ and in any other system of betting created and regulated by the rules of the Insular Racing' Commission.” (§29 Act of 1941). The income thus obtained is invested or spent, not as the Racing Commission may determine and wish, but in the manner expressly provided by the Legislature in §31 of the Act.3 A mere reading of this Section shows that although the funds of the Racing Commission are derived from the bets placed in the race tracks, said body, as a dependency of the' government, may invest them only for the purposes expressly specified by the Legislature, and in certain eases it even needs the approval of the Governor of Puerto Rico. Such being the case, said funds may not be considered, as appellant urges, as private [467]*467funds of the Eaeing Commission to the inversion of which the prohibition contained in §177 of the Political Code, supra, and the provision of paragraph 13 of §34 of the Organic Act to the effect that no law “will permit any officer or employee to receive compensation for more than one office or employment,” may not be applied. In the case of López v. Martorell, supra, it was held that this prohibition of the Organic Act was applicable even to those cases in which the offices are compatible — as appellant contends that his two offices were.

The fact that the Legislature in the year 1943 approved a law4 amending §15 of the Eaeing Law to the effect that the payment of professional fees to a veterinarian appointed by the Insular Eaeing Commission, when said veterinarian likewise renders services to the Government of Puerto Eico, will not be subject to the prohibition contained in §177 of the Political Code, tends to demonstrate'that the Legislature considered that said amendment was necessary to exclude a case like the one now before us from the effects of said prohibition. Assuming, without deciding, that said amendment is valid notwithstanding the prohibition contained in § 34 of the Organic Act it is obvious that said amendment may not be made retroactive to cover appellant’s case, because the Legislature did not provide it expressly. Section 3 Civil Code.

The judgment appealed from must be affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)
63 P.R. 463, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/baiz-v-insular-racing-commission-prsupreme-1944.