Baise v. Puckett

2024 Ohio 508

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: February 12, 2024
• Docket: CA2023-05-008
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Baise v. Puckett, 2024-Ohio-508.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

CLINTON COUNTY

TRAVIS BAISE dba T&T RESIDENTIAL : CONSTRUCTION, : CASE NO. CA2023-05-008 Appellee, : OPINION 2/12/2024 - vs - :

: DAVID PUCKETT, et al., : Appellants.

APPEAL FROM CLINTON COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. CVH 20210111

Hoover Law Firm, LLC, and Phillip D. Hoover, for appellee.

Miller, Westwood & Brush, LLP, and Michael B. Miller, for appellants.

HENDRICKSON, P.J.

{¶ 1} Defendants, David and Cantessa Puckett (the "Pucketts"), appeal the April

11, 2023 Judgment Entry and Decision of the Clinton County Court of Common Pleas in

favor of Plaintiff, Travis Baise, dba T&T Residential Construction ("T&T").

I. Factual Background

{¶ 2} The facts of this case are relatively simple for the purposes of this appeal.

In 2020, T&T went to the Pucketts' home to make a quote for roofing work. T&T provided Clinton CA2023-05-008

a written quote dated April 30, 2020 to install a new roof on the house and detached

garage, to replace fascia, gutters and downspouts on the house and garage, and to

replace a portion of siding on the garage. T&T provided a second written quote the same

day for removing and replacing all fascia and "freeze metal" gutters on the house and for

installing shutters and posts at the house. Each quote stated that 30% of the total would

be paid up front and the final 70% paid upon completion. Additionally, each quote

prominently contained an "Acceptance of Proposal" box, but neither were signed nor

dated by the Pucketts. Nonetheless, the Pucketts paid T&T $6,815 on May 4, 2020. The

receipt for that payment states it is for "30% prepayment on $22,717.00" for "Roof, Soffit,

Gutters, Post." Notably, $22,717.00 is the sum of the costs provided in the two quotes.

{¶ 3} Upon beginning the work, T&T notified the Pucketts that the original shingle

they had selected for the roof was not available. The Pucketts then selected a different

shingle for their roof. After completing just the roof, T&T submitted a bill to the Pucketts

for the balance due on the roof and six sheets of oriented strand board on Sept 2, 2020.

The Pucketts took issue with the invoice for two reasons: the price did not match the

quotes, and they believed that payment would not be due until all items on both quotes

were completed. A dispute also developed as to whose responsibility it was to

communicate with the Pucketts' insurance company to receive money for covered work.

{¶ 4} Communication between the parties subsequently broke down and the

Pucketts told T&T to not return. Ultimately, the remainder of the work listed in the two

quotes was not completed. The Pucketts later complained that they did not like the color

of the shingles, that some shingles on the completed roof were lifting, that there was a rut

in the yard, and that two shrubs were damaged from the work done by T&T. T&T received

no money from the Pucketts other than the $6,815 paid on May 4, 2020.

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II. Procedural Posture

{¶ 5} T&T filed a complaint against the Pucketts setting forth three causes of

action: (1) breach of contract; (2) money had and received; and (3) fraud. For the breach

of contract claim, T&T alleged that it and the Pucketts "entered [into] a contract whereby

[T&T] agreed to complete roof replacement for the sum of $22,717.00 * * * Per the parties'

agreement, [the Pucketts] were to remit 30% of the sum as a downpayment and satisfy

the remaining 70% upon completion of the roof, facia and gutter." T&T claimed the

Pucketts breached their "written agreement" and sought $11,400 in compensatory

damages for the completed work as well as compensatory and punitive damages for

fraud, attorneys' fees, and costs.

{¶ 6} The Pucketts filed five counterclaims: (1) breach of contract; (2) Consumer

Sales Practices Act ("CSPA") violations; (3) negligence; (4) promissory estoppel; and (5)

unjust enrichment. The Pucketts sought compensatory damages, $5,000 in noneconomic

damages, attorney fees for the CSPA violations, $50,000 in punitive damages, and costs.

{¶ 7} The matter proceeded to a bench trial on January 31, 2023. On April 11,

2023, the trial court issued its decision and ruled on several key issues that are relevant

for this appeal: (1) the two quotes and the parties' actions operated as an implied contract,

not an express one; (2) T&T "did partially perform the agreement and completed

installation of the roof" and is entitled to recover for that work; (3) the cost of the roof

totaled $16,257.00; (4) the Pucketts originally paid $6,815.00; and (5) there were no

issues with the installation of the roof other than T&T damaged shrubbery at the home.

The court awarded $9,442.00, plus court costs on T&T's breach of contract claim as well

as $1,500 to the Pucketts on their negligence claim for the damaged shrubbery.

III. Discussion

{¶ 8} The Pucketts now appeal and raise a single assignment of error for our

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review:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND THE DECISION WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE TO FIND THAT A BREACH OF CONTRACT OCCURRED BASED ON THE CAUSES OF ACTION PLED BY PLAINTIFF.

{¶ 9} The Pucketts contend the trial court's judgment was against the manifest

weight of the evidence because T&T's complaint asserted a claim for breach of express

contract and not for unjust enrichment, contract implied in fact, contract implied in law or

quantum meriut. As a result, the Pucketts argue the trial court found something that T&T

neither asserted nor gave notice in his pleadings as a pursued cause of action.

A. Standard of Review

{¶ 10} A review of the manifest weight of the evidence is the same in criminal and

civil cases. Smith-Knabb v. Vesper, 12th Dist. No. CA2022-06-044, 2023-Ohio-259, ¶

16. A manifest weight of the evidence determination must examine "the inclination of the

greater amount of credible evidence, offered at a trial, to support one side of the issue

rather than the other." State v. Barnett, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2011-09-177, 2012-Ohio-

2372, ¶ 14. During this examination, the appellate court will inspect the entire record but

must keep in mind that because testimony and evidence were presented directly to a

judge or jury, the trier of fact was in the best position to evaluate witness credibility and

the weight of the evidence. State v. Maloney, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2022-07-069, 2023-

Ohio-2711; Id. at ¶ 14-15. Ultimately, a judgment will be overturned only where there has

been "a manifest miscarriage of justice" and the evidence "weighs heavily in favor of" a

different result. Barnett, 2012-Ohio-2372, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380,

387 (1997).

B. Applicable Law

{¶ 11} There are three types of contracts under Ohio law: (1) express contracts;

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(2) implied in fact contracts; and (3) implied in law contracts. Sterling Constr., Inc. v.

Alkire, 12th Dist. Madison No. CA2013-08-028, 2014-Ohio-2897, ¶ 23, citing JS

Productions, Inc. v. G129, L.L.C., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2011-02-029, 2011-Ohio-4715,

¶ 15. To create an express contract, there must be an offer and acceptance of written

terms. Id.

{¶ 12} With an implied in fact contract, however, a "meeting of the minds * * * is

shown by the surrounding circumstances which made it inferable that the contract exists

as a matter of tacit understanding." Sterling Constr., Inc. v. Alkire, 12th Dist. Madison No.

CA2013-08-028, 2014-Ohio-2897, ¶ 23. Contracts implied in fact are often found where

services and materials are provided by one party to another, "under such circumstances

that the party to be charged knew or should have known that the services were given with

the expectation of being paid on the basis of their reasonable worth." Id., citing Terex

Corp. v. Grim Welding Co., 58 Ohio App.3d 80, 82, (9th Dist.1989).

{¶ 13} With an implied in law contract "there is no meeting of the minds, but civil

liability arises out of the obligation cast by law upon a person in receipt of benefits which

he is not justly entitled to retain and for which he may be made to respond to another in

an action in the nature of assumpsit." JS Productions, Inc., 2011-Ohio-4715 at ¶ 15.

{¶ 14} Under Ohio Civ. R. 8(A), pleadings are required to contain "(1) a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the party is entitled to relief, and (2) a demand

for judgment for the relief to which the party claims to be entitled." As a result, "a party is

not required to plead operative facts with particularity" if sufficient notice of the claim to

relief is given. Conaway v. Mt. Orab, 12th Dist. Brown No. CA2021-04-005, 2021-Ohio-

4041, ¶ 18, citing Adena at Miami Bluffs Condominium Owners' Assn., Inc. v. R. Hugh

Woodward, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2020-08-044, 2021-Ohio-3872, ¶ 18.

{¶ 15} Stated differently, a complaint "must contain either direct allegations on

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every material point necessary to sustain a recovery on any legal theory, 'or contain

allegations from which an inference fairly may be drawn that evidence on these material

points will be introduced at trial.'" Klan v. Med. Radiologists, Inc., 12th Dist. Warren No.

CA2014-01-007, 2014-Ohio-2344, ¶ 13, quoting Sexton v. Mason, 12th Dist. Warren No.

CA2006-02-026, 2007-Ohio-38, ¶ 25. To that effect, Ohio courts construe complaints

liberally "to serve the substantive merits of the action" and "to do substantial justice."

State of Ohio ex. rel. Solid Rock Ministries Internatl., et al., v. City of Monroe, 12th Dist.

Warren No. CA2021-04-035, 2022-Ohio-431, ¶ 17, citing MacDonald v. Bernard, 1 Ohio

St.3d 85, 86, fn. 1; Ohio Civ. R. 8(F).

C. Analysis

{¶ 16} The trial court correctly found there was no express contract between the

parties. The two April 30, 2020 quotes that were the subject of the trial were clearly not

accepted by the Pucketts so as to create an express contract because the "Acceptance

of Proposal" box in each was not signed and dated. Nonetheless, the parties agree that

the Pucketts made a partial payment to T&T to begin work on the home and that T&T

completed the roofing portion of the quotes and otherwise furnished materials to the

Pucketts' home. At this point, the parties' actions implied that a contract between them

existed, even if there was no express writing signed by each party.

{¶ 17} We disagree, however, with the trial court's conclusion that "it is clear that

the parties did not have a meeting of the minds as to when payment was due." The

parties agree that the Pucketts paid T&T $6,815.00 on May 4, 2020. The receipt for that

payment states it is for "30% prepayment on $22,717.00" for "Roof, Soffit, Gutters, Post."

As stated previously, $22,717.00 is the sum of the costs provided in the two quotes. In

addition, each quote provided from T&T to the Pucketts stated that 30% would be put

down with the remaining 70% paid upon completion. Thus, the surrounding

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circumstances demonstrate it was the parties' tacit understanding that 30% would be

prepaid for all projects encompassed by the two quotes, with the final 70% due after all

work was completed.

{¶ 18} Nonetheless, we find no error in the trial court's award of $9,442.00 to T&T.

On appeal, the Pucketts only challenge whether the trial court could find an implied

contract existed between the parties. The Pucketts' appeal does not take issue with the

trial court's findings that the Pucketts received a new roof, that the roof cost $9,442.00

more than what the Pucketts had already paid T&T, that it was installed in a workmanlike

manner, or any other finding on the parties' causes of action. While T&T may have

requested payment before it was entitled to it, and that dispute, in part, resulted in the

cessation of T&T's work at the Pucketts' home, T&T is entitled to payment for the work it

did complete because an implied contract existed between them.

{¶ 19} Additionally, we are unconvinced by the Pucketts' argument that T&T is

prevented from recovering against them at trial because T&T did not specifically allege

that they breached an implied contract. T&T's complaint alleged a "breach of contract."

As discussed above, T&T was ultimately incorrect in its assertion that it had a written

contract with the Pucketts. However, the complaint still clearly put the Pucketts on notice

of the nature of the action and T&T's claim to relief of money damages for the roofing

work completed in 2020. The record, and particularly the trial transcript, reflects that the

parties understood that their claims and defenses turned on the quotes and the actions

taken based off the quotes.

{¶ 20} In conclusion, the trial court's decision that the Pucketts should pay T&T for

the work completed before their relationship broke down does not represent a manifest

miscarriage of justice. Further, the trial court's decision construed T&T's complaint

liberally, served the substantive merits of the action, and accomplished substantial justice

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between the parties.

{¶ 21} Judgment affirmed.

PIPER and BYRNE, JJ., concur.

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