Baird & Warner Residential Sales, Inc. v. RXHST Naperville, LLC f/k/a CAHST Naperville, LLC

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedJuly 21, 2025
Docket1:23-cv-16113
StatusUnknown

This text of Baird & Warner Residential Sales, Inc. v. RXHST Naperville, LLC f/k/a CAHST Naperville, LLC (Baird & Warner Residential Sales, Inc. v. RXHST Naperville, LLC f/k/a CAHST Naperville, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Baird & Warner Residential Sales, Inc. v. RXHST Naperville, LLC f/k/a CAHST Naperville, LLC, (N.D. Ill. 2025).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

BAIRD & WARNER RESIDENTIAL SALES, INC.,

Plaintiff / Counter-Defendant, Case No. 23-cv-16113

v. Judge Mary M. Rowland

RXHST NAPERVILLE, LLC f/k/a/ CAHST NAPERVILLE, LLC,

Defendant / Counter-Plaintiff / Cross- Plaintiff.

v.

BAIRD & WARNER REAL ESTATE, INC.,

Cross-Defendant

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant Baird & Warner Residential Sales, Inc. (“Plaintiff” or “Tenant”) instituted this lawsuit against Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff RXHST Naperville, LLC (“Defendant” or “Landlord”) seeking a declaratory judgment that Tenant had the right to terminate the parties’ lease agreement. Landlord brings counterclaims alleging that Tenant breached or anticipatorily repudiated the lease and seeking damages. Tenant moves for partial summary judgment on Landlord’s counterclaims, arguing that Landlord cannot recover any damages as a matter of law. For the reasons stated below, Tenant’s motion for partial summary judgment [36] is denied. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD Summary judgment is proper where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The substantive law controls which facts are material. Id. After a “properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse party ‘must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue

for trial.’” Id. at 250 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The Court “consider[s] all of the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and [ ] draw[s] all reasonable inferences from that evidence in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.” Logan v. City of Chicago, 4 F.4th 529, 536 (7th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted). The Court “must refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing evidence.” Viamedia, Inc. v. Comcast Corp., 951 F.3d 429, 467 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). In ruling

on summary judgment, the Court gives the non-moving party “the benefit of reasonable inferences from the evidence, but not speculative inferences in [its] favor.” White v. City of Chicago, 829 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted). “The controlling question is whether a reasonable trier of fact could find in favor of the non-moving party on the evidence submitted in support of and opposition to the motion for summary judgment.” Id. BACKGROUND1 Tenant is a real estate brokerage company. [38] at ¶ 5. Landlord is a real estate investment trust that owns, operates, manages, and develops commercial real estate.

[44] at ¶ 1. Landlord owned the property located at 1528 Aurora Avenue in Naperville Illinois (the “Premises”). Id. at ¶ 2. Prior to 2022, the Premises was undeveloped. Id. at ¶ 3. In June 2022, Tenant and Landlord entered into a 12-year Lease Agreement (the “Lease”) for the Premises. [38] at ¶ 5; [44] at ¶ 8. Both Landlord and Tenant were represented by counsel during the negotiations for the Lease. [44] at ¶ 5. The Lease

required Landlord to construct the shell of the building on the Premises at Landlord’s own expense. [44] at ¶¶ 6, 10. The Lease provided that the Lease Commencement Date would be reached upon substantial completion of the Landlord’s work constructing the shell of the building and delivery of the Premises to Tenant. [38] at ¶ 6; [44] at ¶ 11. The Lease defined substantial completion as when Landlord’s architect or contractor determined that Landlord’s work was complete in accordance with the terms set forth in the Lease, and Tenant would be able to commence

construction on the interior of the building. [38] at ¶ 9. After the Lease Commencement Date, the Lease provides for a 180-day Deferred Rent Period. [38] at ¶ 8; [44] at ¶ 13. The Rent Commencement Date would be the first day after the Deferred Rent Period ends. [38] at ¶ 7; [44] at ¶ 15.

1 These facts are taken from Plaintiff’s statement of facts [38] and Defendant’s statement of additional facts [44] and are undisputed unless otherwise noted. The Lease provides for an option for Tenant to terminate the Lease under certain circumstances: Subject to extension for Unforeseen Causes, in the event the Lease Commencement Date has not occurred by July 1, 2023, Tenant shall have the option to terminate this Lease by providing Landlord with written notice, whereupon this Lease shall terminate and neither party shall have any further obligations with respect to the Lease.

[38] at ¶ 10; [44] at ¶ 16; [44-1], Ex. 3 at ¶ 4. The Lease defines “Unforeseen Causes” as causes or events beyond the reasonable control of Landlord, including delays caused by supply chain issues. [38] at ¶ 11; [44] at ¶ 19. The Lease also provides Landlord with remedies in the event of Tenant’s default. [38] at ¶ 24. The Lease provides that upon Tenant’s default, Landlord may: in addition to all other rights and remedies at law or in equity: Terminate this Lease and Tenant’s right of possession of the Premises, and recover all damages to which Landlord is entitled herein, at law and in equity, specifically including, without limitation, all Landlord’s expenses of reletting (including repairs, legal fees and brokerage commissions), plus Rent accelerated to the end of the Term as liquidated damages;

[38] at ¶¶ 24-25; [44-1], Ex. 3 at ¶ 23(a) (the “Accelerated Rent Clause”). Alternatively, the Lease provides that Landlord may “[t]erminate Tenant's right of possession of the Premises without terminating this Lease,” in which case Landlord would be permitted, but not obligated, to re-let the Premises. [38] at ¶ 26; [44-1], Ex. 3 at ¶ 23(b) (the “Termination of Possession Clause”). During Landlord’s work to construct the building, delivery of an electrical panel was severely delayed due to global supply chain issues. [44] at ¶¶ 23-24. Landlord therefore did not substantially complete its work and the Lease Commencement Date did not occur by July 1, 2023. [38] at ¶¶ 12-13; [44] at ¶¶ 21- 24. Landlord ultimately incurred over $5 million in costs to construct the building on the Premises pursuant to the Lease. [44] at ¶ 20.

On September 4, 2023, Tenant provided written notice that it terminated the Lease. [38] at ¶ 18. Landlord disputed that Tenant had the right to terminate the Lease. Id. Tenant initiated this lawsuit on September 20, 2023, seeking a declaration that Tenant had the right to terminate the Lease. Id. at ¶ 19. Landlord filed counterclaims on November 20, 2023, alleging that Tenant breached the lease or, in the alternative, that Tenant anticipatorily repudiated the lease. Id. at ¶ 21; [30] at

¶¶ 73-84. Landlord seeks accelerated rent as liquidated damages. [38] at ¶ 23. Landlord substantially completed work on the building on December 15, 2023, after which Landlord took steps to re-let the Premises. [38] at ¶ 30; [44] at ¶¶ 30-31.

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Bluebook (online)
Baird & Warner Residential Sales, Inc. v. RXHST Naperville, LLC f/k/a CAHST Naperville, LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/baird-warner-residential-sales-inc-v-rxhst-naperville-llc-fka-cahst-ilnd-2025.