Bain v. Fry

89 N.W.2d 485, 352 Mich. 299, 1958 Mich. LEXIS 444
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedApril 14, 1958
DocketDocket 53, Calendar 47,138
StatusPublished
Cited by23 cases

This text of 89 N.W.2d 485 (Bain v. Fry) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bain v. Fry, 89 N.W.2d 485, 352 Mich. 299, 1958 Mich. LEXIS 444 (Mich. 1958).

Opinion

Kavanagh, J.

On July 8,1955, plaintiffs filed their bill of complaint in the Oakland county circuit court against defendants Carl O. Fry and the city of Pontiac. They alleged ownership of lot 61 of assessor’s plat No. 122 of said city; that said lot was on the corner of Oakland avenue and Myrtle drive. Plaintiffs further alleged that they had occupied the premises since about August, 1942, during which time Myrtle drive had been used as a public alley openly and continuously until defendant Carl 0. Fry, who owned and occupied the lot directly north of plain *301 tiffs’ lot, across Myrtle drive, a short time before the filing; of the bill of complaint, used a portion of Myrtle drive for parking his automobile thereon so that plaintiffs were unable to have access from Myrtle drive to the rear of their lot; that defendant Carl 0. Fry had caused a fence to be constructed along the southeasterly boundary of Myrtle drive in such a fashion as to constitute an obstruction of plaintiffs’ access to Myrtle drive, causing them damages in connection with their property rights in said lot 61. Plaintiffs further alleged that the city of Pontiac was named defendant because of the public interest in Myrtle drive as a part of its street and highway system. It was also alleged that certain city officials had declined to assume the responsibility of keeping Myrtle drive open as a public alley.

Subsequently defendant Roy and wife and defendant Booth and wife sought and were granted the right to intervene as party defendants on the theory that their property rights were involved. They alleged that no lot owner on the plaintiffs’ side of the alley had access to Myrtle drive from their properties for a period of 30 years or more. Intervening defendant A. J. Roy further alleged that he is the owner of lot 47 of assessor’s plat No. 122 and that the lot includes Myrtle drive for its entire width of 15 feet.

Intervening defendants moved to dissolve the temporary injunction granted to plaintiffs and asked that a counterinjunction be granted defendants restraining plaintiffs from using Myrtle drive as a means of ingress to and egress from their properties. The motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ temporary injunction was granted, as was the request for a counter-injunction.

Defendants all allege that Myrtle drive was a private drive for the use and benefit of the persons owning lots on the northwest side of Myrtle drive; that *302 the private drive was never accepted by the city of Pontiac; that the drive was never offered to said city so that a dedication could have taken place. They denied that any use by the public or maintenance of the premises by public authorities had been made that would constitute a common-law dedication.

Plaintiffs claim that the public at large had used Myrtle drive; that it had been maintained by the city of Pontiac; that through the recording and approving of assessor’s' plat No. 122 city officials as well as county officials had participated in an acceptance of the dedication of Myrtle drive for public use by the city assessor prior to the plat’s recording in 1933, indorsing upon the plat the following:

“and that the streets and alleys as shown on said plat are now being used for such purposes.”

The circuit court at the conclusion of the trial concluded that no dedication—statutory, * common law or otherwise—had been shown by plaintiffs with reference to Myrtle drive; that it was a private drive; that plaintiffs had no right to use said drive nor any property rights in and to the easement created by Myrtle drive, and permanently enjoined plaintiffs from using said drive.

Plaintiffs appeal to this Court, contending that the record shows that assessor’s plat No. 122 was recorded in the Oakland county register of deeds office on April'20, 1933; that it portrays Myrtle drive as a 15-foot drive or alley; that the city of Pontiac erected street signs at the intersection of Myrtle drive with Oakland avenue and Howard street, which are standard signs similar to those erected at other streets in the city; that none of the land described as Myrtle drive has been assessed for taxation; that linder the statutes of the State of Michigan, roads *303 used as highways for 10 years or more are deemed public highways whether any record or other proof exists that they were ever established as highways or not. Plaintiffs contend that testimony indicates such use for more than the statutory time, and that a dedication for the use of the public has been created with reference to Myrtle drive.

It appears to be an undisputed fact that witness Eva L. Mosher and her deceased husband were the owners of a small tract of land between Oakland avenue and Howard street in the city of Pontiac. Several years before this action was instituted the said Moshers subdivided it into several building sites. A private drive 15 feet in width extending from Oakland avemie to Howard street provided the only means of access to several of the lots. This private drive became known as Myrtle drive. The area embraced in the tract for many years has been fenced off from adjoining lands. The. plaintiffs, owners of a parcel of adjoining land, now seek a removal of the fence barrier so as to have ingress and egress to Myrtle drive for the purpose of driving to and from a garage they are constructing at the rear of their lot. The drive is not essential as a means of access as they enjoy with an adjacent owner the benefit of a mutual drive, which could permit access to the garage from another direction. Mrs. Mosher testified that along the southeasterly line of the driveway, which was the line of their property, was erected a fence for the purpose of maintaining the drive as a private one.

An examination of this record discloses ample testimony upon which the trial court was justified in basing a finding that neither a statutory nor common-law dedication had been proven. The testimony of Mrs. Mosher that it was the intention of her and her husband at the time the easement was created to to make it a private drive and not to dedicate it for *304 the public use is consistent with the position of tbe city of Pontiac officials that it had never been accepted by the city, that it had not been maintained by the city, and that it was not a part of the city’s system of streets, alleys and highways.

Mrs. Mosher further testified that she and her husband graveled the private drive off and on throughout the years. She also testified that they had caused private drive signs to be installed at both the Oakland avenue and Howard street entrances and through the years maintained them in keeping with their intention to indicate to the public that it was to remain a private drive.

Plaintiff Ivan Bain himself testified that when Oakland avenue was being paved he sought permission of the Moshers to use Myrtle drive on a temporary basis. He also stated that prior to building a fence along the south side of Myrtle drive across the north portion of his lot, where originally a steel cable was installed, he sought permission of the Moshers to remove the steel cable and replace it with a fence, as he testified: “because it was tearing our clothes and cutting the children’s hands.”

Witness A. J.

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Bluebook (online)
89 N.W.2d 485, 352 Mich. 299, 1958 Mich. LEXIS 444, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bain-v-fry-mich-1958.