Bailey v. State of Nevada

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: November 19, 2019
• Docket: 2:16-cv-02515
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 6 * * *

7 ANTHONY BAILEY, Case No. 2:16-CV-2515 JCM (EJY)

8 Plaintiff(s), ORDER

9 v.

10 STATE OF NEVADA, et al.,

11 Defendant(s).

12 13 Presently before the court is the matter of Bailey v. State of Nevada et al., case number 14 2:16-cv-02515-JCM-EJY. 15 I. Background 16 The instant action arises from alleged violations of pro se plaintiff Anthony Bailey’s 17 (“plaintiff”) civil rights. Plaintiff complains that his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights 18 have been violated because the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (“LVMPD”) has 19 been allegedly fabricating and falsifying evidence, and state court officials have declined to enter 20 default judgment against LVMPD in plaintiff’s state court proceedings. 21 Magistrate Judge Foley issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”) on August 30, 22 2017, which the court adopted on April 12, 2018, over plaintiff’s objection. (ECF Nos. 5; 10; 23 12). The court gave plaintiff leave to amend his claims against defendants Whitney Welch and 24 Nancy Katafia, and plaintiff filed an amended complaint on November 17, 2017. (ECF No. 11). 25 II. Legal Standard 26 Federal courts must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner 27 seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss 1 any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 2 seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 3 1915A(b)(1), (2). In addition to those grounds for dismissal, the PLRA requires a federal court 4 to dismiss a prisoner’s claims “if the allegation of poverty is untrue.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 5 Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted is 6 provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and the Court applies the same 7 standard under Section 1915(e)(2) when reviewing the adequacy of a complaint or amended 8 complaint. Review under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling on a question of law. 9 See Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 2000). 10 A court may dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief 11 can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A properly pled complaint must provide “[a] short 12 and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 13 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While Rule 8 does not 14 require detailed factual allegations, it demands “more than labels and conclusions” or a 15 “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 16 (2009) (citation omitted). 17 “Factual allegations must be enough to rise above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 18 U.S. at 555. Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 19 matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation 20 omitted). 21 In Iqbal, the Supreme Court clarified the two-step approach district courts are to apply 22 when considering motions to dismiss. First, the court must accept as true all well-pled factual 23 allegations in the complaint; however, legal conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of 24 truth. Id. at 678-79. Mere recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported only by 25 conclusory statements, do not suffice. Id. 26 Second, the court must consider whether the factual allegations in the complaint allege a 27 plausible claim for relief. Id. at 679. A claim is facially plausible when plaintiff’s complaint 28 1 alleges facts that allow the court to draw a reasonable inference that defendant is liable for the 2 alleged misconduct. Id. at 678. 3 Where the complaint does not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of 4 misconduct, the complaint has “alleged—but it has not shown—that the pleader is entitled to 5 relief.” Id. at 679. When the allegations in a complaint have not crossed the line from 6 conceivable to plausible, plaintiff’s claim must be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 7 All or part of a complaint filed by a prisoner may be dismissed sua sponte if the 8 prisoner’s claims lack an arguable basis either in law or in fact. This includes claims based on 9 legal conclusions that are untenable (e.g. claims against defendants who are immune from suit or 10 claims of infringement of a legal interest which clearly does not exist), as well as claims based 11 on fanciful factual allegations (e.g. fantastic or delusional scenarios). See Neitzke v. Williams, 12 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989); see also McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991). 13 III. Discussion 14 First, the court acknowledges that petitioner filed this action pro se. “A document filed 15 pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be 16 held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 17 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). But “[t]he right of self- 18 representation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom. Neither is it a license not to 19 comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Faretta v. Cal., 422 U.S. 806, 20 834 (1975); see also United States v. Merrill, 746 F.2d 458, 465 (9th Cir. 1984) (“A pro se 21 defendant is subject to the same rules of procedure and evidence as defendants who are 22 represented by counsel.”). Indeed, “pro se litigants in an ordinary civil case should not be 23 treated more favorably than parties with attorneys of record.” Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 24 1364 (9th Cir. 1986). 25 The court adopted Magistrate Judge Foley’s R&R, which explained why the doctrines of 26 judicial immunity, prosecutorial immunity, and quasi-judicial immunity precluded many of 27 plaintiff’s claims. (See ECF No. 5). The R&R also provided plaintiff with the blueprint for 28 1 amending his possibly-viable claims. As it pertains to defendant Welch, Magistrate Judge Foley 2 explained: 3 First, [p]laintiff fails to state that [d]efendant Welch’s actions were the result of a government policy. In addition, for purposes of § 4 1983, [d]efendant is a private actor and is not deemed a government official acting under the color of state law and 5 [p]laintiff has not argued otherwise. As a result, [p]laintiff has not alleged that his constitutional rights were violated by a person 6 acting under the color of state law and has therefore failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983. However, 7 the [c]ourt cannot state with certainty that [p]laintiff could never state a proper claim against [d]efendant Welch. 8 9 Id. at 6. Next, regarding defendant Katafia, Magistrate Judge Foley’s R&R stated as follows: 10 Here, [p]laintiff seeks to sue Nancy Katafia, the state tort claims manager for allegedly circumventing the issues raised in 11 [p]laintiff’s state court complaint. Because [d]efendant Katafia is a state official, [p]laintiff’s official-capacity claims are barred 12 because she is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983. Plaintiff has also failed to set forth sufficient facts to establish that [d]efendant 13 Katafia violated his constitutional rights so that she may be liable in her personal capacity. Therefore, the [c]ourt will recommend 14 dismissal of [p]laintiff’s official-capacity claims against [d]efendant Katafia for failure to state a claim upon which relief 15 may be granted. 16 Id. at 7. Magistrate Judge Foley also admonished plaintiff to “demonstrate that the alleged 17 constitutional violations committed by Defendants Welch and Katafia were committed separate 18 and apart from the unfavorable rulings Plaintiff received in his state court case(s)” in order to 19 avoid having his case barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Id. at 7–8. 20 With one unavailing exception, plaintiff failed to address the deficiencies in his 21 complaint. Plaintiff’s amended complaint does not allege that Welch was acting under state law, 22 nor does it assert a claim against Welch as a private citizen. (See ECF No. 11). Plaintiff’s 23 amended complaint also fails to allege why Katafia can be held liable in her personal capacity. 24 Id. Instead, plaintiff continues to take issue with the disposition of his state court action(s) and 25 the inaction of certain state officials regarding his allegations of misconduct by the LVMPD. 26 Plaintiff’s amended complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim. 27 The only attempt plaintiff made to address the deficiencies in his original complaint was 28 his decision to include the following note in his amended complaint: 1 Note: This litigation is based upon the State of Nevada, Attorney General’s Office fact-findings, not the decisions of the state court, 2 although the [d]efendant Welch’s conduct stems from the sworn facts contained in paragraphs 1 through 9 stated up and above. 3 4 (ECF No. 11 at 4(b)1). Yet, contrary to plaintiff’s “note,” his prayer for relief asks this court to 5 order the State of Nevada “by way of its subsidiary municipal corporations (courts and/or 6 Attorney General’s Office and/or its independent hired attorneys” to “declare default judgment 7 against LVMPD sheriff, its forensic lab, and its subordinates . . . in the amount of 8 $10,000,000.00 dollars U.S. currency.”2 Id. at 9. 9 Plaintiff’s amended complaint once again runs afoul of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, 10 which bars “state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered 11 before the district court proceedings commenced” from asking district courts to review and reject 12 those judgments. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283–84 (2005). 13 Absent express statutory authorization, only the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to reverse or 14 modify a state court judgment. See Henrichs v. Valley View Development, 474 F.3d 609, 614 15 (9th Cir. 2007). 16 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars plaintiff’s complaint entirely. Plaintiff was given an 17 opportunity to show the court that his claim did not amount to a collateral review of a state court 18 decision. Instead, plaintiff reaffirmed the fact that his complaint stems solely from the state 19 court’s refusal to enter default judgment against LVMPD. As a result, plaintiff’s complaint is 20 dismissed with prejudice. 21 IV. Conclusion 22 Accordingly, 23 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that plaintiff’s complaint 24 against defendants Welch and Katafia be, and the same hereby is, DISMISSED with prejudice. 25 26 1 For the sake of clarity, the will use plaintiff’s page numbering system when referring to his amended complaint. 27 2 The court also notes that plaintiff attempted to circumvent Eleventh Amendment 28 sovereign immunity by characterizing his requested relief as injunctive relief despite his prayer for $10 million. 1 The clerk is instructed to enter judgment and close the case accordingly. 2 DATED November 19, 2019, 3 ©. Mahan 4 UNITED)STATES DISTRICTJUDGE——~C~— 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

es C. Mahan District Judge -6-