Bailey v. Shasta Union High School District

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: November 19, 2024
• Docket: 2:23-cv-01750
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 | Maril Bailey, No. 2:23-cev-01750-KJM-DMC 12 Plaintiff, ORDER 13 v. 14 Shasta Union High School District, et al., 1S Defendants. 16 17 As explained in this order, plaintiff Maril Bailey’s complaint largely satisfies the 18 | requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) and thus withstands the pending Rule 12 19 | motions to dismiss and strike for the most part. There are a few gaps in Bailey’s allegations, but 20 | these could potentially be filled by the addition of factual allegations in an amended complaint, so 21 | the motions to dismiss and strike are granted in part with leave to amend. 22 | I. BACKGROUND 23 For purposes of this motion, the court assumes the following allegations are true. See 24 | Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). 25 Several years ago, when Maril Bailey was fifteen years old, she was a student at Foothill 26 | High School in Palo Cedro, California. First Am. Compl. 5-6, ECF No. 13. One day, another 27 | student at the school, Joseph Hornbeck, caught her as she exited the women’s restroom, restrained 28 | her, overpowered her, and sexually assaulted her, causing her severe pain. /d. 9 19-21. She

1 tried to stop him by telling him a security camera would record what he was doing, but he told her 2 no cameras were pointed in their direction. Id. ¶ 21. Bailey tried to use the bathroom again later 3 that day, but Hornbeck again forced himself upon her. Id. ¶ 23. 4 Bailey reported the assaults to the school’s Vice Principal, Lauren Stroud. Id. ¶¶ 7, 25– 5 26. Within a day or so, the school decided not to take any disciplinary or corrective action. See 6 id. ¶ 27. In its assessment, there was no evidence to corroborate Bailey’s report, a “he said, she 7 said” situation. Id. Bailey believes the school “wholly failed to adequately investigate the 8 assaults.” Id. ¶ 28. She claims the school did not review any video from security cameras, did 9 not take any action to protect her in the future, did not report the assaults to authorities as required 10 by state law, and did not install security cameras where the assaults occurred. Id. ¶¶ 29–31. She 11 also believes Hornbeck sexually assaulted or harassed at least one other student near the same 12 restroom, and she believes at least one of these other students reported the assault to the school. 13 See id. ¶¶ 16–18. 14 After the assault, Hornbeck would stare at Bailey and wink at her, and he spread rumors 15 about her. Id. ¶ 32. She feared him. Id. ¶ 33. She felt betrayed and abandoned. Id. To make 16 matters worse, Stroud prevented Bailey from attending school activities, including the prom, on 17 account of her report. Id. ¶ 34. Hornbeck’s actions and the school’s inaction took a toll on 18 Bailey’s mental health, and she eventually withdrew from the school until Hornbeck graduated. 19 Id. ¶¶ 35–36. Even today she has continued to suffer from depression, anxiety, confusion, anger, 20 humiliation, suicidal thoughts and other symptoms as a result of the assault and the school’s 21 response. Id. ¶ 36. She twice attempted suicide and has sought extensive mental health 22 treatment. Id. 23 Bailey filed this action in 2023 against Hornbeck, Stroud, the school principal Steve 24 Abbott, the Shasta Union High School District, which encompasses the high school, and ten Doe 25 defendants.1 She asserts several claims. Defendants Stroud, Abbott and the district now move to 26 dismiss the following six claims under Rule 12(b)(6), see generally Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 21:

1 If defendants’ identities are unknown when the complaint is filed, plaintiffs have an 1  Bailey claims Stroud and Abbott deprived her of her constitutional rights in 2 violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (claims three and four). First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 60–74. 3  She claims all defendants interfered with her rights in violation of the California 4 Bane Civil Rights Act (claim six). Id. ¶¶ 85–90 (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1). 5  She claims all defendants are liable for intentionally inflicting emotional distress 6 upon her (claim nine). Id. ¶¶ 115–20. 7  She claims all defendants except Hornbeck negligently failed to protect her and 8 other students under the California Court of Appeal’s decision in Juarez v. Boy 9 Scouts of America (claim thirteen). Id. ¶¶ 146–48 (citing 81 Cal. App. 4th 377 10 (2000)). 11  She claims all defendants violated the California Ralph Civil Rights Act (claim 12 seventeen). Id. ¶¶ 167–73 (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 51.7). 13 Stroud also moves to strike Bailey’s request for punitive damages. See generally Mot. Strike, 14 ECF No. 15. Both motions are fully briefed. See generally Opp’n Dismiss, ECF No. 24; Opp’n 15 Strike, ECF No. 25; Reply Dismiss, ECF No. 27; Reply Strike, ECF No. 28. The court took the 16 matter under submission without hearing oral arguments. Min. Order, ECF No. 29. 17 II. DISCUSSION 18 A party may move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 19 granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In response, the court begins by assuming the complaint’s 20 factual allegations are true, but not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79 (citing Bell 21 Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The court then determines whether those 22 factual allegations “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief” under Federal Rule of Civil 23 Procedure 8. Id. at 679. This evaluation of plausibility is a context-specific task drawing on 24 “judicial experience and common sense.” Id.

1980). But the court will dismiss such unnamed defendants if discovery clearly would not uncover their identities or if the complaint would clearly be dismissed on other grounds. Id. The federal rules also provide for dismissing unnamed defendants that, absent good cause, are not served within 90 days of the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). 1 A. Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Claims 3 and 4) 2 Stroud, Abbott and the district first move to dismiss claims three and four, which Bailey 3 asserts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That section imposes liability on any person who subjects 4 another “to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution 5 and law,” but only if the first person acted “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 6 custom, or usage of any State.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Stroud and Abbott contend they cannot be 7 liable under this section because Bailey does not allege they were acting under color of state law. 8 See Mot. Dismiss at 5–7. Bailey alleges unambiguously, however, that both Stroud and Abbott 9 were public school administrators and were acting in that capacity at the time. See First Am. 10 Compl. ¶ 8. 11 Stroud and Abbott contend relatedly they were not acting under color of law inasmuch as 12 Bailey has sued them in their individual or personal capacities, as opposed to their official 13 capacities. See Mot. Dismiss at 7. But both personal-capacity and official-capacity claims can be 14 viable. “[O]fficial capacity suits ‘generally represent only another way of pleading an action 15 against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’ . . . Personal-capacity suits, on the other hand, 16 seek to impose individual liability upon a government officer for actions taken under color of 17 state law.” Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 18 165 (1985))). 19 The court denies the motion to dismiss claims three and four. 20 B. Bane Act (Claim 6) 21 Stroud, Abbott and the district next move to dismiss claim six, which Bailey asserts under 22 the California Tom Bane Civil Rights Act. The Bane Act imposes liability on any person who 23 “interferes by threat, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threat, intimidation, or 24 coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured by the 25 Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of 26 [California].” Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(b). 27 The district argues it cannot be directly liable under the Bane Act because it is a public 28 entity. See Mot. Dismiss at 8. Although the district may not be liable directly, public officials 1 may be liable under the Bane Act, and if so, their employer may be vicariously liable. See, e.g., 2 Burgess v. County San Diego, No. 21-616, 2021 WL 5810662, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2021) 3 (collecting authority and distinguishing theories of liability); see also Santos ex rel. Santos v. City 4 of Culver City, 228 F. App’x 655, 659 (9th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (reversing order granting 5 summary judgment to municipal defendant because defendant could be vicariously liable for 6 employees’ Bane Act violations). 7 Stroud, Abbott and the district also argue Bailey’s complaint lacks any allegations about 8 actual or attempted threats, intimidation or coercion. See Mot. Dismiss at 8. Bailey alleges, 9 however, that Stroud and other unidentified staff members retaliated against her after she reported 10 the assaults. First Am. Compl. ¶ 34. That allegation plausibly describes an attempt to coerce or 11 intimidate Bailey and thus to interfere with her rights, which supports her claim. 12 Finally, Stroud, Abbott and the district argue the complaint wrongly lumps them together 13 without explaining their roles in the alleged wrongdoing. See Mot. Dismiss at 8. The complaint 14 clearly explains Stroud’s role. See, e.g., First Am. Compl. ¶ 34 (“Plaintiff faced retaliation from 15 STROUD and other staff members for reporting her assault. STROUD prevented Plaintiff from 16 participating in school activities, such as prom.” (capitalization in original)). But the complaint 17 does not explain what role Abbott played, if any. 18 For these reasons, as to defendant Abbott, the court grants the motion to dismiss claim six 19 in part, with leave to amend. The court otherwise denies the motion to dismiss claim six. 20 C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Claim 9) 21 The district next argues it cannot be directly liable for intentional infliction of emotional 22 distress, as Bailey alleges in her ninth claim. See Mot. Dismiss at 9. But again, regardless of a 23 public entity’s direct liability, it may be vicariously liable for its employees’ torts. See, e.g., 24 Large v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., No. 08-02835, 2012 WL 3647455, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 25 2012) (denying motion to dismiss emotional distress claim against public university based on its 26 employee’s actions). 27 Stroud and Abbott contend they are immune from liability under Government Code 28 sections 820.2 and 822.2. See Mot. Dismiss at 9. Section 820.2 provides that public employees 1 acting within the scope of their employment are not liable for injuries resulting from acts or 2 omissions within their discretion. Section 822.2 provides similarly for injuries caused by public 3 employees’ misrepresentations absent “actual fraud, corruption or actual malice.” At this early 4 stage, the court does not consider evidence from outside the complaint. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 5 678–79; Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). No allegations show the 6 alleged injuries arose from actions within the individual defendants’ discretion or as a result of 7 misrepresentations short of actual fraud, corruption or actual malice. The defense cannot prevail 8 at this stage based on immunities under sections 820.2 or 822.2. 9 Finally as to this claim, Stroud, Abbott and the district argue the complaint lacks 10 allegations that could, if proven, show they acted outrageously and beyond all reasonable bounds 11 of decency. The court cannot conclude at this early stage that Stroud’s alleged actions fell short 12 of this line. A defendant’s quickly dismissing or ignoring plausible and specific allegations of 13 sexual harassment could support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See, e.g., 14 D.C. by & through Cabelka v. Cnty. of San Diego, 445 F. Supp. 3d 869, 901 (S.D. Cal. 2020). 15 The complaint does not explain, however, what actions Abbott took or failed to take. 16 For these reasons, the court grants the motion to dismiss claim nine in part, with leave to 17 amend only as to the claim against Abbott. 18 D. Failure to Warn, Train or Educate (Claim 13) 19 Bailey contends the district, Stroud and Abbott negligently failed to protect her and other 20 students from sexual assault. First Am. Compl. ¶ 147. To explain her theory of the defendants’ 21 negligence, Bailey cites the California Court of Appeal’s decision in Juarez v. Boy Scouts of 22 America. See id. (citing 81 Cal. App. 4th 377 (2000)). As the Court of Appeal put it several 23 years later, Juarez was about when a “special relationship” between a plaintiff and defendant can 24 show the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care. See Doe v. U.S. Youth Soccer Assn., Inc., 25 8 Cal. App. 5th 1118, 1129 (2017). “California courts have frequently recognized special 26 relationships between children and their adult caregivers that give rise to a duty to prevent harms 27 caused by the intentional or criminal conduct of third parties.” Id. When a defendant with a 28 special relationship is accused of “nonfeasance,” courts balance the factors listed in Rowland v. 1 Christian, to decide what duty the defendant is owed. See id. at 1128 (citing 69 Cal. 2d 108 2 (1968)). These factors include how foreseeable the harm was and how closely the plaintiff’s 3 injury is connected to the defendant’s conduct. See id. at 1128–29, 1131–39. 4 Stroud, Abbott and the district do not discuss or analyze these decisions or the relevant 5 factors. See Mot. Dismiss at 10–11; Reply Dismiss at 5. They simply assert Juarez is 6 inapplicable, the Court of Appeal’s decision in United States Soccer relieves them of liability, and 7 schools have no specific duty to educate their students. See, e.g., Mot. Dismiss at 10–11. These 8 simplistic arguments fall short of what is necessary to support a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Rios 9 v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 562 F. Supp. 3d 999, 1024 (E.D. Cal. 2021); Gallardo v. DiCarlo, 203 F. 10 Supp. 2d 1160, 1165 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 11 The court denies the motion to dismiss claim thirteen. 12 E. Ralph Act (Claim 17) 13 The California Ralph Civil Rights Act of 1976 protects “the right to be free from any 14 violence, or intimidation by threat of violence” because of several protected characteristics, 15 including sex. Cal. Civ. Code § 51.7(b)(1) (citing id. § 51(b)). Bailey alleges defendants 16 “intentionally subjected [her] to injury by exposing her to sexual assault and harassment at 17 school” because of her sex. First Am. Compl. ¶ 170. She alleges she was intimidated by their 18 “indifference toward the harmful effects that sexual assault and harassment would have on her 19 mental and physical health and safety.” Id. She does not allege, however, that any defendant 20 other than Hornbeck committed violence or threatened violence. 21 The court grants the motion to dismiss this claim against the district, Stroud and Abbott, 22 but with leave to amend if possible under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. 23 F. Punitive Damages 24 Finally, Stroud argues the complaint does not include allegations that could support 25 Bailey’s request for punitive damages against her. Mot. Strike at 5–6. Stroud moves to strike 26 that request under Rule 12(f). See id. A motion to strike under Rule 12(f) serves “to avoid the 27 expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with 28 those issues prior to trial.” SidneyVinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). 1 In ruling on a motion to strike, the court “may not resolve disputed and substantial factual or legal 2 issues.” Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi–Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010) (quotation 3 marks omitted). If a motion to strike is in substance a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure 4 to state a claim, the court may convert the motion to the proper designation and consider the 5 motion as though it were brought under Rule 12(b)(6). Kelley v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 750 F. Supp. 6 2d 1132, 1146 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (considering motion to strike punitive damages request as Rule 7 12(b)(6) motion). Stroud’s motion contests the adequacy of Bailey’s allegations and thus is best 8 designated a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6); the court therefore exercises its discretion to 9 convert the motion to strike into a motion to dismiss. 10 California law permits plaintiffs to recover punitive damages in actions “for the breach of 11 an obligation not arising from contract” if they prove, among other things, “by clear and 12 convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” Cal. Civ. 13 Code § 3294(a). As used in the statute, “malice” means “conduct which is intended by the 14 defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the 15 defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” Id. 16 § 3294(c)(1). Bailey’s complaint includes allegations supporting a plausible claim that Stroud 17 acted “with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” Id. As 18 summarized above, Bailey alleges Stroud dismissed her harassment report, did not investigate 19 Bailey’s claims, did not take actions to prevent other similar assaults by Hornbeck, and prevented 20 Bailey from participating in school activities after she made her report. 21 The court denies the motion to strike, construed as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 22 III. CONCLUSION 23 The court resolves the motions to dismiss and strike as follows, granting in part: 24  The motion to dismiss claims three, four, and thirteen is denied. 25  The motion to dismiss claims six and nine is granted in part with leave to 26 amend as to the claims against defendant Abbott and is otherwise denied. 27  The motion to dismiss claim seventeen is granted with leave to amend. 28  The motion to strike, construed as a motion to dismiss, is denied. 1 Any further amended complaint must be filed within twenty-one days. 2 This order resolves ECF Nos. 15 and 21. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 DATED: November 18, 2024.