Bailey v. County of Stanislaus
This text of Bailey v. County of Stanislaus (Bailey v. County of Stanislaus) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 DAVID MICHAEL BAILEY, No. 2:24-cv-03231-JAM-AC 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS 12 COUNTY OF STANISLAUS; DEPUTY LARSON; DEPUTY ROSE; DEPUTY 13 GARCIA; CITY OF TURLOCK; DOE ONE; and DOES 2-10, 14 inclusive. 15 Defendants. 16 17 Before the Court is County of Stanislaus, Deputy Larson, 18 Deputy Rose, and Deputy Garcia’s (collectively, “Defendants”) 19 motion to dismiss David Bailey’s (“Plaintiff”) complaint for 20 failure to state a claim. See Mot., ECF No. 16. Defendant City 21 of Turlock does not join in the present motion and has separately 22 answered the Complaint. See ECF No. 13. Plaintiff opposed 23 Defendants’ motion. See Opp’n, ECF No. 18. Defendants replied. 24 See Reply, ECF No. 19. For the following reasons, Defendants’ 25 motion is granted with leave to amend.1 26
27 1This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 28 scheduled for April 22, 2025. 1 I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 This controversy arises out of the police shooting of 3 Plaintiff’s nephew, Kevin Frey. See Compl. ¶ 57, ECF No. 1. 4 Plaintiff filed his complaint (“the Complaint”), bringing causes 5 of action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and state law, as Mr. 6 Frey’s successor in interest. See id. at 1. Plaintiff alleges 7 that Mr. Frey’s mother, Judy Frey, was Mr. Frey’s successor in 8 interest at the time of his death, and that because Ms. Frey has 9 since died, and Plaintiff was Ms. Frey’s successor in interest, 10 Plaintiff is now Mr. Frey’s successor in interest. See id. ¶¶ 4, 11 10. 12 Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure 13 to state a claim. See Mot. Defendants argue that Plaintiff has 14 not adequately pled his standing to bring this action as Mr. 15 Frey’s successor in interest. See id. at 4-5. Plaintiff 16 counters that he alleged sufficient facts in the Complaint and in 17 his subsequent declaration. See Opp’n at 3. 18 II. OPINION 19 A. Legal Standard 20 A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of a 21 complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 22 granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to 23 dismiss [under 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain sufficient 24 factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief 25 that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 26 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 27 Plausibility requires “factual content that allows the court to 28 draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for 1 the misconduct alleged.” Id. While “detailed factual 2 allegations” are unnecessary, the complaint must allege more 3 than “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 4 action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Id. 5 Conclusory allegations are not to be considered in the 6 plausibility analysis. Id. at 679 (“While legal conclusions can 7 provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by 8 factual allegations.”). When a plaintiff fails to “state a 9 claim upon which relief can be granted,” the Court must dismiss 10 the claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint may be 11 dismissed for failure to adequately allege a plaintiff’s 12 standing. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 13 (1992). 14 B. Analysis 15 “The party seeking to bring a survival action bears the 16 burden of demonstrating that a particular state’s law authorizes 17 a survival action and that the plaintiff meets that state’s 18 requirements for bringing a survival action.” Moreland v. Las 19 Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 159 F.3d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1998). 20 In California, Civil Procedure Code Section 377.32 provides that 21 a person seeking to commence an action as a decedent’s successor 22 in interest must show “facts in support” of the conclusion that 23 they are the “decedent’s successor in interest.” Cal. Civ. 24 Proc. Code § 377.32. Accordingly, “most federal courts to have 25 confronted the issue have found that plaintiffs must satisfy the 26 procedural requirements of section 377.32.” Anderson v. 27 Hickman, No. CIV. S-07-1466LKKDAD, 2008 WL 2397470, at *1 (E.D. 28 Cal. June 11, 2008) (collecting cases). 1 The Court must first determine whether it can consider the 2 alleged facts that Plaintiff provided in his declaration 3 submitted after the filing of the Complaint. The Court finds 4 that it cannot consider this declaration in resolving this 5 motion to dismiss. 6 On a motion to dismiss, a district court cannot consider 7 evidence outside the pleadings unless it is a document attached 8 to the complaint, a document incorporated by reference in the 9 complaint, or a matter of judicial notice. U.S. v. Ritchie, 342 10 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). In his declaration, Plaintiff 11 provides facts supporting the conclusions that Ms. Frey was Mr. 12 Frey’s successor in interest and that, in turn, Plaintiff is Ms. 13 Frey’s successor in interest. See Declaration of David Bailey, 14 ECF No. 18-2. This declaration was not attached to the 15 Complaint. It also was not incorporated by reference because 16 Plaintiff did not “extensively” refer to it in the Complaint, 17 nor does the declaration “form[] the basis” of Plaintiff’s 18 claims. See United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th 19 Cir. 2003). This document is also not proper for judicial 20 notice because the declaration’s alleged facts cannot be 21 “accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy 22 cannot reasonably be questioned.” See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). 23 In the Complaint, Plaintiff summarily alleges that Ms. Frey 24 was Mr. Frey’s successor in interest, and that Plaintiff is Ms. 25 Frey’s successor in interest, which provides Plaintiff standing 26 to bring these claims as Mr. Frey’s successor in interest. See 27 id. These allegations are legal conclusions, which the Court is 28 not bound to accept as true. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. There 1 are no factual allegations in the Complaint showing that Ms. 2 Frey was Mr. Frey’s successor in interest, and there is a 3 similar lack of factual allegations supporting the inference 4 that Plaintiff is Ms. Frey’s successor in interest. Plaintiff 5 thus has failed to plead “facts in support” of the conclusion 6 that he is the “decedent’s successor in interest.” See Cal. 7 Civ. Proc. Code § 377.32. Accordingly, the Complaint is 8 dismissed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 9 561. 10 C. Leave to Amend 11 A court granting a motion to dismiss must then decide 12 whether to grant leave to amend. Leave to amend should be 13 “freely given” where there is no “undue delay, bad faith or 14 dilatory motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue prejudice 15 to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, 16 [or] futility of [the] amendment . . . .” Foman v. Davis, 371 17 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 18 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (listing the Foman factors as 19 those to be considered when deciding whether to grant leave to 20 amend).
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