Bailey v. Capelle

1 Del. 449
CourtSuperior Court of Delaware
DecidedJuly 5, 1834
StatusPublished

This text of 1 Del. 449 (Bailey v. Capelle) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bailey v. Capelle, 1 Del. 449 (Del. Ct. App. 1834).

Opinion

The court

inclined to the opinion that the return -of a sheriff is prima facie evidence of the facts properly stated in it, even in a suit against himself; (Roscoe on Ev. 305;,) but as a measure of value it cannot apply here, for if the sheriff was a trespasser, the seizure, and not the sale, was the trespass, and the value of the property at the time and place of seizure would be the measure of damages, and not its value at the time and place of sale. The return only professes to show the latter.

The deposition of Lloyd Norris, of the firm of Tyson & Norris, was offered by the plff. to prove that the corn was purchased on commission for Bailey, in pursuance of orders received from him. Objected to.

Rogers.

The witness is interested in establishing a sale to Bailey and to defeat the attachments.

Latimer.

He is not interested in the event of the suit. The objection goes only to his credit, and not to his competency. The verdict could not be given in evidence either for or against him in any other action. He is not bound even for costs.

Rogers. Suppose a recovery in this action. Tyson and Norris will be entitled to demand and receive of the plff. the price of the corn. If there should be no recovery, Bailey will not be liable to them, for the attachment will be a sufficient defence to any suit against him.

The Court said the interest of the witness was equal both ways. If the plff. recovers, the price of the corn will go to the assignees of Tyson and Norris; if he fails, it will go to their attaching creditors; either way it is applied to the payment of their debts; and they have no disqualifying interest, though they may have a bias or feeling as to which of the creditors shall be benefitted by it.

*451 Latimer and J. JL. Bayard, for plaintiff, Rogers, for defendant.

It was insisted on the part of the plff. that a delivery to a common carrier or master of a vessel was a delivery to the consignee, subject only to the right of stoppage in transitu where that right could be properly exercised: that a general consignment of property vests the property in the consignee: that it made no difference whether the property was paid for or not. 1 Ld. Raymd. 271; 3 Bos. & Pul. 584; 1 Johns. Rep. 15; 3 P. Wm.’s. 185. Plff. claimed damages to the value of the corn and interest, costs and expenses in prosecuting his suit, and also special damage for the stopping of his mill in consequence of having a supply of grain cut off by these attachments. [Note. This special damage was laid in the narr.]

On the part of the deft, it was contended that the bill of lading, though prima facie, was not conclusive evidence of property in the consignee: (5 Com. Law Rep. 283; Sergeant vs. Morris; 3 Stark. 1620; 1 Camp. 85;) that it appeared to have been Bailey’s understanding that he was to pay for the grain only on delivery; and that he had in fact ordered but one of the cargoes to be sent on to him.

Harrington, Justice,

charged the jury: That the question for them to consider was, whether these two cargoes of corn were, at the time of the seizure, the property of Samuel Bailey, the consignee, or of Tyson & Norris: that they need not regard the transaction as between Tyson & Norris and Joynes, Bain and Joynes and the other attaching creditors. If these delivered their grain to Tyson & Norris on a cash sale without receiving the money, they enabled them to transfer the property to another in any bona fide transaction, and the present question was, whether it had been so transferred before attachment. That the consignment, if fairly and regularly made, passed the property to the consignee, and it could not afterwards be lawfully seized as the property of the consigners. That it did not alter the ease though the corn had not been paid for, or had not been specially ordered. It was the habit of plff. to receive large shipments of grain from these commission merchants, and though only one of these cargoes may have been specially ordered, about which there was some doubt, if he .chooses to accept the consignment, the property is his and he will be liable for the value to the consignors or their assignees. That the damage was the value of the grain at the time and place of seizure, deducting freight; and any special damage proved on account of the plff.’s mill being stopped by the seizure. It is in the discretion or the jury to give or withhold interest.

Verdict for'plff. $¡2,648 13.

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1 Del. 449, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bailey-v-capelle-delsuperct-1834.