Bailey v. Bass
This text of 553 So. 2d 589 (Bailey v. Bass) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
The plaintiff, John W. Bailey, appeals from summary judgments entered in favor [590]*590of defendants Ray D. Bass, B.A. Riddle, Joe Black, and Tom Cain.1 We affirm.
The dispositive issue in the case before us is whether defendant Tom Cain is entitled to discretionary function immunity from tort liability.
On April 24, 1985, Bailey was injured when two 34-foot spans of the Chickasa-bogue Creek Bridge collapsed while he was driving his vehicle across it. The collapse was due to corrosion of the bridge’s underwater steel substructure. In April 1987, Bailey sued, as individuals and in their official capacities, the director of the State Highway Department, Bass; the maintenance bureau chief, Cain; the assistant maintenance engineer, Riddle; and the division bridge inspector for the Ninth Division, Black. Bailey alleged negligence in (1) the research, engineering, and design of the bridge; (2) the construction of the bridge; (3) the failure to inspect, test, and maintain the underwater substructure of the bridge; (4) the failure to notify the public that the bridge was structurally unsafe; and (5) the failure to create, adopt, and implement a highway bridge inspection, testing, and repair policy under established federal guidelines.
In Count Five of his complaint, Bailey specifically averred that Cain “negligently failed to create, adopt, and implement an adequate highway bridge inspection, testing, and repair policy which required or mandated underwater inspection of the Chickasabogue Creek Bridge structure on a regular basis.” Bailey premised his argument on the existence of federal guidelines issued to the states regarding the adoption and implementation of state bridge inspection programs.2 He argues that these inspection programs mandated manual inspection or investigation of a bridge’s substructure below the water’s surface to detect corrosion and deterioration, and therefore, that Cain’s job in developing the bridge inspection program for the state was not discretionary in nature. We disagree.
Cain was a public official who acted within the general scope of his authority in performing functions that involve a degree of discretion. Although the state may have had no discretion not to inspect at all, Cain was performing a discretionary function “in determining the manner of carrying out these inspections, i.e. determining the method and means.” Grant v. Davis, 537 So.2d 7, 10 (Ala.1988). He is, there[591]*591fore, entitled to discretionary function immunity in this action. “Whether a particular defendant is engaged in a protected discretionary function, and is thereby immune from liability, is a question of law to be decided by the trial court.” Woods v. Wilson, 539 So.2d 224 (Ala.1989); Barnes v. Dale, 530 So.2d 770 (Ala.1988).
Based upon the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court is due to be, and it is hereby, affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
553 So. 2d 589, 1989 Ala. LEXIS 741, 1989 WL 144499, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bailey-v-bass-ala-1989.