NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 17 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ERIC JAMES BAGNALL, individually, No. 25-248 and as Administrator of the Estate of D.C. No. Camren McKay Bagnall, 2:23-cv-01606-KJM-CKD Plaintiff - Appellant, MEMORANDUM*
v.
CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY MARITIME ACADEMY; VINEETA DHILLON; LILLIAN GREGG; BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Kimberly J. Mueller, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 9, 2025** San Francisco, California
Before: BUMATAY, JOHNSTONE, and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges. Dissent by Judge BUMATAY.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Eric Bagnall appeals the district court’s denial of leave to file a fourth
amended complaint amending his Title IX claim against California State
University Maritime (CSU Maritime) and the CSU Board of Trustees (collectively
“Defendants”) on behalf of his son Camren Bagnell. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We review the denial of leave to amend for an abuse of discretion
but review de novo the legal determination that amendment would be futile. See
United States v. United Healthcare Ins. Co., 848 F.3d 1161, 1172 (9th Cir. 2016).
We affirm.
Although leave to amend should be “freely given when justice so requires,”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), several factors weigh against granting leave to amend,
including “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant,
repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue
prejudice to the opposing party, [and] futility of amendment.” Eminence Capital,
LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Foman v.
Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).
1. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining, after
providing Bagnall with a hearing and an opportunity for supplemental briefing,
that a fourth amended complaint would cause prejudice and undue delay. The
district court had already granted Bagnall three opportunities to amend and
determined that granting further leave would unduly delay case proceedings
2 25-248 without an explanation for why the claims could not previously be asserted. See
Salameh v. Tarsadia Hotel, 726 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013) (“A district
court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where the plaintiff
has previously amended.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). And the
only new allegations Bagnall proposes would come from reports published on July
17, 2023, before he filed his second amended complaint.
Prejudice to the opposing party is the most significant factor. Eminence
Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052. The district court also found that granting leave again
would likely prejudice defendants because Bagnall’s proposed fourth amendment
added six new federal claims that would likely alter the nature of litigation and
require a new defense strategy. Its denial of leave to amend based on these factors
did not apply the wrong legal rule, nor was it “illogical, implausible, or without
support in the record.” Tarsadia Hotel, 726 F.3d at 1129 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
2. Moreover, further amendment would be futile. Amendment is futile
when “no set of facts can be proved under the amendment to the pleadings that
would constitute a valid and sufficient claim.” Sweaney v. Ada Cnty., 119 F.3d
1385, 1393 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To state
a Title IX claim, a plaintiff must allege both “background indicia of sex
discrimination” and “facts particular to [the plaintiff’s] case.” Schwake v. Ariz. Bd.
3 25-248 of Regents, 967 F.3d 940, 949 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). In dismissing the Second Amended Complaint, the district court
provided detailed instructions to Bagnall on how to cure the deficiencies in his
Title IX claim. Bagnall could not cure those deficiencies in his proposed fourth
amended complaint because the new allegations rely exclusively on the addition of
two reports describing systemic delays in Title IX investigations at CSU Maritime
and across the CSU system. The reports contain only generalized assessments
about Title IX procedures and do not indicate any background indicia of sex
discrimination against men or refer to the facts of Bagnall’s son’s case. The district
court “previously explained plaintiff failed to plead an atmosphere of bias against
his son or evidence of a one-sided investigation,” and Bagnall does not contest this.
So even if the new reports could establish relevant background indicia of sex
discrimination, as the dissent would hold, they still could not satisfy Schwake, 967
F.3d at 949, as the reports do not show facts particular to this case. Because
Bagnall identifies nothing in the reports that would support both the background-
indicia and particular-facts elements of a Title IX claim, amendment would also be
futile.
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave
to amend.
AFFIRMED.
4 25-248 FILED 25-248 Bagnall v. California State University Maritime Academy, et al. DEC 17 2025 Bumatay, J., dissenting MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
Requests for leave to amend is one of the easiest standards to meet in the law.
It’s supposed to granted with “extreme liberality.” Eminence Capital, LLC v.
Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (simplified). Absent bad faith and
other similar factors, it should be “freely given.” Id. (simplified). The district court
kicked Eric Bagnall out of federal court based on futility. But amendment is only
futile if “no set of facts can be proved under the amendment to the pleadings that
would constitute a valid and sufficient claim or defense.” Sweaney v. Ada Cnty., 119
F.3d 1385, 1393 (9th Cir. 1997). Here, the district court completely dismissed
Bagnall’s new factual allegations that are certainly relevant to alleging a Title IX sex
discrimination claim. While I am not sure whether Bagnall’s allegations will amount
to a viable Title IX claim, he should’ve been given the opportunity to plead it.
Eric Bagnall alleges that his son, Camren Bagnall, a first-year cadet at
California State University Maritime Academy, was falsely accused of sexual
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 17 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ERIC JAMES BAGNALL, individually, No. 25-248 and as Administrator of the Estate of D.C. No. Camren McKay Bagnall, 2:23-cv-01606-KJM-CKD Plaintiff - Appellant, MEMORANDUM*
v.
CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY MARITIME ACADEMY; VINEETA DHILLON; LILLIAN GREGG; BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Kimberly J. Mueller, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 9, 2025** San Francisco, California
Before: BUMATAY, JOHNSTONE, and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges. Dissent by Judge BUMATAY.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Eric Bagnall appeals the district court’s denial of leave to file a fourth
amended complaint amending his Title IX claim against California State
University Maritime (CSU Maritime) and the CSU Board of Trustees (collectively
“Defendants”) on behalf of his son Camren Bagnell. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We review the denial of leave to amend for an abuse of discretion
but review de novo the legal determination that amendment would be futile. See
United States v. United Healthcare Ins. Co., 848 F.3d 1161, 1172 (9th Cir. 2016).
We affirm.
Although leave to amend should be “freely given when justice so requires,”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), several factors weigh against granting leave to amend,
including “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant,
repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue
prejudice to the opposing party, [and] futility of amendment.” Eminence Capital,
LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Foman v.
Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).
1. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining, after
providing Bagnall with a hearing and an opportunity for supplemental briefing,
that a fourth amended complaint would cause prejudice and undue delay. The
district court had already granted Bagnall three opportunities to amend and
determined that granting further leave would unduly delay case proceedings
2 25-248 without an explanation for why the claims could not previously be asserted. See
Salameh v. Tarsadia Hotel, 726 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013) (“A district
court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where the plaintiff
has previously amended.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). And the
only new allegations Bagnall proposes would come from reports published on July
17, 2023, before he filed his second amended complaint.
Prejudice to the opposing party is the most significant factor. Eminence
Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052. The district court also found that granting leave again
would likely prejudice defendants because Bagnall’s proposed fourth amendment
added six new federal claims that would likely alter the nature of litigation and
require a new defense strategy. Its denial of leave to amend based on these factors
did not apply the wrong legal rule, nor was it “illogical, implausible, or without
support in the record.” Tarsadia Hotel, 726 F.3d at 1129 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
2. Moreover, further amendment would be futile. Amendment is futile
when “no set of facts can be proved under the amendment to the pleadings that
would constitute a valid and sufficient claim.” Sweaney v. Ada Cnty., 119 F.3d
1385, 1393 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To state
a Title IX claim, a plaintiff must allege both “background indicia of sex
discrimination” and “facts particular to [the plaintiff’s] case.” Schwake v. Ariz. Bd.
3 25-248 of Regents, 967 F.3d 940, 949 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). In dismissing the Second Amended Complaint, the district court
provided detailed instructions to Bagnall on how to cure the deficiencies in his
Title IX claim. Bagnall could not cure those deficiencies in his proposed fourth
amended complaint because the new allegations rely exclusively on the addition of
two reports describing systemic delays in Title IX investigations at CSU Maritime
and across the CSU system. The reports contain only generalized assessments
about Title IX procedures and do not indicate any background indicia of sex
discrimination against men or refer to the facts of Bagnall’s son’s case. The district
court “previously explained plaintiff failed to plead an atmosphere of bias against
his son or evidence of a one-sided investigation,” and Bagnall does not contest this.
So even if the new reports could establish relevant background indicia of sex
discrimination, as the dissent would hold, they still could not satisfy Schwake, 967
F.3d at 949, as the reports do not show facts particular to this case. Because
Bagnall identifies nothing in the reports that would support both the background-
indicia and particular-facts elements of a Title IX claim, amendment would also be
futile.
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave
to amend.
AFFIRMED.
4 25-248 FILED 25-248 Bagnall v. California State University Maritime Academy, et al. DEC 17 2025 Bumatay, J., dissenting MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
Requests for leave to amend is one of the easiest standards to meet in the law.
It’s supposed to granted with “extreme liberality.” Eminence Capital, LLC v.
Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (simplified). Absent bad faith and
other similar factors, it should be “freely given.” Id. (simplified). The district court
kicked Eric Bagnall out of federal court based on futility. But amendment is only
futile if “no set of facts can be proved under the amendment to the pleadings that
would constitute a valid and sufficient claim or defense.” Sweaney v. Ada Cnty., 119
F.3d 1385, 1393 (9th Cir. 1997). Here, the district court completely dismissed
Bagnall’s new factual allegations that are certainly relevant to alleging a Title IX sex
discrimination claim. While I am not sure whether Bagnall’s allegations will amount
to a viable Title IX claim, he should’ve been given the opportunity to plead it.
Eric Bagnall alleges that his son, Camren Bagnall, a first-year cadet at
California State University Maritime Academy, was falsely accused of sexual
misconduct by another student in September 2020 and subsequently subjected to a
biased and procedurally unfair Title IX investigation. According to the complaint,
Camren provided extensive exculpatory evidence, including friendly
contemporaneous text messages with the Title IX Complainant, witness statements
disputing key aspects of her account, and a Cal Maritime campus police report
finding no substantiation of the allegations. But the Cal Maritime Title IX 1 Coordinator, Vineeta Dhillon, allegedly ignored these materials, prejudged him as
guilty based on his sex, and prolonged the investigation without justification.
Bagnall further alleges that Dhillon and Cal Maritime knew of but failed to intervene
as Camren became the target of severe peer harassment tied to the accusation, with
classmates calling him “The First Floor Rapist” and telling him “You should be
behind bars.” The complaint asserts that Cal Maritime’s inadequate Title IX
infrastructure contributed to these failures by allowing investigations to languish, by
failing to protect accused students from sex-based harassment, and by fostering an
environment of pervasive distrust and discrimination on campus. Tragically, Bagnall
contends that all this caused his son to commit suicide. The district court dismissed
Bagnall’s Title IX claim chiefly because he failed to allege “indicia of sex
discrimination” or a biased or one-sided investigation.
Bagnall now proffers newly discovered evidence that could move the needle
on his Title IX claim. The new evidence is California State University’s own
systemwide assessment of its programs to prevent sex discrimination. The reports
are bleak. Commissioned after several negative, “high-profile incidents,” within the
California State University system, these reports document structural deficiencies
across California State’s Title IX infrastructure. For example, they note systemwide
delays and failures in Title IX responsiveness; an inability to track or identify
patterns of misconduct; widespread distrust in the system; and prevalent bullying.
2 At Cal Maritime’s campus specifically, the reports criticize the absence of an on-
campus Title IX office, significant community concern about pervasive
discrimination and harassment, and a documented “trust gap.”
More importantly, the reports acknowledge the significant external pressures
that the California State University system faced that drove our decision in Schwake
v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 967 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2020). In Schwake, we noted
specifically a 2011 Department of Education letter that pressured colleges was
“relevant” to establishing a “background indicia of sex discrimination.” Id. at 948.
The California State reports similarly discuss the difficulties of implementing
“myriad and shifting government regulations,” which bring “potential harm … to
students, faculty and staff—both complainants and respondents[.]” The reports
observe that these legal shifts have “reinforc[ed] the perception of institutional bias.”
They further recommend institutional reforms to “reinforce[] the neutrality and
impartiality of the investigator’s role and diminish[] potential concerns about
conflict of interest or bias.” And the reports recommend additional training
requirements to ensure that staff understand “how to serve impartially, including by
avoiding prejudgment of the facts at issue, conflicts of interest, and bias.”
These facts could potentially lead to the inference that Cal Maritime’s
institution’s procedures functioned in a manner that systemically disadvantaged
accused male students, as Bagnall alleges. Indeed, they potentially corroborate his
3 view that Cal Maritime staff prejudged the facts and were biased. After all, why
recommend training on how to serve impartially and without prejudgment if staff
have already been doing that? And more specifically with respect to Cal Maritime’s
climate, the reports describe a campus where bullying was “prevalent,”
discrimination was perceived as pervasive, and trust in Title IX processes was low—
precisely the environment that, Bagnall alleges, allowed a gender-charged rumor
mill to flourish unchecked. This is coupled with the specific allegations of a one-
sided disciplinary response, in which staff allegedly ignored exculpatory evidence,
discounted inconsistencies in the complainant’s account, and failed to intervene in
openly gendered peer harassment. And an allegation that the Title IX investigator
held publicly expressed views suggesting a predisposition in favor of complainants
and against male respondents.
Under Schwake, a plaintiff need not produce statistical proof or comparator
cases at the pleading stage. It is enough to allege facts that, taken together, allow a
reasonable inference of sex discrimination. 967 F.3d at 947–48. We have repeatedly
emphasized that Title IX complaints must be read as a whole, and that allegations of
procedural irregularities, external pressures, and background patterns may
collectively satisfy the plausibility standard. Id.; see also Doe v. Regents of Univ. of
Cal., 23 F.4th 930, 936 (9th Cir. 2022) (finding sufficient allegations of external
4 pressure to take a harder line in sexual misconduct cases and allegations that male
respondents were systematically deprived of fair process.).
The allegations here, taken together as true, could potentially support a
plausible claim that sex bias infected Camren Bagnall’s investigation. Whether that
inference is ultimately borne out is a question for Rule 12(b)(6), not Rule 15(a)
futility. The majority seemingly acknowledges that the reports change the calculus
on the “indicia of sex discrimination” but relies on the district court’s previous ruling
on the lack of evidence of “bias” or a “one-sided investigation.” But the district
court never analyzed the evidence all together, which was required by Schwake. So
it would be improper to rely solely on that former ruling.
The majority also relies on the district court’s finding of “prejudice.” The
district court found prejudice simply because Bagnall added six new federal claims,
which would “likely alter the nature of the litigation and require a new defense
strategy.” That kind of “prejudice” would seem to preclude any amendment of the
complaint that adds new claims. But even if so, the district court could have granted
leave for Bagnall to amend only his existing claims. After all, the new reports go to
the heart of his Title IX claim.
I respectfully dissent.