Bagley v. United States
This text of 136 F.2d 567 (Bagley v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Convicted of the offense of having knowingly hindered and interfered by, force and violence with the administration of the Selective Training and Service Act' of 1940,1 and given a penitentiary sentence,, defendant appealed. Here he insists that; the indictment did not charge,2 the proof 3 [569]*569did not make out, the offense, and the judgment must be reversed. We agree. The language in which the act was couched was not put there by accident or inadvertence. It was carefully chosen by Congress when this country was not at war but only preparing for its eventuality in order to insure, the fullest preservation of freedom of opinion and expression, that the act would not be the instrument of partisan prosecution to suppress that freedom, and that prosecutions under it would he brought only where there was forcible rather than ideological opposition to the draft. The [570]*570words chosen are not new words in American law.4 They are particularly not new in federal statutes.5 They were chosen in the light of the meaning which long and consistent use in American law had given them, and war hysteria may not impart to or distill from them any different meaning. If Congress had desired to denounce as the offense “threats to use” rather than “the use of” force and violence, it could easily have followed the pattern laid down in 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 89, 338a and 408d. The feeings of distaste and resentment aroused by the defendant’s drunken boastings may not take the place of charge and proof that he has violated a criminal statute. “At a time when passion and prejudice are heightened by emotions stirred by our participation in a great war”, Viereck v. United States, 63 S.Ct. 561, 566, 87 L.Ed. -, we must be particularly careful to hold to the foundations of our freedom. One of these is that “one may be subjected to punishment for crime in the federal courts only for the commission or omission of an act defined by statute, or by regulation having legislative authority, and then only if punishment is authorized by Congress”. Idem. It must be conceded that defendant’s conduct in destroying his first questionnaire and his drunken boasting though not carried out in fact that he would destroy the next one if they sent it to him, his approval of Hitler and his expressed preference to fight with Hitler against England rather than with England against Hitler were most reprehensible, but if these acts and statements constituted offenses against federal laws, he was not prosecuted for them. He was prosecuted for and only for having by force and violence interfered with and hindered the draft board in the discharge of its duties, and the force and violence charged were the mere utterance of words under circumstances which could not amount to acts of force and violence, hindering and interfering with the draft board in the performance of its duties. For they were not said to any member of the draft board or anyone acting for it while in the attempted discharge of its duties, and it was neither charged nor proved that the remarks were made for the purpose or with the intention of having them communicated to the board so that they might influence its actions. As one witness put it, it was “big talk”, and as the evidence makes it clear, it was the big talk of a person unduly in his cups. We are not prepared to hold, and we are not holding that threats of .violence made to members of the draft board or to persons acting for them, with the intent and purpose of interfering with them in the discharge of their duties, or made to strangers with the intent and purpose that they be communicated to the board, if the threats are made under circumstances showing that the threatener has the will, the purpose and the means to carry out his threats, could not be held to amount to the use of force and violence within the statutes. But the indictment does not charge, the proof does not make out such a case. No member of the board was present at the cracker barrel session at the local store, and it is not charged that defendant’s inebriate utterances were made with the intent that they be communicated to the [571]*571board and with the purpose to carry them out. The utterances the indictment charges were in themselves so fantastic as to be silly and were made under such circumstances as that they cannot in law and fact be said to be that use of force and violence to prevent administration which the statute denounces. When it comes to proof, there is even less basis for the conviction. The board member whose brother-in-law heard the defendant’s big talk at the store and reported it to the member who in turn reported it to the board, testified that the defendant came to his house shortly after he had been at the store; that he did tell him that he had burned the questionnaire and that he was for Hitler; but that he didn’t threaten him or talk offensively to him. He testified too that within the next day or so, the defendant came again to see him, and without telling him what he had said volunteered an apology, saying, “I am sorry I acted the way I did down at the store the other day. I am sorry I talked the way I did down at the store.” In the light of this voluntary apology, showing that Bagley did not intend what he said at the store to have any effect on the Board, it may not be said that the words spoken at the store constituted the interference by force and violence at which the act is aimed. If it is said that the board member did not communicate this apology to the board but withheld knowledge of it from them, this will not help the government’s case. It will merely show that the board member, on whose word the board had been thrown into the state of fear and inactivity they testified to did not truly represent to the board the defendant’s attitude. It will merely show that the state of mind they were in was induced not by a true statement of defendant’s attitude toward the board but by a suppression of that truth. In Moore v. United States, 5 Cir., 128 F.2d 974, 976, a prosecution under this section, it was shown that the defendant struck one member of the board and asserted that he intended to administer similar bodily punishment to another member. This court in affirming the conviction said: “The day before the assault was committed, Moore had announced that he would prevent a member of the board from putting him in the army, and that he would straighten out the board in regard to his classification. His later acts made clear that it was his intention to produce this result by the illegal method of force and violence rather than the legal procedure of producing additional evidence.” (Emphasis supplied.) Here not only were there no later acts consistent with the remarks made at the store, there was an apology to a member of the board for the making of those remarks. Because the indictment did not charge, and the proof did not make out, an offense, the judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further and not inconsistent proceedings.
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136 F.2d 567, 1943 U.S. App. LEXIS 3096, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bagley-v-united-states-ca5-1943.