Baer v. Fetrow

43 Pa. D. & C.3d 435, 1987 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 320
CourtPennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Cumberland County
DecidedFebruary 27, 1987
Docketno. 2518 Civil 1986
StatusPublished

This text of 43 Pa. D. & C.3d 435 (Baer v. Fetrow) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Cumberland County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Baer v. Fetrow, 43 Pa. D. & C.3d 435, 1987 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 320 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).

Opinion

BAYLEY, J.,

— On March 10, 1986, plaintiffs entered into an oral month-to-month lease with defendant for a residential property in Boiling Springs, Cumberland County. They escrowed a $300 security deposit with defendant on the same date. On May 18, 1986 plaintiffs notified defendant of their intention to surrender the leasehold premises on May 20, 1986, which in fact they did.

Following their vacation of the premises Bonnie Baer demanded the return of the $300 security deposit and provided an address in writing to defendant where she could be reached. That deposit has never been returned nor has defendant ever pro[436]*436vided plaintiffs with a written list within 30 days of their vacating the premises of any damages to the leased premises for which the landlord claims that the tenants are liable. Plaintiffs have instituted this suit for the return of the $300 security deposit together with a $300 penalty pursuant to the Landlord and.Tenant Act of 1951, April 6, 1951, P.L. 69, Art. V, §512, as amended, 68 P.S. §250.512, which provides as follows:

“Recovery of improperly held escrow funds

(a) Every landlord shall within 30 days of termination of a lease or upon surrender and acceptance of the leasehold premises, whichever first occurs, provide a tenant with a written list of any damages to the leasehold premises for which the landlord claims the tenant is liable. Delivery of the list shall be accompanied by payment of the difference between any sum deposited in escrow, including any unpaid interest thereon, for the payment of damages to the leasehold premises and the actual amount of damages to the leasehold premises caused by the tenant. Nothing in this section shall preclude the landlord from refusing to return the escrow fund, including any unpaid interest thereon, for nonpayment of rent or for the breach of any other condition in the lease by the tenant.

(b) Any landlord who fails to provide a written list within 30 days as required in subsection (a) above, shall forfeit all rights to withhold any portion of sums held in escrow, including any unpaid interest thereon, or to bring suit against the tenant-for damages to the leasehold premises.

(c) If the landlord fais to pay the tenant the difference between the sum deposited, including any unpaid interest, thereon, and the actual damages to the leasehold premises caused by the tenant within 30 days after termination of the lease or surrender [437]*437and acceptance of the leasehold premises, the landlord shall be liable in assumpsit to double the amount by which the sum deposited in escrow, including any unpaid interest thereon, exceeds the actual damages to the leasehold premises caused by the tenant as determined by any court of record or court not of record having jurisdiction in civil actions at law. The burden of proof of actual damages caused by the tenant to the leasehold premises shall be on the landlord.

(d) Any attempted waiver of this section by a tenant by contract or otherwise shall be void and unenforceable.

(e) Failure of the tenant to provide the landlord with his new address in writing upon termination .of the lease or upon surrender and acceptance of the leasehold premises shall reheve the landlord from any liability under this section.

■ (f) This section shall apply only to residential leaseholds and not to commercial leaseholds.”

Defendant has admitted the aforesaid facts in his answer to plaintiffs’ amended complaint. In addition, defendant has averred that he “[d]id provide plaintiff Bonnie Baer with a statement indicating that there was dramatic damage to the premises and that as soon as he was able to secure either estimates or ultimate billings for the damages, he would so advise plaintiff’ and that “[i]t was doubtful that any of their $300 security deposit would be returned due to the dramatic damages involved.”1'

Plaintiffs have moved for a judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1034, which provides:

[438]*438“(a) After the pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.

(b) The court shall enter such judgment or order as shall be proper on the pleadings.”

In Bata v. Central Penn National Bank of Philadelphia, 423 Pa. 373, 224 A.2d 174 (1966), the Supreme Court noted:

“Under Pa.R.C.P. 1034, a motion for judgment on the pleadings may be granted in cases which are so free from doubt that a trial would clearly be a fruitless exercise. Such a motion is in the nature of a demurrer; all of the opposing party’s well-pleaded allé-gations are viewed as true but only those facts specifically admitted by him may be considered against him. Bureau of Child Care v. United Fund of Philadelphia, 416 Pa. 617, 207 A.2d 847 (1965); Poole v. Great American Ins. Co., 407 Pa. 652, 182 A.2d 509 (1962). Unlike a motion for summary judgment, the power of the court to enter a judgment on the pleadings is further circumscribed by the requirement that the court consider only the . pleadings themselves and any documents properly attached thereto. Nederostek v. Endicott-Johnson, 415 Pa. 136, 138, 202 A. 2d 72, 73 (1964); Emery v. Metzner, 191 Pa. Super. 440, 445, 156 A.2d 627, 630 (1959).2

Plaintiffs maintain that the entry of the judgment on the pleadings is warranted because the defendant has admitted that he has not return any portion of the security deposit, or provided them with a written list of' any damages to the subject premises, which failure triggers section 512 of the Landlord [439]*439and Tenant Act which is aimed at the wrongful withholding of a security deposit. While the facts of the case is not on point, Judge Wettick of the Allegheny Court of Common Pleas in Bonifield v. Cassler, 16 D. & C.3d 716 (1980), has analyzed the purposes of section 512 and construed each of its subsections in a manner consistent with the purpose of the legislature. The court noted:

“Security deposits are also dealt with in section 511 (a)-(c) of The Landlord and Tenant Act,'68 P.S. §550.51 l(a)-(c), which bars a landlord from requiring security deposits in excess of two months’ rent for the first year and one month’s rent for the second and each subsequent year, which provides for interest payments on the security deposit, and which requires the security deposit to be placed in an escrow account unless the landlord has guaranteed return through a surety bond. Section 511(a)-(c) and section 512 constitute a legislative scheme that is designed to limit the amount of a security deposit which a landlord may- require and to protect a tenant’s right to the return of the security deposit. Under subsection (a) of §512, a landlord is still entitled to retain the security deposit, for the breach of any condition in the lease. But the additional protection afforded the tenant by this subséction is his or her right to receive within 30 days a written list of the damages claimed together with the difference between the security deposit and the damages claimed.

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Related

Bata v. Central-Penn Nat. Bank of Phila.
224 A.2d 174 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1966)
Commonwealth v. Belcher
335 A.2d 505 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1975)
Poole v. Great American Insurance
182 A.2d 509 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1962)
Necho Coal Co. v. Denise Coal Co.
128 A.2d 771 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1957)
Bertera's Hopewell Foodland, Inc. v. Masters
236 A.2d 197 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1967)
Bureau for Child Care v. United Fund of the Philadelphia Area
207 A.2d 847 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1965)
Nederostek v. Endicott-Johnson Shoe Co.
202 A.2d 72 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1964)
Commonwealth ex rel. Cherry v. Cavell
220 A.2d 837 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1966)
Emery v. Metzner
156 A.2d 627 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1959)

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Bluebook (online)
43 Pa. D. & C.3d 435, 1987 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 320, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/baer-v-fetrow-pactcomplcumber-1987.