Backmon v. Darden Corporation

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: April 18, 2025
• Docket: 2:24-cv-01420
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES

9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 10 AT SEATTLE

11 TIEAST BACKMON, an individual, CASE NO. 2:24-cv-01420-RAJ

12 Plaintiff, ORDER

13 v.

14 DARDEN CORPORATION, a foreign profit corporation doing business as Olive 15 Garden; and DARDEN CONCEPTS, INC., a foreign profit corporation doing business 16 as Olive Garden,

17 Defendants.

18 I. INTRODUCTION 19 THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendants Darden Corporation and 20 Darden Concepts, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”)’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and 21 Stay Case. Dkt. # 8. Plaintiff Tieast Backmon (“Plaintiff”) filed a Response, to which 22 Defendants replied Dkt. ## 11, 13. 23 For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion and 24 ORDERS this case STAYED pending arbitration proceedings. 25

26 1 II. BACKGROUND 2 This is an employment discrimination case relating to an injury Plaintiff sustained 3 while performing his normal job duties. The Court sets forth the relevant facts below, 4 most of which derive from Plaintiff’s Complaint. 5 Plaintiff worked as a line cook at one of Defendants’ restaurants in Lynnwood, 6 Washington. Dkt. #1-2 at ¶ 2.2. On May 22, 2017, Plaintiff suffered a severe injury to 7 his right foot when he tripped over a drain in the kitchen of the restaurant. Id. at ¶ 2.3. 8 That same day, Plaintiff completed an accident report and filed a worker’s compensation 9 claim. Id. at ¶ 2.4. During his worker’s compensation proceedings, Plaintiff alleged that 10 Defendants, through their counsel, violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 11 (“FDCPA”) and RCW 19.16.250 (collectively referred to as the “FDCPA claim”). Dkt. 12 # 11 at 2. Plaintiff also claimed that Defendants published defamatory statements about 13 him. Id. In addition to his FDCPA and defamation claims, Plaintiff asserts causes of 14 action in the instant matter for retaliation, discrimination, and failure to accommodate. 15 Dkt. # 1-1 at ¶¶ 3.1–3.21. 16 As a condition of his employment, Plaintiff agreed to abide by Defendants’ 17 Dispute Resolution Process (“DRP”). Dkt # 10-2 at 2. On November 15, 2016, Plaintiff 18 agreed to the DRP’s terms and conditions by signing a DRP Acknowledgement, which 19 included his agreement and understanding of the following: 20 I acknowledge that I have received and/or have had the 21 opportunity to read this arbitration agreement. I understand that this arbitration agreement requires that disputes that 22 involve the matters subject to the agreement be submitted to mediation or arbitration pursuant to the arbitration agreement 23 rather than to a judge or jury in court. I agree as a condition of my employment, [sic] to submit any eligible disputes I 24 may have to the DRP and to abide by the provisions outlined in the DRP. I understand this includes, for example, claims 25 under state and federal laws relating to harassment or discrimination, as well as other employment-related claims 26 as defined by the DRP. Finally, I understand that the 1 Company is equally bound to all of the provisions of the DRP. 2 Id. 3 The DRP included an express arbitration provision, elucidating that: (1) only 4 disputes that stated a legal claim would be arbitrated; (2) the American Arbitration 5 Association (“AAA”) would administer the arbitration subject to its rules unless the 6 parties jointly selected an arbitrator that met certain qualifications; (3) the arbitrator’s 7 decision was final and binding and the dispute would be considered resolved if there was 8 not a legal claim, untimely filing, or if it had not been timely pursued; and (4) the request 9 for arbitration must be in writing, provided to opposing party by certified mail or 10 registered mail, within thirty days of receipt of written notification that mediation had 11 been terminated. Dkt. # 10-1 at 10–12. Defendants now move to enforce the DRP and 12 its arbitration provision. 13 III. LEGAL STANDARD 14 Under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), the Court’s review is limited to 15 deciding whether an arbitration clause (1) is valid and (2) covers the dispute at issue. See 16 Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 2014). The party seeking 17 to compel arbitration “bears the burden of proving the existence of an agreement to 18 arbitrate by a preponderance of the evidence.” Norcia v. Samsung Telecomm. Am., 845 19 F.3d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 2017). If an agreement exists, the FAA “leaves no place for 20 the exercise of discretion . . . , but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the 21 parties to proceed to arbitration.” Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 213 22 (1985). 23 Under the FAA, generally applicable contract defenses, may invalidate an 24 arbitration agreement. 9 U.S.C. § 2; AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S 333, 25 339 (2011). Federal courts determine validity using ordinary state law rules of contract 26 1 formation. Id. Contract defenses like unconscionability can thus invalidate an arbitration 2 clause. Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 733 F.3d 916, 921 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing 3 Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011)). 4 IV. DISCUSSION 5 The Court finds that the arbitration provision quoted above is valid. Specifically, 6 there is no dispute that Plaintiff consented to the DRP containing the arbitration 7 provision. Additionally, all his claims fall within the scope of the arbitration provision. 8 A. Existence of a Valid Arbitration Agreement 9 Plaintiff consented to an agreement containing a binding arbitration provision 10 when he signed the DRP as a condition of his employment. The DRP provides clear and 11 unmistakable intent to delegate arbitrability questions to an arbitrator through its 12 incorporation of the AAA rules. See generally Dkt. # 10-1. The DRP incorporates the 13 AAA rules by stating, “[t]he arbitration will be conducted according to the Employment 14 Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures of the [AAA] . . .” Id. at 11. Incorporated 15 AAA Rule 7(a) outlines, “[t]he arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own 16 jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope or validity of 17 the arbitration agreement.” Am. Arb. Ass’n 2013. Furthermore, the DRP provides that 18 the AAA rules are “available online at www.adr.org under the heading ‘Rules & 19 Procedures’ or can be found using an internet search engine, such as Google, by searching 20 for ‘AAA employment Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures.’” Dkt. # 10-1 at 9. 21 In his Response to Defendants’ Motion, Plaintiff contends that he is an 22 unsophisticated party and any delegation clause, including through the incorporation of 23 AAA rules, is unconscionable. Dkt. # 11 at 5. Plaintiff also claims that the nature of his 24 job means he cannot be expected to understand that incorporation of the AAA rules by 25 mentioning them in the arbitration agreement would bind him to such rules. Id. at 6. 26 1 In determining whether a contract is unconscionable, Washington courts have held 2 that “either substantive or procedural unconscionability is sufficient to void a 3 contract.” Gandee v. LDL Freedom Enters., Inc., 176 Wn.2d 598, 603, 293 P.2d (2013) 4 (internal citations omitted). Substantive unconscionability involves those cases where a 5 clause or term in a contract is alleged to be one-sided or harsh. Al-Safin v. Circuit City 6 Stores, Inc., 394 F.3d 1254, 1258–59. Procedural unconscionability exists if a party lacks 7 a meaningful choice surrounding the making of the agreement, and factors to be 8 considered in this determination include the manner in which the contract was created, 9 whether both parties had a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the 10 agreement, and whether important terms were buried in fine print. Robbins v. Comcast 11 Cable Commc’ns, LLC, No. 3:19-cv-056603-RBL, 2019 WL 4139292, at *5 (W.D. 12 Wash. Aug. 30, 2019). “Severance is the usual remedy for substantively unconscionable 13 terms, but where such terms ‘pervade’ an arbitration agreement, [Washington courts] 14 ‘refuse to sever those provisions and declare the entire agreement void.’” See Gandee, 15 176 Wn.2d at 603 (quoting Adler v. Fred Lind Manor, 153 Wash. 2d 331, 358, 103 P.3d 16 774 (2004)). 17 Here, there is no evidence to support that the agreement was either substantively 18 or procedurally unconscionable. Plaintiff provided his signature next to the statement, “I 19 acknowledge that I have received and/or have had the opportunity to read this arbitration 20 agreement.” Dkt. # 10-2 at 2. Additionally, the DRP’s arbitration provision appears 21 across three pages and without the incorporation of fine print. Dkt. # 10-1 at 10–12. The 22 necessary provisions delegating arbitrability appear under subheadings titled 23 “Eligibility” and “Applicable Law and Procedural Rules.” See id. The incorporated 24 AAA rules delegating issues of “jurisdiction,” “scope,” and “validity” to the arbitrator 25 are accessible through clear instructions that describe multiple methods to view them. 26 1 See id. Although Plaintiff posits that there is nothing to demonstrate whether the alleged 2 delegation provision was separately negotiated or bargained for, the text of the agreement 3 is not hidden, is broken separately into paragraphs, and contains unambiguous, plain 4 language. Plaintiff also had unlimited time to review the DRP. Accordingly, there are 5 no facts that indicate the presence of procedural or substantive unconscionability. 6 B. Scope of the Arbitration Provision 7 Contrary to Plaintiff’s opinion, his FDCPA and defamation claims also fall within 8 the scope of the arbitration provision. As explained above, the dispute at hand centers 9 around an employment-related injury when Plaintiff suffered harm after tripping over a 10 drain in the kitchen of Defendants’ restaurant. Dkt. # 1-2 at ¶¶ 2.2–2.3 If not for this 11 injury that transpired during working hours, Plaintiff’s FDCPA and defamation claims 12 would not exist. Plaintiff further alleges that his claims are not employment-related 13 because the conduct that gave rise to these claims occurred approximately six years after 14 the alleged termination of the employment relationship. Dkt. # 11 at 11. Plaintiff also 15 contends that the DRP covers work-related or employment-related disputes only, and 16 thus the DRP cannot reach disputes based on conduct that occurred well after the 17 termination of the employment relationship. Id. 18 Hindering Plaintiff’s specious arguments is the plain language of the agreement. 19 For example, the first page of the DRP reads, “[t]he requirements, obligations, procedures 20 and benefits in this booklet are binding on the Employee and the Company during and 21 after the period of the Employee’s employment.” Dkt. # 10-1 at 3. The DRP indeed 22 excludes claims for worker’s compensation benefits. Id. at 5. However, FDCPA and 23 defamation claims do not fall within the scope of workers’ compensation benefits simply 24 because they relate to a workplace injury. The key distinction lies in the type of relief 25 being sought, whether it be medical or workplace injury benefits, as opposed to damages 26 1 to harm to reputation or improper debt collection, the latter of which applies here. 2 Finally, the FDCPA and defamation claims are amenable to resolution through arbitration 3 as per the DRP policy provided by Defendants. Id. at 6. 4 C. Enforceability of Arbitration Provision 5 Defendants claim that the arbitrator, and not the Court, must be the party to rule 6 on any arguments Plaintiff presents as to the enforceability of the arbitration provision. 7 The Court concurs with Defendants’ reasoning. 8 “If a valid agreement exists, and if the agreement delegates the arbitrability issue 9 to an arbitrator, a court may not decide the arbitrability issue.” Henry Schein, Inc. v. 10 Archer & White Sales, Inc., 586 U.S. 63, 67–69 (2019). The DRP contains an express 11 delegation provision stating the following: “[o]nly disputes that state a legal claim will 12 be arbitrated . . . [t]he arbitrator has the sole authority to determine whether a dispute is 13 arbitrable and whether it has been timely filed and pursued.” Dkt. # 10-1 at 10 (emphasis 14 added). The DRP further explains that “[t]he arbitrator will resolve any issue/dispute 15 arising out of or relating to the interpretation or application of the DRP or its rules.” Id. 16 Plaintiff disputes the enforceability of the arbitration provision on the grounds that 17 the DRP fails to specify that threshold issues of arbitrability are delegated to an arbitrator 18 and that the DRP cannot reach disputes based on conduct that occurred well after the 19 termination of an employment relationship. Dkt. # 11 at 4, 11. Given the binding case 20 law and the Court’s prior finding that the arbitration provision is valid, supra, the Court 21 defers to the arbitrator to rule on any enforceability arguments. 22 V. CONCLUSION 23 Based on the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to 24 Compel Arbitration and STAYS this case. Dkt. # 8. Pursuant to the language contained 25 in the arbitration provision, the arbitration of all disputes will be administered by the 26 1 American Arbitration Association under its Consumer Arbitration Rules in effect at the 2 time arbitration commences. 3 The parties are directed to advise the court of the status of arbitration within ninety 4 (90) days of this order. If the parties fail to commence arbitration within twelve (12) 5 months of this order, the court will dismiss the underlying claims and terminate the case. 6 See Sanford v. MemberWorks, Inc., 483 F.3d 956, 962-63 (9th Cir. 2007). 7

8 Dated this 18th day of April, 2024. 9 A 10 11 The Honorable Richard A. Jones 12 United States District Judge 13

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