USCA4 Appeal: 25-1355 Doc: 45 Filed: 06/16/2026 Pg: 1 of 15
PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 25-1355
BACARDI & COMPANY LIMITED; BACARDI USA, INC.,
Plaintiffs – Appellants,
v.
JOHN A. SQUIRES, in his official capacity as the Director of the United States Patent & Trademark Office; UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
Defendant – Appellee,
and
EMPRESA CUBANA EXPORTADORA DE ALIMENTOS Y PRODUCTOS VARIOS,
Intervenor/Defendant – Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge. (1:21-cv-01441-LMB-IDD)
Argued: December 9, 2025 Decided: June 16, 2026
Before NIEMEYER, RICHARDSON, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Richardson wrote the opinion, in which Judges Niemeyer and Rushing joined.
ARGUED: David Meir Zionts, COVINGTON & BURLING LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellants. Weili Justin Shaw, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, USCA4 Appeal: 25-1355 Doc: 45 Filed: 06/16/2026 Pg: 2 of 15
Washington, D.C.; Carl Jonas Micarelli, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP, New York, New York, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Michael C. Lynch, Damon W. Suden, Edwin Adlam Herod, KELLEY DRYE & WARREN, LLP, New York, New York; Alexander J. Cave, Yevgeniy Pilipovskiy, COVINGTON & BURLING LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellants. Brett A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel Tenny, Civil Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellees John Arthur Squires and United States Patent & Trademark Office. David H. Bernstein, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP, New York, New York, for Appellee Empresa Cubana Exportadora de Alimentos y Productos Varios.
2 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1355 Doc: 45 Filed: 06/16/2026 Pg: 3 of 15
RICHARDSON, Circuit Judge:
This spirited trademark dispute lands before our Court yet again. In 2005,
Cubaexport applied to renew a trademark registration with the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO). But Cubaexport’s payment of renewal fees was legally void
without a specific license issued by the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC). For over a decade, OFAC refused to issue that license. Then, in 2016, it issued
a license retroactively authorizing Cubaexport’s 2005 payment. Based on the issuance of
that license, the PTO approved Cubaexport’s renewal filing. Bacardi argues that the PTO
exceeded its statutory authority and acted arbitrarily and capriciously by granting renewal
ten years after the renewal deadline. We disagree. OFAC’s 2016 license validated
Cubaexport’s 2005 payment, removing the sole legal obstacle to renewal. So we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
We have detailed the underlying facts elsewhere. See Bacardi & Co. Ltd. v. U.S.
Pat. & Trademark Off. (Bacardi II), 104 F.4th 527, 529–30 (4th Cir. 2024). We distill the
relevant facts here.
Bacardi has sought registration of the HAVANA CLUB trademark for decades. But
Empresa Cubana Exportadora de Alimentos y Productos Varios—a Cuban state-owned
business known as “Cubaexport”—has long stood in its way.1 Cubaexport registered the
1 The trademark was previously registered by José Arechabala, S.A. See Bacardi II, 104 F.4th at 529. During the Cuban Revolution, the Cuban government seized and expropriated Arechabala’s assets without compensation. After Arechabala’s registration expired, Cubaexport registered HAVANA CLUB for itself. In the 1990s, Arechabala sold its remaining interest in the mark to Bacardi. Bacardi sought to register the mark and cancel Cubaexport’s registration, which spawned a still-pending lawsuit. See Bacardi & Co. Ltd. 3 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1355 Doc: 45 Filed: 06/16/2026 Pg: 4 of 15
trademark in the United States in 1976 and renewed its registration in 1986 and 1996. See
15 U.S.C. § 1058(a) (“Each registration shall remain in force for 10 years . . . .”).
Cubaexport never sold rum in the United States under the HAVANA CLUB mark
during this period, because OFAC regulations prohibit Cuban entities from engaging in
most transactions in the United States. See generally Cuban Assets Control Regulations,
31 C.F.R. pt. 515. Originally, OFAC nevertheless allowed certain transactions related to
the registration and renewal of trademarks with the PTO. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.201,
515.527 (1995). That authorization included payment of the statutorily required renewal
fee. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1058(b), 1059(a); 31 C.F.R. § 515.527(e) (1995). But in 1998,
Congress prohibited those transactions too. See Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 211(a), 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-88
(1998). Under the new regime, to renew its trademark registration before it expired in July
2006, Cubaexport needed to obtain a “specific license” from OFAC exempting it from this
prohibition. 31 C.F.R. § 501.801(b).
In December 2005, Cubaexport submitted its renewal filing without the required
license. The PTO received the renewal funds, but OFAC later notified the PTO that
Cubaexport lacked specific authorization for the payment. So Cubaexport quickly applied
for a license.
v. Empresa Cubana Exportadora de Alimentos y Productos Varios, No. 1:04-cv-00519 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 29, 2004) (case docket). 4 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1355 Doc: 45 Filed: 06/16/2026 Pg: 5 of 15
With the renewal deadline closing in, a PTO examiner 2 notified Cubaexport that its
application was deficient because the “required fee” had “not been paid,” citing the OFAC
notification. J.A. 289. The examiner indicated the December 2005 fee would “be refunded
since it was not properly authorized” and warned that if Cubaexport failed to obtain a
specific license, its registration would expire. J.A. 291 n.1.
OFAC denied Cubaexport a specific license. So, in August 2006, the PTO examiner
refused to renew Cubaexport’s registration and refunded the renewal fee. Cubaexport
responded on two fronts: It sued OFAC in federal court and petitioned the PTO Director
for review of the decision to deny renewal. The Director suspended “matters with respect
to [the PTO] petition” while the OFAC litigation played out. J.A. 466.
Six years later, Cubaexport lost the OFAC suit. See Empresa Cubana Exportadora
de Alimentos y Productos Varios v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 638 F.3d 794 (D.C. Cir.
2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 986 (2012). But Cubaexport pressed on. First, when it
reported the suit’s outcome to the PTO, Cubaexport presented additional arguments against
cancellation of its mark—which further delayed the PTO Director’s review. Second, in
November 2015, Cubaexport again applied for a specific license from OFAC to renew its
trademark registration, ahead of what would be its 2016 expiration date.
This time, OFAC granted the license. Specifically, OFAC authorized Cubaexport
“to engage in all transactions necessary to renew and maintain the HAVANA CLUB
trademark registration . . . including those related to Cubaexport’s submission filed with
A PTO examiner, or “trademark examining attorney,” is a federal employee who 2
examines trademark applications for compliance with applicable laws. 5 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1355 Doc: 45 Filed: 06/16/2026 Pg: 6 of 15
the USPTO on or about December 14, 2005, and the payment referenced therein.” J.A.
518. Cubaexport updated the PTO, and in January 2016, the Director 3 granted
Cubaexport’s petition for review of the examiner’s 2006 refusal to renew. The Director
noted that Cubaexport had “timely submitted” its renewal filing and payment, but the
examiner had been “constrained to refuse the filing” because Cubaexport lacked OFAC
authorization for the fee payment. J.A. 526. Because Cubaexport had since obtained a
license specifically authorizing the December 2005 payment, the Director found “the fee
payment . . . effective as of December 14, 2005,” and the renewal filing to be “complete
and acceptable as of that date.” 4 Id.
But the PTO’s action did not end the matter. Instead, Bacardi entered the fray, suing
the PTO and its Director under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2). Bacardi & Co. Ltd. v. U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off. (Bacardi I), No. 1:21-cv-
1441, 2022 WL 2184940 (E.D. Va. Apr. 6, 2022). In Bacardi’s view, the Director lacked
statutory authority to renew an already-expired registration and did not reasonably explain
The Commissioner for Trademarks acted on the Director’s behalf in granting 3
Cubaexport’s petition. For simplicity, we refer to the Director as the decisionmaker. 4 The Director concluded that, in the alternative, nonpayment of the renewal fee is a deficiency that is curable “within the time period prescribed after notification of the deficiency.” J.A. 526 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1058(c), 1059(a)). The Director reasoned that Cubaexport timely petitioned the Director and was entitled to cure the deficiency while its petition was pending. Because Cubaexport provided the OFAC license as a “timely supplement to its petition” and authorized the PTO to “charge any uncollected fees,” the Director deemed the application complete. J.A. 526. 6 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1355 Doc: 45 Filed: 06/16/2026 Pg: 7 of 15
the decision to grant the petition. 5 See Bacardi II, 104 F.4th at 530. The district court
dismissed the case, holding that the Lanham Act precluded judicial review under the APA.
We reversed and remanded. Id. at 530–34.
On remand, Cubaexport intervened as a defendant. See Bacardi & Co. Ltd. v. U.S.
Pat. & Trademark Off. (Bacardi III), No. 1:21-cv-1441, 2025 WL 711959, at *1 (E.D. Va.
Mar. 3, 2025). The parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the district
court granted Defendants’ motions. Id. at *6. The district court reasoned that the OFAC
license validated the payment as of December 2005, so the payment was timely. Id. at *4.
In the alternative, it held that Cubaexport corrected any fee deficiency by making a valid
payment while its petition was pending. Id. at *5. Bacardi timely appealed, and we now
reach the merits.
II. DISCUSSION
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo and, accordingly,
review the PTO’s actions directly. Pharm. Coal. for Patient Access v. United States, 126
F.4th 947, 953 (4th Cir. 2025).
A. The PTO Director Acted Within Statutory Authority
Whether the PTO exceeded its statutory authority is a question of law we review de
novo. Outdoor Amusement Bus. Ass’n, Inc. v. DHS, 983 F.3d 671, 679–80 (4th Cir. 2020).
We conclude that the PTO acted within its authority.
5 As we noted in Bacardi II, “[v]arious Directors have led the PTO since the events underlying this suit.” 104 F.4th at 530 n.2. The current Director, John A. Squires, is the named defendant on appeal. 7 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1355 Doc: 45 Filed: 06/16/2026 Pg: 8 of 15
The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq., provides federal statutory protection for
trademarks and creates a nationwide trademark registry. U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off. v.
Booking.com B.V., 591 U.S. 549, 552 (2020). Registration confers significant benefits: It
is “prima facie evidence” of the mark’s validity and provides constructive notice
nationwide of the registrant’s claim of ownership. Iancu v. Brunetti, 588 U.S. 388, 391
(2019) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a)).
To prevent marks no longer in use from cluttering the register and blocking others
from using them, a registration expires ten years after issuance unless the registrant renews
it within the statutory period. 15 U.S.C. § 1058(a). Sections 8 and 9 lay out the renewal
requirements. Section 8 requires the registrant to file an affidavit confirming the mark’s
continued use in commerce (or providing an excuse for nonuse) and to pay a fee.
§ 1058(b). Section 9 allows a registration to be renewed for ten-year periods “upon
payment of the prescribed fee and the filing of a written application.” 6 15 U.S.C. § 1059(a).
The Act authorizes the Director to set the requirements for a complete affidavit and
application. See id. But it requires the registrant to pay the fee in the year before the
registration expires, or within a six-month grace period thereafter if accompanied by a
grace-period surcharge. §§ 1058(a), 1059(a).
In December 2005, Cubaexport wired money to the PTO. Although the funds
transferred, the PTO later determined that Cubaexport lacked the required license and
6 The statute authorizes the Director to prescribe the fee amount. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1058(b)(1)(D), 1059(a). The fee schedule is set by regulation. See 37 C.F.R. § 2.6(a)(5), (12). In practice, applicants may submit a combined Section 8 affidavit and Section 9 renewal application with the required fees. 8 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1355 Doc: 45 Filed: 06/16/2026 Pg: 9 of 15
refunded the payment. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.203(a). Without payment, Cubaexport could
not satisfy a statutory requirement for renewal. Cf. Bacardi & Co. Ltd. v. Empresa Cubana
Exportadora de Alimentos y Productos Varios, No. 1:04-cv-00519, 2023 WL 2384145, at
*3 (D.D.C. Mar. 6, 2023) (describing how OFAC’s retroactive license revocation
invalidated intervening transfers). That was true in 2006, when the PTO examiner found
the filing could not be accepted.
But we do not review the PTO examiner’s 2006 decision, because it was not the
agency’s final action in this matter. Because Cubaexport timely petitioned the Director for
review, the Director’s 2016 decision is the PTO’s final action—and the only action we
review today. 5 U.S.C. § 704; 37 C.F.R. § 2.186(c). In 2016, the Director determined that
Cubaexport’s payment was valid as of 2005.
What changed between 2006 and 2016? Cubaexport secured an OFAC license.
Under the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, that license authorized the December 2005
payment. Section 515.502 of the regulations governs when a license may authorize an
earlier transaction: No license “shall be deemed to authorize or validate any transaction
effected prior to the issuance thereof” unless the license “specifically so provides.” 31
C.F.R. § 515.502(a); see also 31 C.F.R. § 515.203(c) (addressing licenses issued “before,
during or after a transfer”). The phrase “specifically so provides” refers to the operative
authorization in the preceding clause—the authorization or validation of an already-
9 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1355 Doc: 45 Filed: 06/16/2026 Pg: 10 of 15
effected transaction. 31 C.F.R. § 515.502(a). In other words, that antecedent phrase
identifies what the license must specifically provide. 7
Cubaexport’s license did just that. It authorized Cubaexport “to engage in all
transactions necessary to renew and maintain” its trademark registration, “including those
related to Cubaexport’s submission filed with the USPTO on or about December 14, 2005,
and the payment referenced therein.” J.A. 518. The license specifically identifies and
authorizes past transactions, including the December 2005 payment. That is enough under
§ 515.502(a). 8
So § 515.502(a) tells us that the 2016 OFAC license reaches the December 2005
transaction. And § 515.203(c) tells us the license’s legal effect: A license authorizing a
prior transfer “shall validate such transfer or render it enforceable to the same extent as it
would be valid or enforceable but for” the embargo against Cuba. 31 C.F.R. § 515.203(c).
But for the embargo, the 2005 payment would have been timely and effective, satisfying
the statutory renewal requirement. Indeed, the funds changed hands. It was only later that
7 Bacardi argues that § 515.502(a) demands a clear statement that the license applies retroactively. True enough. Section 515.502(a) is a clear-statement rule of sorts—a license won’t be read to reach backward by silence or implication. But the regulation requires specificity, not talismanic phrasing. A license that identifies a past transaction and authorizes it clearly applies retroactively. 8 Bacardi’s focus on the word “engage” in the license is misplaced. “To engage” is an infinitive; it carries no tense of its own and draws its temporal content from context. Here, the license authorized transactions “including those related to” a submission already “filed” in December 2005 and “the payment referenced therein.” J.A. 518. That language points to past conduct, not merely future acts. Section 515.502(a) requires no more. 10 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1355 Doc: 45 Filed: 06/16/2026 Pg: 11 of 15
the PTO examiner directed that the payment be refunded. 9 When the Director considered
the petition’s merits in 2016, the license had validated the December 2005 payment,
making it just as valid as it would have been in a world with no embargo. So the Director
correctly found that Cubaexport had paid the fee within the renewal period.
9 Bacardi urges us to hold that a payee’s subsequent handling of funds determines a payment’s validity. Relying on dictionary definitions, Bacardi claims that “payment” requires not only tender, but also the payee’s acceptance. See Payment, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024); Payment, Black’s Law Dictionary (3d ed. 1933). But a payee- focused definition is far from universal. See Payment, Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary (3d ed. 2002); Payment, Webster’s New Int’l Dictionary (2d ed. 1942). And when dictionaries define a term differently, the statutory text resolves the dispute. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 226–29 (1994). Here, Bacardi’s understanding runs counter to the statutory text. Indeed, the statute conditions renewal upon “payment” of the prescribed fee and “filing” of a renewal application. These are both acts the registrant must perform within the statutory window, not the agency. 15 U.S.C. § 1059(a); cf. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure § 405.06 (2002) (identifying only bounced checks, refused EFTs, and chargebacks—actions initiated by a third-party financial institution—as grounds to treat a fee as unpaid). Bacardi’s rule would make the registrant responsible for something only the agency can do: accepting the funds. Cf. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 768 F.3d 580, 587 n.1 (6th Cir. 2014) (finding it “inappropriate to permit [an agency], as the putative payee, to determine whether a specific remittance constitutes a payment”). A later refund—whether correct or incorrect—does not erase the registrant’s timely tender, or its legal effect, if the tender is ultimately validated.
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The OFAC license gave the prior payment new legal status. The Director was no
longer required to refuse renewal—and acted within statutory limits by granting it. 10 So
Bacardi’s statutory-authority challenge fails. 11
B. The Director Reasonably Explained The Decision
Agencies must act reasonably and explain themselves reasonably. Ohio v. EPA, 603
U.S. 279, 292 (2024). The agency must offer a “rational connection between the facts
found and the choice made.” Id. (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). But if the PTO’s explanation is merely “of less
than ideal clarity,” we will uphold its decision “if the agency’s path may reasonably be
discerned.” State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight
Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974)). This kind of review is “very deferential.” Vanda
Pharms., Inc. v. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 98 F.4th 483, 498 (4th Cir. 2024)
(quoting Rural Cellular Ass’n v. FCC, 588 F.3d 1095, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).
The Director’s explanation was brief but adequate. The Director identified the
examiner’s reason for refusing renewal: Cubaexport lacked OFAC authorization for the
fee payment. See J.A. 526 (noting the examiner was “constrained to refuse the filing
because petitioner lacked an OFAC license authorizing the fee payment”). The Director
10 Timely submission of the combined filing and statutory fees is necessary but not sufficient for renewal. The filing may be deficient in other ways, some of which may be corrected. Although the Director cannot waive these threshold requirements, satisfying them does not compel renewal. The Director may still refuse renewal on other grounds. 11 Because the validated 2005 payment satisfied the statutory fee requirement, we do not consider the alternative argument that Cubaexport cured a payment deficiency while its petition was pending. 12 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1355 Doc: 45 Filed: 06/16/2026 Pg: 13 of 15
then identified the changed fact: Cubaexport had obtained an OFAC license specifically
authorizing the December 2005 filing and fee payment. See id. (“Petitioner has provided
an OFAC license that specifically authorizes petitioner’s December 14, 2005 combined
§ 8/9 filing and fee payment.”). So the Director drew the straightforward legal conclusion:
“[T]he fee payment is effective as of December 14, 2005, and the combined § 8/9 filing is
considered complete and acceptable as of that date.” Id. 12
Even so, Bacardi contends the Director acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing
to explain the delay in deciding the petition for review. We disagree. Much of the delay
required no explanation: The petition was stayed during the OFAC litigation. And after
the stay lifted, the Director considered Cubaexport’s renewed arguments against
cancellation, leaving at most a fraction of the total delay unaccounted for. Regardless of
the reasons for the delay, Bacardi did not timely challenge the decision’s timing or the lack
of explanation for the delay. 13 So this argument is forfeited. See Grayson O Co. v. Agadir
Int’l LLC, 856 F.3d 307, 316 (4th Cir. 2017).
12 The Director did not explicitly cite the regulatory provision that permits an OFAC license to “authorize or validate any transaction effected prior to the issuance thereof” if it “specifically so provides.” 31 C.F.R. § 515.502(a). But the Director’s reliance on that rationale is readily discernible from the Director’s language, which tracked the regulatory text, explaining that Cubaexport’s license “specifically authorizes” its December 2005 fee payment, rendering it “effective as of December 14, 2005.” J.A. 526 (emphasis added). 13 Before the Director granted the petition for review, Bacardi might have challenged the delay itself. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Cuccinelli, 985 F.3d 357, 375 (4th Cir. 2021); Telecomms. Rsch. & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984). And after the petition for review was granted, Bacardi might have challenged the agency’s action based on prejudicial delay. See Solenex LLC v. Bernhardt, 962 F.3d 520, 527–28 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (“[A] party challenging agency action must identify something more than mere delay—it must identify harmful consequences emanating from that delay that were not reasonably 13 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1355 Doc: 45 Filed: 06/16/2026 Pg: 14 of 15
Bacardi takes several more shots at the Director’s decision. 14 None land. To the
extent these objections dress Bacardi’s statutory arguments in arbitrary-and-capricious
clothing, we reject them for the same reasons we concluded the Director acted within
statutory authority. And an agency need only address the “important aspect[s] of the
problem” before it, not every item in the administrative record. State Farm, 463 U.S. at
43. The administrative record makes clear that only the missing OFAC license prevented
Cubaexport’s timely submission from satisfying the Lanham Act’s fee requirement. It was
not arbitrary or capricious to conclude that removing this sole barrier satisfied the statute.
* * *
taken into account by the agency.”). Bacardi did neither. Nor has Bacardi pointed to anything that demanded the Director explain its procedural timeline prior to reaching a final action. Cf. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (requiring an agency to “articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action”). 14 For example, Bacardi challenges the PTO’s collection of the renewal fee and a late surcharge. The deficiency surcharge, however, is consistent with the PTO’s alternative determination that Cubaexport timely cured a payment deficiency. Any overcharge is between Cubaexport and the PTO; it is not a basis for invalidating the renewal. Bacardi also faults the Director for not reconciling the decision with how the PTO treated the fee payment in the meantime. But the PTO’s interim handling of the payment is irrelevant to the payment’s legal status after OFAC issued the license authorizing the December 2005 payment. Cf. Vandenbark v. Owens-Ill. Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538, 542–43 (1941) (noting that changes in law may “cause the reversal of judgments which were correct when entered”); Ziffrin, Inc. v. United States, 318 U.S. 73, 78 (1943) (“[T]he Commission was required to act under the law as it existed when its order . . . was entered. . . . Otherwise the administrative body would issue orders contrary to the existing legislation.”); Thorpe v. Hous. Auth., 393 U.S. 268, 281–82 (1969) (extending the general rule that “an appellate court must apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision” to changes “made by an administrative agency acting pursuant to legislative authorization”). The changed legal status of the 2005 payment is not evidence contrary to the Director’s decision. So the Director had no obligation to address it. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43. 14 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1355 Doc: 45 Filed: 06/16/2026 Pg: 15 of 15
The OFAC license cleared the fog, removing the legal obstacle that had prevented
the 2005 transfer from counting as payment. What looked incomplete in 2006 was, by
2016, timely and effective. The Director recognized as much, and so did the district court.
The judgment is
AFFIRMED.