B & L Concourse Housing Assoc. v. Elliot

26 Misc. 3d 487
CourtCivil Court of the City of New York
DecidedOctober 7, 2009
StatusPublished

This text of 26 Misc. 3d 487 (B & L Concourse Housing Assoc. v. Elliot) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Civil Court of the City of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
B & L Concourse Housing Assoc. v. Elliot, 26 Misc. 3d 487 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 2009).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Verna L. Saunders, J.

Petitioner commenced the within nonpayment proceeding seeking rents allegedly owed by the above-named tenants. The disputes are varied but center around the rent regulatory status of the subject premises. Petitioner claims that the premises are not regulated by rent stabilization law and are instead federally regulated through an agreement between itself and the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the City of New York Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD). Petitioner further claims that by virtue of this agreement, federal regulations preempt state rent regulation law and thus, the premises are not rent stabilized.

Respondents dispute this and claim that the premises are rent stabilized and that the federal regulation involved applies only to the financing of the properties and creates a multi-tiered system of regulation, which includes state rent stabilization protections. The resulting claim of respondents is that petitioner is unlawfully seeking rent in excess of the amount contracted by the parties and unjustifiably seeks a rent increase in violation of rent stabilization law. On this basis, respondents move for an order: consolidating the proceedings; granting leave for respondents to serve an amended answer; granting summary judgment, pursuant to CPLR 3212, on the basis that petitioner seeks rent in excess of the contract rent and last legal registered rent; dismissal of the petition, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (2), in that the rent demand is defective; and, dismissal, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), on the basis that petitioner failed to properly plead the regulatory status of the premises. Petitioner opposes the motion.

Pursuant to CPLR 602, the matters are herein consolidated for disposition, as determined at oral argument.

[489]*489In addition, leave is granted to file the proposed amended answer annexed to the moving papers. CPLR 3025 (b) grants broad discretion to the court to permit amendment of answers. (Unger v Leviton, 5 Misc 3d 925 [Sup Ct, Nassau County 2004].) As petitioner has failed to oppose that portion of the motion, the amended answer is deemed served and filed.

According to petitioner, the subject premises were gut-rehabilitated in the late 1980s-early 1990s through federal funding from a now extinct source, through a program which is no longer in existence. The Housing Development Action Grant (HODAG) program issued grant assistance for the project pursuant to an agreement with the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development and the City of New York Department of Housing Preservation and Development. Petitioner contracted with the Department of Housing and Urban Development to rehabilitate the subject premises and agreed through this federal funding scheme to set aside 20% of the units (21 units) as “very low” income housing. At issue herein is whether state or federal regulations govern rent calculation and subsequent rent increases for the four “very low” income units involved in the instant case.

Determining a preemption question requires an analysis of the three ways in which federal law can preempt state or local law: by express provision in the federal statute; by inference, in the case where the federal scheme is pervasive and exhaustive as to the federal obligations imposed; or in the event of conflict between the laws, such that compliance with both is impossible or local or state compliance would thwart the objectives of the federal counterpart. (See Rosario v Diagonal Realty, LLC, 9 Misc 3d 681, 692 [2005], affd 32 AD3d 739 [2006], affd 8 NY3d 755, cert denied 552 US —, 128 S Ct 1069 [2008], citing City of New York v Job-Lot Pushcart, 88 NY2d 163 [1996].)

While the regulatory status of the premises is critical for determining the rights and obligations of the parties, here many factors impede an obvious determination of this issue. Little counsel is provided by the terms of the HODAG program itself as it primarily outlines the financial scheme involved. However, the material facts are essentially undisputed. The HODAG program at the subject premises provided for a set aside of 21 units for “very low” income tenants. As to the “very low income” units at issue here, it is unclear how the initial rents were calculated. It is also unclear whether an evaluation of the income status of the tenants was performed at the initial lease [490]*490signing. It is, however, undisputed that the petitioner offered rent-stabilized leases to respondents for nearly the entire length of each tenancy.1 At a subsequent time, HODAG leases were offered to tenants, seeking to increase the rent, allegedly pursuant to HODAG calculations.2 Prior to petitioner offering the HODAG leases which led to the instant litigation, petitioner offered rent-stabilized renewal leases, presumably based on the schedule of allowable Rent Guidelines Board increases. The HODAG program is in fact now defunct. And it further appears to this court that the 20-year program limit is fast approaching, if not already here. All these factors create a circumstance where it is difficult to determine the continuing viability of the HODAG guidelines in a situation where the guidelines were never followed.

An analysis of the current state of the law provides little direct guidance. In 43-45 W. 129th St. HDFC v Doe (NYLJ, Mar. 2, 1992, at 31, col 2), the court evaluated whether a building was exempt from rent regulation where the building was formerly owned by New York City and a participant in HPD’s Division of Alternative Management Program (DAMP). The court determined that the tenant’s receipt of benefits in a building which had an agreement with the federal HODAG program had no effect on the rent regulation status of the apartment. Specifically, the court determined that the local rent regulations were not preempted by the Section 17 Housing Development Grant Program (42 USC § 1437o; see 43-45 W. 129th St. HDFC v Doe).

The court acknowledges that in that case, the respondents occupied the premises prior to the owner’s participation in the federal grant program and were found to retain their regulated status, succeeding to the “former” rent-regulated tenancy, while the respondents here entered into possession after the regulatory agreement was executed. However, the court finds instructive the determination on the limited question of whether the regulations of the contracting agency, there HPD, preempted the local rent control and rent stabilization law. The 43-45 W. 129th St. court found that federal law did not preempt the local law.

[491]*491223 Chelsea Assoc., LLC v Dobler (NYLJ, May 18, 2001, at 18, col 2 [App Term, 1st Dept]) stands for the proposition that once the premises are no longer supervised by HUD, the unit becomes subject to rent stabilization, pursuant to section 2520.11 of the Rent Stabilization Code (RSC) (9 NYCRR). At issue in Dobler was a federally funded project in which participation in the federal scheme was terminated by virtue of satisfaction of the HUD mortgage. Petitioner opted to terminate the tenancies in holdover proceedings alleging that the lease terms expired. It was alleged, therefore, that since HUD’s involvement in the premises had ended there no longer existed a valid basis for petitioner to contend exemption from local rent regulation.

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Related

Rosario v. Diagonal Realty, LLC
872 N.E.2d 860 (New York Court of Appeals, 2007)
City of New York v. Job-Lot Pushcart
666 N.E.2d 537 (New York Court of Appeals, 1996)
Rosario v. Diagonal Realty, LLC
32 A.D.3d 739 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2006)
Unger v. Leviton
5 Misc. 3d 925 (New York Supreme Court, 2004)
Rosario v. Diagonal Realty, LLC
9 Misc. 3d 681 (New York Supreme Court, 2005)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
26 Misc. 3d 487, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/b-l-concourse-housing-assoc-v-elliot-nycivct-2009.