B. B. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin)
• Decided: January 8, 2026
• Docket: 03-25-00649-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-25-00649-CV

B. B., Appellant

v.

Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee

FROM THE 53RD DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. D-1-FM-24-001890, THE HONORABLE MAYA GUERRA GAMBLE, JUDGE PRESIDING

MEMORANDUM OPINION

B.B. (Mother) appeals from the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights

to her children. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001. After a jury trial, the trial court rendered

judgment finding by clear and convincing evidence that two statutory grounds existed for

terminating Mother’s parental rights and that termination was in the children’s best interest. See

id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (2).

Mother’s court-appointed counsel has filed a brief concluding that her appeal is

frivolous and without merit. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); In re P.M.,

520 S.W.3d 24, 27 & n.10 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (approving use of Anders procedure in

appeals from termination of parental rights because it “strikes an important balance between the

defendant’s constitutional right to counsel on appeal and counsel’s obligation not to prosecute

frivolous appeals” (citations omitted)). The brief meets the requirements of Anders by

presenting a professional evaluation of the record and demonstrating why there are no arguable

grounds to be advanced on appeal. See 386 U.S. at 744; Taylor v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 160 S.W.3d 641, 646–47 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied) (applying

Anders procedure in parental-termination case). Mother’s counsel certified to this Court that she

provided Mother with a copy of the Anders brief and a copy of the entire appellate record and

informed her of her right to file a pro se brief. The Department of Family and Protective

Services has filed a response to the Anders brief, waiving its right to file an appellee’s brief

unless requested by this Court or as needed to respond to any pro se brief filed by appellant.

Mother has filed a pro se brief, which we have reviewed.

We have conducted a full examination of all of the proceedings to determine

whether the appeal is wholly frivolous, as we must when presented with an Anders brief. See

Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988). We have specifically reviewed the jury’s findings under

parts (D) and (E) of Family Code § 161.001(b)(1), and we have found no non-frivolous issues

that could be raised on appeal with respect to that finding. See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 237

(Tex. 2019) (holding that “due process and due course of law requirements mandate that an

appellate court detail its analysis for an appeal of termination of parental rights under section

161.001(b)(1)(D) or (E) of the Family Code”). After reviewing the record, the Anders brief,

and Mother’s pro se brief, we find nothing in the record that would arguably support Mother’s

appeal. We agree with Mother’s counsel that the appeal is frivolous and without merit.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating the parental rights of Mother.

__________________________________________ Karin Crump, Justice

Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Crump and Ellis

Affirmed

Filed: January 8, 2026 2