Azor v. City of New York

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Azor v. City of New York

137 A.D.3d 426, 25 N.Y.S.3d 869

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMarch 1, 2016

Docket358 21026/13

StatusPublished

This text of 137 A.D.3d 426 (Azor v. City of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Azor v. City of New York, 137 A.D.3d 426, 25 N.Y.S.3d 869 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2016).

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Opinion

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Mitchell J. Danziger, J.), entered on or about September 5, 2014, which granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff’s claim for alleged civil rights violations during disciplinary hearing proceedings, under 42 USC § 1983, is barred by the three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [5]; Owens v Okure, 488 US 235, 250 [1989]; 423 S. Salina St. v City of Syracuse, 68 NY2d 474, 486 [1986], cert denied 481 US 1008 [1987]). Plaintiff’s time to commence the section 1983 action began to accrue on the date of the disciplinary hearing determination, as it impliedly challenged the conditions of his confinement, namely, punitive segregation, and not the fact or duration of his confinement (see Jenkins v Haubert, 179 F3d 19 [2d Cir 1999]; cf. Edwards v Balisok, 520 US 641 [1997]; Heck v Humphrey, 512 US 477 [1994]). That plaintiff was a pretrial detainee, at the time, does not bring this claim outside of the purview of Jenkins.

Concur—Acosta, J.P., Renwick, Andrias and Moskowitz, JJ.

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Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Mitchell J. Danziger, J.), entered on or about September 5, 2014, which granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff’s claim for alleged civil rights violations during disciplinary hearing proceedings, under 42 USC § 1983, is barred by the three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [5]; Owens v Okure, 488 US 235, 250 [1989]; 423 S. Salina St. v City of Syracuse, 68 NY2d 474, 486 [1986], cert denied 481 US 1008 [1987]). Plaintiff’s time to commence the section 1983 action began to accrue on the date of the disciplinary hearing determination, as it impliedly challenged the conditions of his confinement, namely, punitive segregation, and not the fact or duration of his confinement (see Jenkins v Haubert, 179 F3d 19 [2d Cir 1999]; cf. Edwards v Balisok, 520 US 641 [1997]; Heck v Humphrey, 512 US 477 [1994]). That plaintiff was a pretrial detainee, at the time, does not bring this claim outside of the purview of Jenkins.

Concur—Acosta, J.P., Renwick, Andrias and Moskowitz, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

137 A.D.3d 426, 25 N.Y.S.3d 869, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/azor-v-city-of-new-york-nyappdiv-2016.

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