Azell Jackson Hodges, Jr. v. United States

Fifth Circuit

Azell Jackson Hodges, Jr. v. United States

363 F.2d 439, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 5464

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

DecidedJuly 18, 1966

Docket22682_1

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 363 F.2d 439 (Azell Jackson Hodges, Jr. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Azell Jackson Hodges, Jr. v. United States, 363 F.2d 439, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 5464 (5th Cir. 1966).

Pincite

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The appellant, Azell Jackson Hodges, Jr., was convicted by a jury April 7, 1965 for possession, removal, and concealment of distilled spirits in violation of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5205(a) (2), 5604(a) (4), and 5601 (a) (12). In this appeal, he questions (1) the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction; and (2) the completeness of the court’s instructions to the jury on the requirements of possession.”

We find that the evidence as a whole is sufficient to support both counts of the conviction. The evidence of dominion and control satisfies this Court’s standard for possession of unstamped liquor. See Handford v. United States, 5 Cir. 1957, 249 F.2d 295. The circumstantial evidence of removal and concealment was sufficient for the jury to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt. See Clark v. United States, 5 Cir. 1961, 293 F.2d 445, 448.

The appellant argues that the instructions on “possession” were defective in that the judge did not draw a specific distinction between dominion and control of the liquor and mere presence at *440 the stash. We have often observed that specific mention of this distinction is desirable in section 5205(a) (2) possession charges. See, e. g., Handford v. United States, supra 247 F.2d at 297. The appellant requested instructions that expressly noted the distinction. Nonetheless, we find that the instructions given “substantially covered” the requirements of possession in language that would prevent the jury’s mistaking “mere presence at the scene” for dominion and control of the liquor. See Pine v. United States, 5 Cir. 1943, 135 F.2d 353, 355, cert. denied, 320 U.S. 740, 65 S.Ct. 40, 88 L.Ed. 439; cf. Teate v. United States, 5 Cir. 1961, 297 F.2d 120.

The judgment must be affirmed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

PER CURIAM.

The appellant, Azell Jackson Hodges, Jr., was convicted by a jury April 7, 1965 for possession, removal, and concealment of distilled spirits in violation of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5205(a) (2), 5604(a) (4), and 5601 (a) (12). In this appeal, he questions (1) the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction; and (2) the completeness of the court’s instructions to the jury on the requirements of possession.”

We find that the evidence as a whole is sufficient to support both counts of the conviction. The evidence of dominion and control satisfies this Court’s standard for possession of unstamped liquor. See Handford v. United States, 5 Cir. 1957, 249 F.2d 295. The circumstantial evidence of removal and concealment was sufficient for the jury to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt. See Clark v. United States, 5 Cir. 1961, 293 F.2d 445, 448.

The appellant argues that the instructions on “possession” were defective in that the judge did not draw a specific distinction between dominion and control of the liquor and mere presence at *440 the stash. We have often observed that specific mention of this distinction is desirable in section 5205(a) (2) possession charges. See, e. g., Handford v. United States, supra 247 F.2d at 297. The appellant requested instructions that expressly noted the distinction. Nonetheless, we find that the instructions given “substantially covered” the requirements of possession in language that would prevent the jury’s mistaking “mere presence at the scene” for dominion and control of the liquor. See Pine v. United States, 5 Cir. 1943, 135 F.2d 353, 355, cert. denied, 320 U.S. 740, 65 S.Ct. 40, 88 L.Ed. 439; cf. Teate v. United States, 5 Cir. 1961, 297 F.2d 120.

The judgment must be affirmed.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

363 F.2d 439, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 5464, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/azell-jackson-hodges-jr-v-united-states-ca5-1966.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack