A.Z. v. A.R.P.

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: July 30, 2025
• Docket: A-1859-22
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1859-22

A.Z.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

A.R.P.,

Defendant-Respondent,

and

R.T.P.,

Defendant. __________________________

Submitted April 29, 2025 - Decided July 30, 2025

Before Judges Susswein and Bergman.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, Docket No. L-4011-17.

The Privacy Firm PC, attorneys for appellant (Joseph A. Bahgat, on the briefs). Pringle Quinn Anzano, PC, attorneys for respondent (H. Steven Berkowitz, of counsel and on the brief; Denise M. O'Hara, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff A.Z.1 appeals the January 10, 2023 Law Division order granting

defendant A.R.P.'s motion for summary judgment, dismissing her civil

complaint alleging sexual assault by defendant A.R.P. The trial court found that

plaintiff failed to file her complaint within the statute of limitations as then

prescribed in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 and N.J.S.A. 2A:14-21. This matter returns to

us after we partially reversed the trial court's previous order granting defendant's

motion to dismiss. A.Z. v. A.R.P., No. A-5536-17 (App. Div. Feb. 24, 2020)

(slip op. at 15). We instructed the trial court to consider whether plaintiff's

claims are time-barred. Id. at 14-15. Plaintiff contends the trial court failed to

consider that N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2a (subsection 2a), which was enacted during the

pendency of this litigation, replaced the previous two-year statute of limitations.

Subsection 2a allows a child sexual abuse victim to file a civil action within

thirty-seven years of reaching the age of majority or within seven years of

1 We use initials to refer to the parties to protect the privacy of plaintiff, an alleged victim of sexual offenses. A-1859-22 2 reasonable discovery of the injury and its causal relationship to the act,

whichever date is later. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2a(1).

After reviewing the record in light of the parties' arguments and governing

legal principles, we conclude that plaintiff's allegations of sexual assault fall

under the substantially extended statute of limitations adopted in subsection 2a. 2

As to its retroactive application, subsection 2a expressly provides child sexual

abuse victims with a cause of action for acts that occurred "prior to, on or after"

the statute's effective date of December 1, 2019. Ibid. Relatedly, N.J.S.A.

2A:14-2b established a two-year revival window for child sexual abuse victims

to file otherwise time-barred claims, bolstering our conclusion that the

Legislature intended to provide greater opportunities for child sexual abuse

victims to file claims. In view of the unambiguous statutory language, we vacate

the January 10, 2023 order granting summary judgment and remand for the trial

court to consider defendant's motion for summary judgment on the merits.

I.

Plaintiff alleges that, beginning in March 2011, defendant sexually

assaulted her and later physically battered her by punching her in the stomach.

2 We note that neither party filed a Rule 2:6-11 letter alerting us to the enactment of the new law. A-1859-22 3 Plaintiff was then sixteen years old and defendant was seventeen years old.

They attended the same high school. The parties dispute whether the acts were

consensual.

Plaintiff reported the alleged incidents to the Rumson Police Department

on November 5, 2016. On October 19, 2017, plaintiff filed a complaint against

defendant, which she amended on April 25, 2018. Her amended complaint

included four claims: two sexual abuse claims under the Child Sexual Abuse

Act (CSAA), N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1; (counts one and two); an assault and battery

claim against defendant (count three); and a false imprisonment claim against

defendant's father, R.T.P. (count four). The complaint stated, "[b]ecause of

psychological trauma, plaintiff was prevented from discovering the abuse until

Nov[ember] 4, 2016, when she learned [defendant] had also raped one of her

friends."

Defendant moved to dismiss the claim for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e), which the trial court

granted. The court found counts one and two were barred due to defendant's age

at the time of the alleged assaults and counts three and four were time-barred

due to N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2's two-year statute of limitations period.

A-1859-22 4 On appeal, we affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's CSAA claims (counts

one and two) because defendant was not an adult during the period of alleged

abuse. A.Z., slip op. at 10. With respect to counts three and four, we vacated

the trial court's order and remanded the case because "the judge erred by finding

the common law discovery rule inapplicable to plaintiff's common law claims

as a matter of law." Id. at 14. We instructed the remand court to determine the

accrual date of claims three and four, and "whether the claims were timely filed

within the statute of limitations periods in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 and N.J.S.A. 2A:14-

21." Ibid. As noted, neither party addressed the 2019 amendment to N.J.S.A.

2A:14-2, and we did not mention it in our prior opinion.

On remand, defendant filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court

denied. The court explained that it must accept plaintiff's allegations as true,

and her allegations included that she was not aware of the abuse until November

4, 2016. As a result, the trial court concluded, the N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 statute of

limitations did not begin to run until November 4, 2016 because "psychological

trauma prevented her from awareness" of the possibility of an actionable claim.

Since her common law claims were filed on April 25, 2018, the trial court found

they were within the pre-amendment N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 two-year statute of

limitations.

A-1859-22 5 On June 10, 2022, defendants filed for summary judgment with respect to

plaintiff's two remaining tort claims (counts three and four). That motion largely

focused on whether N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 time-barred plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff's

counterstatement of facts also primarily focused on whether the claims are time-

barred.

By this point, plaintiff argued that her claims fell under subsection 2a.

Alternatively, plaintiff contended that, if subsection 2a does not apply, her

claims were not time barred since they fell within the time limitations of

N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 and N.J.S.A. 2A:14-21.

Defendant's motion was heard on January 5 and 9, 2023. The trial court

briefly addressed subsection 2a, stating: "[t]he Appellate Division . . . rejected

[plaintiff's subsection 2a] argument and, therefore, [it] merits no discussion."

The trial court's analysis instead focused on N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 and

N.J.S.A. 2A:14-21. The court determined that plaintiff's claims arose in 2011

and were tolled on the date of her eighteenth birthday in October 2012, per

N.J.S.A. 2A:14-21. Therefore, by the trial court's reckoning, plaintiff had until

October 2014 to bring her claims. Since her complaint was filed on October 19,

2017, the court ruled her claims were time-barred.

A-1859-22 6 In reaching that conclusion, the trial court rejected plaintiff's fact-

sensitive argument that she was unaware of the alleged abuse until November 4,

2016. The court found that "plaintiff fails to cite to a shred of evidence to

support her argument that she did not have the emotional wherewithal to realize

that she had been raped." Plaintiff also argued that she needed more time to

retain an expert to testify about her mental capacity before November 5, 2016,

but the court rejected that argument, reasoning that discovery had already been

extended on five occasions.

The court noted that: "[a]s a threshold issue, the [c]ourt . . . mak[es] no

determination on the v[e]racity of [plaintiff's] allegations" and instead only

considered "whether [plaintiff's claims] were legally complained of within the

statute of limitations, even when considering the discovery rule exceptions."

This appeal followed. Plaintiff raises the following contention for our

consideration:

The trial court erred by applying the incorrect statute of limitations period under N.J.S.A. . . . 2A:14-2, rather than the correct limitation period for sexual assault- related claims set forth in N.J.S.A. . . . 2A:14-2a, as amended, which went into effect on Dec[ember] 1, 2019.

A-1859-22 7 II.

We first focus on plaintiff's argument that the trial court erred by granting

defendant's summary judgment motion based on the two-year statute of

limitations prescribed in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, rather than the extended statute of

limitation set forth in subsection 2a. Plaintiff contends the subsection 2a statute

of limitations is appliable here because it went into effect during the pendency

of her first appeal and applies to common law claims alleging child sexual

assault. Relatedly, plaintiff contends the trial court erred by assuming that

subsection 2a is inapplicable because we did not mention it in our prior opinion.

We review a trial court's summary judgment decision de novo. DeSimone

v. Springpoint Senior Living, Inc., 256 N.J. 172, 180 (2024). Further, we

"accord no 'special deference' to the 'trial court's interpretation of the law and

the legal consequences that flow from established facts.'" Cherokee LCP Land,

LLC v. City of Linden Plan. Bd., 234 N.J. 403, 414-15 (2018) (quoting

Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378

(1995)). This case turns on a legal question concerning the applicability of the

2019 amendments to the statutory framework that imposes time limits on

bringing civil actions.

A-1859-22 8 N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 generally provides a two-year statute of limitations for

personal injury claims. It states: "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, every

action at law for an injury to the person caused by the wrongful act, neglect or

default of any person within this State shall be commenced within two years

next after the cause of any such action shall have accrued . . . ." Ibid. N.J.S.A.

2A:14-21 tolls the statute of limitations for a person who "is under the age of

[eighteen]" and for "a person who has a mental disability that prevents the

person from understanding [their] legal rights or commencing a legal action at

the time the cause of action . . . . accrues." Once the person reaches the age of

majority or has "the mental capacity to pursue [their] lawful rights[,]" the two-

year statute of limitations begins to run. Ibid.

Subsection 2a took effect on December 1, 2019 and extends the two-year

statute of limitations for civil actions alleging child sexual abuse. N.J.S.A.

2A:14-2a. It provides:

a. (1) Every action at law for an injury resulting from the commission of sexual assault, any other crime of a sexual nature, a prohibited sexual act as defined in section 2 of P.L.1992, c. 7 (C.2A:30B-2)[3], or sexual abuse as defined in section 1 of P.L.1992, c. 109 (C.2A:61B-1) against a minor under the age of [eighteen] that occurred prior to, on or after the

3 The Child Exploitation Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:30B-1 to -7, provides a "[c]ivil remedy for victims of child pornography." N.J.S.A. 2A:30B-3. A-1859-22 9 effective date of P.L.2019, c. 120 (C.2A:14-2a et al.) shall be commenced within [thirty-seven] years after the minor reaches the age of majority, or within seven years from the date of reasonable discovery of the injury and its causal relationship to the act, whichever date is later.

[Ibid. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).]

A statute's plain language serves as "the best indicator" of the Legislature's

intent. DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005). "When the provisions of

a statute are clear and unambiguous, they should be given their literal

significance, unless it is clear from the text and purpose of the statute that such

meaning was not intended." Turner v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 162 N.J. 75, 84

(1999). If the Legislature's intent is clear on the face of the statute, then the

"interpretive process is over." Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's

Ret. Sys., 192 N.J. 189, 195 (2007).

We add that as a general matter, when determining whether to apply a

statute retroactively, "[t]he degree of retroactivity 'depends largely on the court's

view of what is just and consonant with public policy in the particular situation

presented.'" Roik v. Roik, 477 N.J. Super. 556, 574 (App. Div. 2024) (quoting

Primmer v. Harrison, 472 N.J. Super. 173, 189 (App. Div. 2022)). "Relevant

considerations include '(1) "justifiable reliance by the parties and the community

as a whole on prior decisions," (2) whether the purpose of the new rule will be

A-1859-22 10 advanced by retroactive application, and (3) any adverse effect retrospectivity

may have on the administration of justice.'" Ibid. (quoting Primmer, 472 N.J.

Super. at 189).

In this instance, the plain language of subsection 2a calls for retroactive

application. It expressly extends the statute of limitations for "every action at

law for an injury . . . against a minor under the age of [eighteen] that occurred

prior to, on or after the effective date of [December 1, 2019]." N.J.S.A. 2A:14 -

2a (emphasis added). We view the express language to unequivocally and

irrefutably establish "public policy" within the meaning of the Roik test. 477

N.J. Super. at 574. So too, the plain language of subsection 2a definitively

resolves the question of whether the purpose of the new rule will be advanced

by retroactive application. Ibid. In these circumstances, there is no need for us

to consider the third Roik consideration.

III.

We next consider defendant's argument that subsection 2a is inapplicable

because plaintiff's claims do not fall within one of the four enumerated offenses. 4

4 Subsection 2a provides four separate actionable offenses, including: (1) "the commission of sexual assault[,]" or (2) "any other crime of a sexual nature[.]" N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2a(a)(1). These two offenses are potentially applicable to plaintiff's common law claims. Cf. Doe v. Estate of C.V.O., 477 N.J. Super. 42,

A-1859-22 11 We acknowledge that subsection 2a does not define the two potentially

applicable offenses: (1) "the commission of sexual assault" or (2) "any other

crime of a sexual nature[.]" N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2a(a)(1). However, in Doe, we

recently held that in determining whether N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2b5 applies, a court

can rely on the definition of "sexual assault" in N.J.S.A 2C:14-2. 477 N.J.

Super. at 60-61. Writing for the court, Judge Lisa Perez Friscia held that

plaintiffs are not required to use any "specific verbiage" in their civil complaint

to invoke the expanded statute of limitations. Ibid.

In the matter before us, plaintiff's complaint alleges in court three that:

"defendant [] intentionally, unlawfully, and assaulted and battered [plaintiff], by

physically overpowering her, and forcibly committed acts of sexual penetration

upon her, without her consent" and for count four that: "defendant [] engaged

in forced non-consensual sexual acts with [plaintiff] in the house owned by

[defendant's father]." (Emphasis added). We are satisfied that plaintiff's claims

60 (App. Div. 2023), certif. denied, 257 N.J. 232 (2024) ("Had the Legislature intended to limit the availability of claims only to [statutory] sexual abuse claims . . . , it would not have permitted 'an action . . . from the commission of sexual assault' . . . ." (second omission in original)). 5 Subsection 2a and N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2b rely upon the same four enumerated offenses.

A-1859-22 12 fall within the penal code definition of sexual assault. 6 Thus, applying the

rationale in Doe, we conclude plaintiff's complaint falls under the expanded

statute of limitations afforded under subsection 2a, meaning that her remaining

claims are not time-barred.

We add, finally, that we did not in our prior opinion tacitly rule that

subsection 2a does not apply. See A.Z., slip op. at 1. We reiterate that the effect

of the then-recent 2019 amendments was not raised by the parties, see footnote

2, which explains why those statutory revisions were not addressed in our

remand instructions.

Because the trial court solely considered whether plaintiff's claims were

time-barred, this matter must be remanded for the trial court to consider the

substantive merits of defendant's motion for summary judgment. We recognize

that the trial court has already made findings in deciding defendant's motion to

dismiss that are relevant in deciding whether summary judgment is appropriate.

See DepoLink Ct. Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J.

Super. 325, 333 (App. Div. 2013) (holding that to rule on summary judgment,

courts must determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement

6 We note the penal code includes a specific definition of the term "sexual penetration," N.J.S.A. 2C:14-1(c), which is used in determining whether a defendant committed a sexual assault. A-1859-22 13 to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must

prevail as a matter of law") (quoting Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. v. Nowell

Amoroso, P.A., 189 N.J. 436, 445-46 (2007)). We nonetheless remand for the

trial court to complete the summary judgment analysis.

Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We

do not retain jurisdiction.

A-1859-22 14