Ayra Castaneda v. Blanche

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 13, 2026
• Docket: 24-7794
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 13 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MILY MAGDA AYRA CASTANEDA; No. 24-7794 A. L. E. A., Agency Nos. A240-588-402 Petitioners, A240-494-451 v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted May 13, 2026** San Francisco, California

Before: RAWLINSON, MILLER, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.

Ayra Castaneda and her minor daughter, both natives and citizens of Peru,

petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming an

immigration judge’s denial of their motion to reopen their proceedings and rescind

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). their in absentia removal order. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and

we deny the petition.

We review the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Montejo-

Gonzalez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 851, 854 (9th Cir. 2026) (en banc). “The BIA abuses

its discretion when it acts arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to the law, and when

it fails to provide a reasoned explanation for its actions.” Id. (quoting Hernandez-

Galand v. Garland, 996 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2021)).

An in absentia removal order may be rescinded “upon a motion to

reopen . . . if the alien demonstrates that the failure to appear was because of

exceptional circumstances,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i), that were “beyond the

control of the alien,” id. § 1229a(e)(1). “In other words, the circumstances (1) must

cause the noncitizen’s failure to appear, (2) must be beyond the petitioner’s

control, and (3) must be sufficiently compelling.” Montejo-Gonzalez, 166 F.4th at

854. There are no “bright-line rules about what can or cannot qualify as an

exceptional circumstance.” Id. at 856. Rather, the Board must look “‘to the

particularized facts presented in each case’” and consider the “totality of the

circumstances.” Id. at 854 (quoting Singh v. INS, 213 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir.

2000)).

The Board did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to

reopen. First, unlike in Montejo-Gonzalez, the Board did not apply any bright-line

2 24-7794 rules. See 166 F.4th at 856. The Board expressly recognized that our precedent

requires an analysis “under the totality of the circumstances,” and it acknowledged

that “[u]nder certain circumstances, traffic or other conditions may support a

finding of exceptional circumstances.” Consistent with that standard, the Board

considered the particularized facts of petitioners’ case, including (1) the reasons

petitioners missed their hearing, (2) whether petitioners had a “motive for failing to

appear,” and (3) whether denying their motion would lead to “unconscionable

results.”

Second, the Board’s decision was supported by the record and was not

arbitrary or irrational. See Montejo-Gonzalez, 166 F.4th at 854. As the Board

recognized, and as petitioners concede, the lead petitioner mistyped the ZIP Code

for the immigration court into Lyft, causing her to be taken to the wrong

neighborhood in San Francisco. This mistake compounded the risks inherent in her

decision to begin travel only 75 minutes before her hearing—despite knowing that

she needed to call a rideshare to take her child to daycare and then call a second car

to downtown San Francisco during morning rush hour. As a result, even though the

immigration judge gave the lead petitioner a 20-minute grace period after the

scheduled start time, she still did not arrive until after the immigration judge had

ordered petitioners removed in absentia.

We do not question that the lead petitioner’s failure to appear was

3 24-7794 unintentional. But the Board was well within its discretion to determine, under

these circumstances, that petitioners failed to establish the requisite “exceptional

circumstances . . . beyond [their] control.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(1). The Board did

not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen.

The motion (Dkt. No. 8) and supplemental motion (Dkt. No. 9) to stay

removal are denied.

PETITION DENIED.

4 24-7794