Aylо Premium Ltd v. Popravkin Anton, et al.

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: January 23, 2026
• Docket: 3:25-cv-05094
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3

4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 AYLO PREMIUM LTD, CASE NO. C25-5094-KKE 8

Plaintiff(s), ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 9 v. DEFAULT JUDGMENT

10 POPRAVKIN ANTON, et al.,

11 Defendant(s).

12 Plaintiff is an adult entertainment content provider. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 1. Plaintiff filed this 13 action in February 2025, alleging that Defendant Popravkin Anton owns and operate websites 14 trafficking thousands of pirated works owned by Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 2. Anton has not appeared or 15 otherwise defended this action, and the Court entered an order of default against him. Dkt. No. 16 23. 17 In this action, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, damages, attorney’s fees, and costs. Dkt. 18 No. 1 at 14–17. Plaintiff now requests entry of default judgment against Anton. Dkt. No. 24. For 19 the following reasons, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion. 20 I. ANALYSIS 21 A. The Court Has Jurisdiction Over the Subject Matter and the Parties. 22 Before entering default judgment, the Court must confirm that it has both subject matter 23 and personal jurisdiction. See In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999) (“When entry of 24 1 judgment is sought against a party who has failed to plead or otherwise defend, a district court has 2 an affirmative duty to look into its jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties.”). 3 1. The Court Has Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Plaintiff’s Copyright Infringement Claim. 4 The Court has federal question jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim for copyright 5 infringement. See Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 19. 6 2. The Court Has Personal Jurisdiction Over Anton. 7 The Court also has personal jurisdiction over Anton because, as alleged in the complaint, 8 he operates websites directed at the United States, offering infringing content to United States and 9 Washington residents. Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 17–18. 10 B. Legal Standards on a Motion for Default Judgment 11 The Court’s decision to enter a default judgment is discretionary. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 12 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). The Court “ordinarily disfavor[s]” default judgment because 13 “[c]ases should be decided upon their merits whenever reasonably possible.” Eitel v. McCool, 782 14 F.2d 1470, 1472 (9th Cir. 1986). In considering a motion for default judgment, the Court accepts 15 “the well-pleaded factual allegations” as true, but “necessary facts not contained in the pleadings, 16 and claims which are legally insufficient, are not established by default.” Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. 17 of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992) (cleaned up). 18 When considering whether to exercise its discretion to enter a default judgment, the Court 19 may consider the following Eitel factors: 20 (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, 21 (2) the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, 22 (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; 23 (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring 24 decisions on the merits. 1 Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471–72. 2 The Western District of Washington also requires a party seeking default judgment to 3 provide “a declaration and other evidence establishing plaintiff’s entitlement to a sum certain and

4 to any nonmonetary relief sought.” Local Civil Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 55(b)(2). “A default 5 judgment must not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the pleadings.” 6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c). 7 C. Plaintiff Is Entitled to Default Judgment Against Anton. 8 The Court applies the Eitel factors to this case and finds that, on balance, they favor a 9 default judgment on Plaintiff’s claims. 10 1. Possibility of Prejudice to Plaintiff 11 For the first Eitel factor, the Court analyzes the possibility of prejudice to Plaintiff. 12 Prejudice exists when “the plaintiff has no recourse for recovery other than default judgment.”

13 Curtis v. Illumination Arts, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 3d 1200, 1211 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (cleaned up). 14 In this case, Anton has failed to respond to or otherwise defend against Plaintiff’s 15 complaint. Without a default judgment, Plaintiff would have no recourse. Therefore, the Court 16 finds the first Eitel factor favors a default judgment. 17 2. Sufficiency and Merits of Plaintiffs’ Complaint 18 The Court analyzes the second and third Eitel factors—the merits of Plaintiff’s substantive 19 claim and the sufficiency of the complaint—together. See, e.g., Curtis, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 1211. 20 For the following reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged facts in its complaint showing 21 that Anton is liable on the copyright infringement claim.1 22 23

1 Plaintiff’s complaint lists four causes of action, but Plaintiff requests default judgment on only one claim (copyright 24 infringement). Compare Dkt. No. 1 with Dkt. No. 24. 1 As noted above, Plaintiff’s complaint brings a claim for copyright infringement (Dkt. No. 2 1 ¶¶ 51–73), which has two elements: (1) plaintiff’s ownership of a valid copyright in the allegedly 3 infringed work, and (2) defendant’s copying of protected aspects of the work. See Skidmore as

4 Trustee for Randy Craig Wolfe Trust v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051, 1064 (9th Cir. 2020). 5 Accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently stated 6 claims for copyright infringement against Anton. Plaintiff owns copyrights in works that were 7 copied or displayed by Anton’s websites without Plaintiff’s authorization or consent. Dkt. No. 1 8 ¶¶ 54–56. Therefore, the Court finds the second and third Eitel factors favor entry of default 9 judgment. 10 3. The Sum of Money at Stake 11 For the fourth Eitel factor, the Court considers the amount of money at stake in relation to 12 the seriousness of the defendant’s conduct. PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172,

13 1176 (C.D. Cal. 2002). The Court also assesses whether the amount of monetary damage requested 14 is proportional to the harm caused by the defendant. See Curtis, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 1212. 15 In this case, Plaintiff seeks an award of $15,000 in statutory damages per work infringed, 16 although it could have requested significantly more. See Dkt. No. 24 at 5. The amount Plaintiff 17 seeks to recover is within the parameters of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). The Court 18 finds that this factor therefore favors entry of a default judgment. 19 4. Possibility of Dispute over Material Facts 20 For the fifth Eitel factor, the Court considers the possibility of a dispute concerning material 21 facts. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471–72. Upon default, a plaintiff’s factual allegations in the complaint 22 will be taken as true. Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977). Because

23 Anton failed to appear or otherwise respond, he has failed to rebut Plaintiff’s allegations or 24 1 evidence provided to support its claim. Therefore, given that no dispute of material facts is 2 apparent, the Court finds that the fifth Eitel factor favors entry of a default judgment. 3 5. Possibility of Excusable Neglect

4 For the sixth Eitel factor, the Court assesses whether the defendant’s default was due to 5 excusable neglect. Here, Plaintiff has submitted evidence that Anton was provided notice of this 6 lawsuit, and yet he made no apparent effort to respond by the deadline. Dkt. Nos. 20, 21. The 7 Court finds that the sixth Eitel factor favors entry of a default judgment. See Landstar Ranger, 8 Inc. v. Parth Enters., 725 F. Supp. 2d 916, 922 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 9 6. Policy in Favor of Decision on the Merits 10 For the seventh Eitel factor, the Court addresses the strong policy preference in favor of 11 resolution of Plaintiff’s claims on the merits. See Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472 (“Cases should be decided 12 upon their merits whenever reasonably possible.”). However, a defendant’s “failure to answer

13 Plaintiffs’ Complaint makes a decision on the merits impractical, if not impossible.” PepsiCo, 238 14 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. 15 Thus, although the Court’s preference for resolving issues on their merits weighs against 16 entry of a default judgment, this factor is outweighed by the other Eitel factors, as summarized 17 here. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment should be granted. 18 D. Plaintiff Is Entitled to Statutory Damages, Attorney’s Fees, and Costs. 19 Having found that Plaintiff is entitled to entry of default judgment, the Court now turns to 20 consider the relief requested. 21 1. Statutory Damages 22 The Copyright Act authorizes an award of statutory damages “in a sum of not less than

23 $750 or more than $30,000” per work infringed, in lieu of actual damages and the defendant’s 24 profits. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). “In a case where the copyright owner sustains the burden of 1 proving, and the court finds, that infringement was committed willfully, the court in its discretion 2 may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than $150,000.” 17 U.S.C. § 3 504(c)(2).

4 Plaintiff argues that Anton’s infringement was willful because Plaintiff sent him more than 5 10,000 takedown notices to inform him that he was infringing Plaintiff’s copyrights, yet he ignored 6 them. Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 39–40, Dkt. No. 26 ¶ 14. Plaintiff’s complaint also alleges that Anton’s 7 infringement was willful, and that Anton infringed at least 9,006 works. Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 2, 58. 8 Plaintiff requests an award of $15,000 per work infringed, which totals $135,090,000. Dkt. No. 9 24 at 13. 10 The Court finds that Anton’s infringement was willful, as was alleged in the complaint. 11 See Derek Andrew, Inc. v. Poof Apparel Corp., 528 F.3d 696, 702 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that 12 in the default judgment context, “all factual allegations in the complaint are deemed true, including

13 the allegation of [defendant’s] willful infringement of [plaintiff’s] trademarks”). 14 The Court now turns to determine the appropriate amount of statutory damages. “The court 15 has wide discretion in determining the amount of statutory damages to be awarded, constrained 16 only by the [Copyright Act’s] specified maxima and minima.” Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 17 F.2d 1329, 1335 (9th Cir. 1984). “Statutory damages are particularly appropriate in a case ... in 18 which [a] defendant has failed to mount any defense or to participate in discovery, thereby 19 increasing the difficulty of ascertaining plaintiff’s actual damages.” Jackson v. Sturkie, 255 F. 20 Supp. 2d 1096, 1101 (N.D. Cal. 2003). “Because awards of statutory damages serve both 21 compensatory and punitive purposes, a plaintiff may recover statutory damages ‘whether or not 22 there is adequate evidence of the actual damages suffered by plaintiff or of the profits reaped by

23 defendant.’” L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l., Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 996 (9th Cir. 24 1998) (quoting Harris, 734 F.2d at 1335). 1 Here, Plaintiff acknowledges that “[i]t is impossible to calculate the exact loss resulting 2 from a piracy operation like” Anton’s, but states that if each of the approximately 3.59 million 3 monthly visitors to Anton’s websites represents a potential lost subscription to Plaintiff, the

4 estimated lost revenue to Plaintiff would amount to approximately $36,474,400 per month. Dkt. 5 No. 24 at 8. Plaintiff concedes that not all of those monthly visitors would necessarily have 6 subscribed, but argues that this calculation nonetheless “reflects the value of what [Anton] 7 unlawfully provided for free.” Id. Plaintiff emphasizes that Anton’s websites “generate substantial 8 internet traffic” (Dkt. No. 24 at 8) but does not estimate his profits from the infringing activity. 9 See also Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 31 (“The scheme to monetize the unlawful copyright infringement on 10 [Anton’s websites] is predominately from advertising banners.”). 11 Although Plaintiff requests damages of $15,000 per infringed work, the Court exercises its 12 discretion to award $10,000 per infringed work—for a total award of $90,060,000.00 in statutory

13 damages—which is in line with awards in similar cases. See, e.g., Aylo Premium Ltd v. Does 1– 14 20, No. 25-CV-5473 BHS, 2025 WL 3677487, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 18, 2025) (awarding 15 $5,000 per infringed work of adult entertainment, although plaintiff requested $15,000 per work, 16 because it overestimated its revenue loss); Mg Premium Ltd. v. Hoi, No. 2:23-cv-00349-CBM- 17 PVCx, 2023 WL 8895698, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2023) (awarding $15,000 per infringed work 18 of adult entertainment). Because Plaintiff has not presented persuasive evidence to support its 19 $15,000 valuation of each infringed work, the Court declines to assume that the full amount 20 requested is appropriate. See, e.g., Morrow v. Stay Winning Boutique LLC, No. 2:23-cv-2167 21 WBS AC, 2025 WL 653792, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2025) (awarding only the statutory minimum 22 because plaintiff failed to present evidence on its lost profits or defendant’s profits based on

23 infringement). The amount awarded will nonetheless discourage wrongful conduct and uphold the 24 integrity of copyright laws. 1 2. Attorney’s Fees and Costs 2 The Copyright Act authorizes a court, in its discretion, to grant a prevailing party an award 3 of attorney’s fees and costs. 17 U.S.C. § 505. In exercising this discretion, a court may consider

4 a number of factors, including “the need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of 5 compensation and deterrence.” Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 n.19 (1994) (quoting 6 Lieb v. Topstone Indus., Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 156 (3d Cir. 1986)). 7 Here, Plaintiff requests an award of fees and costs as the prevailing party. Dkt. No. 24 at 8 17–18. The Court agrees that an award of fees and costs is appropriate here, and finds that the 9 amounts requested by Plaintiff are reasonable. The declaration submitted by Plaintiff’s counsel 10 reflects necessary hours expended at rates commensurate with counsel’s experience, totaling 11 $19,360.00. See Dkt. No. 27. See, e.g., Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th 12 Cir. 2008) (explaining that a court determines a reasonable fee award by first calculating the

13 lodestar, which represents the product of a reasonable number of hours expended and a reasonable 14 hourly rate). In addition, the costs award requested ($990.00) reflects expenses necessary to this 15 litigation. Dkt. No. 27 ¶¶ 6–7. 16 Therefore, the Court will award Plaintiff $90,060,000.00 in statutory damages, $19,360.00 17 in attorney’s fees, and $990.00 in costs. 18 E. Plaintiff Is Entitled to Injunctive Relief.

19 Plaintiff requests an injunction restraining Anton and those affiliated with him from 20 a. manufacturing, distributing, marketing, advertising, promoting, or selling or authorizing any third party to manufacture, distribute, market, advertise, promote, 21 or sell any products, works, or other materials that include, copy, are derived from, or otherwise embody any copyrighted work of Aylo Premium Ltd; 22 b. reproducing, distributing, performing, or publicly displaying any copyrighted 23 work of Aylo Premium, Ltd., creating any derivative works based on those works, or engaging in any activity that infringes Plaintiff’s rights in those works; and 24 1 c. aiding, assisting, or abetting any other individual or entity in doing any act prohibited by sub-paragraphs (a) or (b). 2 Dkt. No. 24-1 at 4. 3 “Any court … may … grant temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem 4 reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.” 17 U.S.C § 502(a). To obtain such 5 relief, “[a] plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that 6 remedies available at law … are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the 7 balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) 8 that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.” eBay Inc. v. 9 MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 10 Plaintiff argues that it has satisfied all four factors (Dkt. No. 24 at 13–16), and the Court 11 agrees. First, Plaintiff has suffered irreparable harm in the form of copyright infringement, and 12 this harm is ongoing because Anton continues to infringe despite repeated requests to stop. Dkt. 13 No. 1 ¶¶ 51–73. Second, monetary damages are inadequate to compensate Plaintiff’s injuries. Id. 14 ¶¶ 69–73. Third, requiring Anton to cease his unlawful conduct is not a legitimate hardship. Last, 15 the public has an interest in protecting copyright holders against infringement. 16 Accordingly, the Court will enjoin Anton’s future infringement, and will also grant 17 Plaintiff’s request to require the registries and registrars of Anton’s websites to transfer his 18 domains used for infringement to Plaintiff. A transfer of this kind will stop Anton from distributing 19 infringing content to the public and has been ordered in similar cases. See, e.g., Aylo Premium, 20 2025 WL 3677487, at *2. 21

24 1 II. CONCLUSION 2 For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment. Dkt. No. 3 24.

4 Dated this 23rd day of January, 2026. 5 A 6 Kymberly K. Evanson 7 United States District Judge

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24