Aycox v. Brook House

• Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
• Decided: August 26, 1992
• Docket: 92-1307
• Status: Published

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion

[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

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No. 92-1307

                                     ISAAC AYCOX,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                             BROOKE HOUSE, INC., ET AL.,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

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                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                       [Hon. Mark L. Wolf, U.S. District Judge]
                                           ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                 Breyer, Chief Judge,
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                           Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
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                               and Cyr, Circuit Judge.
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                                 ____________________

            Isaac Aycox on brief pro se.
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            Howard A. Brick, Cynthia  O. Hamilton, Donald K. Stern, Daniel  P.
            _______________  ____________________  _______________  __________
        Tighe, and  Hale and  Dorr, on  Memorandum  in Support  of Motion  for
        _____       ______________
        Summary Disposition, for appellees.

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                                  August 26, 1992
                                 ____________________

Per Curiam.  Pro se inmate Isaac Aycox appeals from
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            a district  court judgment  dismissing his  42 U.S.C.    1983

            complaint  against  Brooke  House,  a  Massachusetts  halfway

            house, and its  director, Andy McDonald.   The district court

            ruled that the  complaint failed to state a  claim upon which

            relief  could   be  granted  and  simultaneously  denied  the

            plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.  We affirm.

                                          I.
                                          _

                      We recite only  those facts relevant to  the issues

            on appeal.  In 1976, plaintiff was convicted of armed robbery

            and sentenced to  ten to twenty years' imprisonment.   He was

            transferred to  Brooke House  in September  1988.   Plaintiff

            alleged  that he  was  deceived  into  signing  a  "Community

            Release  Agreement" in  connection with  this  transfer.   On

            October  2,  1988,  while "on  furlough"  from  Brooke House,

            plaintiff  went  to   visit  his   fiancee  in   Springfield,

            Massachusetts and found her with another man.  An altercation

            ensued.   Plaintiff was arrested and arraigned in Springfield

            district court  on the following day.   He was then  taken to

            the Massachusetts  Correction  Institute  (M.C.I.)  at  Cedar

            Junction, a maximum security prison.   On or about October 6,

            1988,  plaintiff received  disciplinary  reports from  Brooke

            House which charged him with violating "'prison institutional

            and  disciplinary rules and regulations'"  as a result of his

            conduct in  Springfield  on October  2-3, 1988.     Plaintiff

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alleges  that these  reports  fraudulently identified  Brooke

            House as  one of  the DOC's  "Contact Pre-release  Programs."

            Plaintiff claimed that Brooke House had no authority to issue

            disciplinary reports  against him and,  as a result  of these

            reports, plaintiff's  "rights to  parole  release" have  been

            adversely  affected.    Plaintiff   sought  compensatory  and

            punitive  damages,  as  well as  declaratory  and  injunctive

            relief.1

                      On August 23, 1989, Brooke House and McDonald moved

            to  dismiss the  complaint under  Fed.  R. Civ.  P. 12(b)(6).

            They  argued  that the  complaint  failed  to state  a  claim

            because  Massachusetts law  authorized Brooke House  to issue

            disciplinary reports  and because the complaint wholly failed

            to allege any facts with respect to McDonald.  Plaintiff  did

            not  oppose  this motion.    On January  23,  1990, plaintiff

            appeared  for  a scheduling  conference  before  a magistrate

            judge (magistrate), who set  October 31, 1990 as a  discovery

            deadline.    After  plaintiff  filed  interrogatories  and  a

            request  for protection of documents, the defendants moved to

            stay all discovery and requested an expedited ruling on their

            motion to dismiss.  Plaintiff opposed this motion by filing a

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            1.  The  complaint  also  named  three  "program  pre-release
            officers"  as  defendants  (i.e.,   Bernard  Menendez,  Karen
            Posnick,  and Douglas  Davis),  but it  failed to  allege any
            facts  as to how  these defendants deprived  plaintiff of any
            federal  rights.   The  district  court  allowed  motions  to
            dismiss on  behalf of  these defendants  on August  11, 1989.
            Plaintiff does not attack this ruling on appeal.

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"Motion to Set Aside Motion  for Stay."  Without alleging any

            facts,  this  motion  argued  that  McDonald  should  not  be

            dismissed  for  the  same reason  that  the  other individual

            defendants were dismissed.   On November 11,  1990, plaintiff

            filed   a  motion  for  summary  judgment  and  a  supporting

            affidavit.     The  latter  averred  that  "the  Commonwealth

            subjected  me  to  lost  (sic)  of  liberty  and  freedom  in

            violation  of  due process  of  law."    In contrast  to  the

            allegations  in  his  complaint,  the  plaintiff's  affidavit

            claimed that he was not "on furlough" on October 2, 1988, but

            rather, that he  was free  on a  "24 hour  pass."   Plaintiff

            complained that because Brooke House reported that he was "on

            furlough" on October 2, 1988,  the DOC confiscated all of his

            good time credits and plaintiff was prosecuted as  a habitual

            offender for the events  of October 2-3, 1988.   As a result,

            he is now serving a mandatory ten-year sentence.

                      On  July 2, 1991,  the district court  referred the

            motion to dismiss, the  motion for summary judgment,  and all

            discovery-related  motions to the magistrate for a report and

            recommendation.2  On  July 18, 1991, the  magistrate issued a

            report  which  recommended  that the  defendants'  motion  to

            dismiss be allowed  because the complaint failed  to indicate

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            2.  Plaintiff  filed an  "Objection to  the  Wording" of  the
            order referring the aforementioned motions  to the magistrate
            which argued that the motion to dismiss should not be allowed
            since the defendants  had not produced documents  nor opposed
            plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.

                                         -5-

that Brooke House  deprived plaintiff of liberty  without due

            process  and further  failed to  allege  any facts  regarding

            McDonald.     Plaintiff  filed   timely  objections   to  the

            magistrate's report  which reiterated that  Brooke House  did

            not  have legal authority  to issue disciplinary  reports and

            that Brooke House  caused plaintiff to  forfeit all his  good

            time  credits by  holding themselves  out  as a  correctional

            facility.  Plaintiff further  objected on the ground that  he

            never received a copy  of the defendants' motion  to dismiss.

            The  district  court  adopted the  magistrate's  report.   On

            October 29, 1991, the court allowed the defendants' motion to

            dismiss and denied  plaintiff's motion for  summary judgment.

            Plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal.

                                         II.
                                         __

                      On appeal, plaintiff argues that the district court

            erred in denying his motion for summary  judgment because the

            defendants  falsely   represented  that   Brooke  House   had

            authority to issue disciplinary reports under M.G.L. c.127,  

            49.   Plaintiff also  argues that the  court should  not have

            allowed  the defendants' motion  to dismiss because  he never

            received a copy of it.  We reject both contentions.

                      Plaintiffs' challenge  to Brooke  House's authority

            to  issue disciplinary  reports  is specious.   In  Lanier v.
                                                                ______

            Fair, 876  F.2d  243,  244-45 (1st  Cir.  1989),  this  court
            ____

            recognized  this very facility as a "minimum security halfway

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house   .  .  .   that  operate[s]  under   the  auspices  of

            Massachusetts  Halfway  House,  Inc.  and the  Department  of

            Correction (DOC)."   Plaintiff acknowledged that he  signed a

            community release agreement  upon entering Brooke House.   We

            take notice that when plaintiff entered Brooke House in 1988,

            such agreements  typically provided  that "Community  Release

            Programs are an extension of the confines of the institution"

            and inmates like the  plaintiff agreed that "all [DOC]  rules

            and regulations  will be  in effect  throughout my  community

            release time."  See 103 C.M.R.   465.21, Exhibit C (effective
                            ___

            March  20, 1987).   Massachusetts  G.L. c.127,    49  further

            provides  that  an inmate  who  participates in  educational,

            training   and  employment   programs  outside   correctional

            facilities "shall remain subject to the rules and regulations

            of the  correctional  facility.  .  .  .  "    It  is  beyond

            peradventure  that  plaintiff remained  subject to  the DOC's

            rules while he resided at  Brooke House and that Brooke House

            therefore  had  authority   to  issue  disciplinary   reports

            charging him  with violations  of these  rules.   Plaintiff's

            challenge   to   Brooke   House's   authority   to   initiate

            disciplinary  proceedings against him fails to state a viable

            claim for relief.3

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            3.  On  appeal, plaintiff argues that his allegations against
            Brooke House  should be  read to include  its director,  Andy
            McDonald.  Even if we do so, the complaint still falls short.
            As  the allegations against  Brooke House are  specious, they
            remain specious even when read against McDonald.

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To be sure, we have recognized that inmates such as

            Lanier have a  liberty interest in remaining  at Brooke House
            ______

            that  is  protected  under the  Fourteenth  Amendment.   Such

            inmates  may not  be returned  to higher  custody absent  due

            process.  See 876 F.2d at 246-250.  But the instant complaint
                      ___

            does  not allege sufficient  facts to suggest  that plaintiff

            did not receive  due process.  Rather, from  all that appears

            in  the complaint, plaintiff  received notice of  the charges

            against  him when he  received the disciplinary  reports from

            Brooke  House on  October 6,  1988.   Apart from  the general

            allegation that plaintiff's parole was "adversely  affected,"

            what followed is unpled and,  therefore, unknown.  "It is not

            enough to allege a general  scenario which could be dominated

            by unpleaded  facts. .  . .  "   Dewey v.  University of  New
                                             _____     __________________

            Hampshire, 694 F.2d  1, 3  (1st Cir.  1982).  Even  a pro  se
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            prisoner's complaint must  set forth "minimal facts .  . . as

            to who did what to whom and why."  Id.  The instant complaint
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            raised  only a baseless technical challenge to Brooke House's

            authority to issue  disciplinary reports.  It did  not allege

            any  facts showing  that the  events  surrounding plaintiff's

            return to higher custody and prosecution violated plaintiff's

            constitutional rights.   Dismissal  of the  complaint against

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both Brooke House  and McDonald for failure to  state a claim

            was therefore proper.4

                      We further  reject plaintiff's  unsworn claim  that

            this dismissal was not fair  because he never received a copy

            of  the defendants'  motion to  dismiss.   Plaintiff's  brief

            indicates that he  learned that the motion had  been filed at

            least as early as the January 23, 1990 scheduling conference.

            During  the  twenty-two  months  that  elapsed  between  this

            conference  and  the dismissal  of  the  complaint, plaintiff

            filed several documents  with the court which  indicated that

            he had knowledge of the  substance of the defendants' motion.

            For example, plaintiff's opposition to the defendants' motion

            to stay discovery effectively argued that McDonald should not

            be dismissed  because the complaint  failed to set  forth any

            facts against him.   If plaintiff did not have a  copy of the

            motion   itself,  he  should  have  raised  this  before  the

            magistrate  issued   her  recommendation.     Moreover,   the

            magistrate's report afforded  plaintiff sufficient notice  of

            the shortcomings  in  his complaint.    His failure  to  come

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            4.  Similarly,  while inmates  may have  a  protected liberty
            interest  in their reserve  parole dates  under Massachusetts
            law, see  Lanier, 876  F.2d at  253, as well  as a  protected
                 ___  ______
            interest in good time credits,  see Nelson v. Commissioner of
                                            ___ ______    _______________
            Correction,  390  Mass.  379,   388-89  (1983),  neither  the
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            complaint nor  plaintiff's summary judgment  filings describe
            any conduct by  Brooke House or McDonald which  suggests that
            these defendants violated plaintiff's right to due process by
            instituting  disciplinary proceedings  that  resulted in  the
            loss of these rights.

                                         -9-

forward  with  additional  facts  supporting  his  claims  in

            response  to  the  magistrate's  report   persuades  us  that

            dismissal remained proper  even if plaintiff did  not receive

            the  motion to dismiss.   See Purvis v.  Ponte, 929 F.2d 822,
                                      ___ ______     _____

            826-27  (1st Cir. 1991)  (affirming dismissal for  failure to

            state a claim where magistrate's report notified plaintiff of

            complaint's deficiencies).

                      Judgment affirmed.
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