Aycock v. State

534 So. 2d 670, 1988 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 58, 1988 WL 11692
CourtCourt of Criminal Appeals of Alabama
DecidedJanuary 26, 1988
Docket8 Div. 596
StatusPublished

This text of 534 So. 2d 670 (Aycock v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Aycock v. State, 534 So. 2d 670, 1988 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 58, 1988 WL 11692 (Ala. Ct. App. 1988).

Opinion

LEIGH M. CLARK, Retired Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction and sentence for the offense of unlawful possession of cocaine, a controlled substance enumerated in Title 20, Section 2-25, Schedule II of the Code of Alabama, known as the Alabama Uniform Controlled Substances Act. Defendant was fined $25,000 and sentenced to imprisonment for fifteen years.

Two issues are presented by appellant, which we now consider in the order found in brief of counsel for appellant.

I.

By this issue, the contention is made that “the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the defense of entrapment.” The case of Jackson v. State, 384 So.2d 134 (Ala.Crim.App.1979), writ quashed, 384 So.2d 140 (Ala.1980), is relied upon by appellant as to this issue. We quote from the opinion in the cited case at page 139 as follows:

“The distinction between an inducement that entraps and an inducement that merely detects has been variously stated in multitudinous instances. We accept the following as satisfactory and attractively succinct:
“ ‘One who is instigated, induced, or lured by an officer of the law or other person, for the purpose of prosecution, into the commission of a crime which he had otherwise had no intention of committing may avail himself of the defense of entrapment. Such defense is not available, however, where the officer or other person acted in good faith for the purpose of discovering or detecting a crime and merely furnished the opportunity for the commission thereof by one who had the requisite criminal intent.’ 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law, § 45(2).
“A valuable discussion of applications of the distinction is furnished by Judge Bowen in Tyson v. State, Ala.Cr.App., 361 So.2d 1182, in which it is stated at 1186,
“ ‘The primary focus is on a predisposition of the accused rather than on the agent’s actions.’ ”

We note also that it was stated at page 140 in Jackson v. State as follows:

“Although it is conceivable, if all the facts bearing on the question were shown in evidence, that it could be said as a matter of law whether there was an entrapment, this cannot be said on a consideration of the evidence on a trial of the case. Not being determinable either way as a matter of law, it became a question for the jury to decide under proper instructions by the court. In view of the action of the court in ruling that there was no issue for the jury to decide on the question of entrapment, declining to allow attorneys for defendant to argue to the jury the matter of the question of entrapment, and refusing the charge requested by defendant on the subject on the sole ground that no jury question as to entrapment was presented and that on the ground that the defense of entrapment was not available to defendant, we must find that such action constituted error prejudicial to defendant and that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and the cause remanded.”

II.

By the only other issue in the case, the question is raised as to “Whether the trial court erred in failing to suppress evidence that was obtained in a warrantless search.” In support of this issue, counsel for appellant cites the case of Murray v. State, 396 So.2d 125 (Ala.Cr.App.1980), cert. denied, 396 So.2d 132 (Ala.1981), which, in our opinion, does not support appellant’s contention as to the issue under consideration.

We are of the opinion that a recital of the material facts in this case is sufficient to lead to the conclusion that this issue should be determined adversely to appellant. We [672]*672proceed to give a summary of such material facts.

The first witness for the State was Officer Steve Anderson, who had been engaged in law enforcement approximately seven years, three of which had included investigation for narcotics, who said that he went with other officers with a search warrant for cocaine to Debbie Holland’s apartment, from where they had received notice to be there.

Debbie Holland testified as a witness for the State that on the night in question at approximately 9:00 or 9:30 in the morning, she was visited by police officers. We now quote from her testimony:

“Q. Then what happened?
“A. They proceeded to search my apartment.
“Q. Did they find anything?
“A. Yes', sir.
Q. What did they find?
“A. They found approximately half a pound to three-quarters of a pound of marijuana.
Q. Where did they find that?
“A. It was sitting in a leather bag in the middle of the floor.
[[Image here]]
“Q. Did they find any other drug-related items?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. What else did they find?
“A. They found a pair of scales, the grinder that had been used.
“Q. A grinder?
“A. A grinder that had been used for grinding cocaine.
“Q. Okay.
“A. A plate that had shavings or dust-ings or cocaine, and I believe they found some bag comers of plastic bags that had been cut away.
“Q. Did those items belong to you?
“A. They were in my apartment with my knowledge. They did not belong to me, but they were there with my knowledge.
“Q. Okay. Did they find something in the microwave?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Why was something in the microwave? I’m just curious.
“A. That was a suggestion that it be put there, which I told them where it was. I told them.
“Q. You told the police officers?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Somebody else suggested putting it there?
“A. There had been some discussion which this has nothing to do with this case, but Mr. Elam said he thought that it might be a good idea to put it in an obvious place, not an inobvious place. I told them where it was.
[[Image here]]
“Q. Did you cooperate with the police officers when they showed up?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Did you tell them about the marijuana?
“A. Yes, sir. I mean, it was obvious it was there.
[[Image here]]
“Q. Did you tell them how the residue came to be located in your apartment?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Did you tell the police officers anything about Mr. Albert Neal Aycock?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. What did you tell them?
“A.

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Related

United States v. Russell
411 U.S. 423 (Supreme Court, 1973)
Mullins v. State
323 So. 2d 109 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama, 1975)
Jackson v. State
384 So. 2d 134 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama, 1979)
Tyson v. State
361 So. 2d 1182 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama, 1978)
Johnson v. State
61 So. 2d 867 (Alabama Court of Appeals, 1952)
Boswell v. State
276 So. 2d 592 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1973)
Murray v. State
396 So. 2d 125 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama, 1980)
Mullins v. State
323 So. 2d 116 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1975)
Jackson v. State
384 So. 2d 140 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1980)

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Bluebook (online)
534 So. 2d 670, 1988 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 58, 1988 WL 11692, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/aycock-v-state-alacrimapp-1988.