Ayanna Weathersby v. FCA US, LLC

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: October 29, 2025
• Docket: 3:24-cv-08779
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 AYANNA WEATHERSBY, 10 Case No. 24-cv-08779-RS Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 12 MOTION TO REMAND FCA US, LLC, 13 Defendant. 14

15 Ayanna Weathersby sued FCA US, LLC in California state court, asserting four causes of 16 action under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1790, et seq. See Dkt. 1 17 (Notice), Ex. 1 (Complaint). She alleged that defects in her 2019 Dodge Challenger rendered the 18 vehicle substantially worthless and that FCA did not comply with its obligations under the parties’ 19 warranty agreement. See Complaint, ¶¶ 12–15. FCA timely removed the case to federal court 20 based on diversity jurisdiction. See Notice, ¶ 16. Weathersby moves to remand the case to state 21 court. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the motion is suitable for disposition without oral 22 argument, and the hearing set for December 4, 2025, is vacated. Because the parties are 23 completely diverse and amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold, the motion is 24 denied. 25 I. BACKGROUND 26 In 2019, Weathersby and FCA entered a warranty contract regarding a 2019 Dodge 27 Challenger. See Complaint, ¶ 6. The contract included a basic warranty covering “the cost of all 1 is defective in material, workmanship or factory preparation.” Complaint Ex. A, at 5. It also 2 covered some damage to specific components of the vehicle, such as the powertrain. See id., at 8. 3 Weathersby alleged that certain defects including, but not limited to, engine defects, 4 transmission defects, and electrical defects manifested during the contract’s coverage period. See 5 Complaint, ¶ 11. She further alleged that FCA failed to repair the vehicle pursuant to the terms of 6 the warranty. See id., ¶ 35. That triggered an obligation to replace the vehicle or make restitution 7 to Weathersby. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.2(d). When FCA failed to comply with that obligation, 8 Weathersby sued in California state court. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1794 (providing a cause of action 9 to buyers harmed by violations of the Song-Beverly Act). 10 FCA filed a timely notice of removal in federal court, invoking diversity jurisdiction. See 11 Notice, ¶ 16. FCA asserted that the parties were completely diverse and that the amount in 12 controversy exceeds $75,000. See id., ¶¶ 17–32. FCA began its calculation of the amount in 13 controversy by estimating Weathersby’s “actual damages.” To establish a floor, FCA pointed to 14 Weathersby’s discovery response admitting the cost of the vehicle exceeded $25,000. See id., ¶ 24. 15 To establish a ceiling, it provided a declaration stating that the manufacturer’s suggested retail 16 price (MSRP) of the vehicle was $32,880. See id., ¶ 31. Next, FCA added double the actual 17 damages ($50,000 on the low end, $65,760 on the high end) because the Song-Beverly Act 18 permits a civil penalty of twice the actual damages if the plaintiff establishes that the defendant’s 19 failure to comply with its obligations under the warranty was willful. See Cal. Civ. Code 20 § 1794(c); Notice, ¶ 31. Finally, FCA noted that attorney’s fees are at stake because they are 21 statutorily recoverable, and it submitted several declarations stating that fee awards in like cases 22 regularly exceed $50,000. Almost ten months later, Weathersby filed a motion to remand the 23 action to state court. 24 II. LEGAL STANDARD 25 A defendant may remove a civil action from state to federal court if the district court would 26 have had original jurisdiction over the action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Where, as here, the 27 defendant removes an action to federal court based on diversity of citizenship, the parties must be 1 completely diverse and the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 2 There is no dispute here that the parties are completely diverse; the amount in controversy is the 3 only contested requirement. 4 “Generally, the amount in controversy is determined from the face of the pleadings.” Crum 5 v. Circus Circus Enters., 231 F.3d 1129, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000). “Where it is not facially evident 6 from the Complaint that more than $75,000 is in controversy, the removing party must prove, by a 7 preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy meets the jurisdictional 8 threshold.” Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003). 9 “Where doubt regarding the right to removal exists, a case should be remanded to state court.” 10 Matheson, 319 F.3d at 1090. 11 III. DISCUSSION 12 A. Face of the Complaint 13 The starting point in determining the amount in controversy is the face of the pleadings. 14 Weathersby’s state court complaint alleged that she “suffered damages in a sum to be proven at 15 trial in an amount that is not less than $35,001.” Complaint, at 3 (emphasis added). FCA contends 16 that this represents the minimum amount of actual damages that Weathersby has placed in 17 controversy. After applying the two times civil penalty and baking in even a modest quantum of 18 attorney’s fees, the total amount in controversy is, in FCA’s view, well over $75,000. 19 FCA’s construction of the complaint is unpersuasive. The allegation that Weathersby is 20 entitled to at least $35,001 is patently intended to meet the jurisdictional threshold for an unlimited 21 civil action in California state court. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 85(a) (setting the threshold). 22 California law permits Weathersby to calculate the amount in controversy using all sources of 23 recovery, including civil penalties, save attorney’s fees. See id. (defining the “amount in 24 controversy” as “the amount of the demand[] or the recovery sought . . . exclusive of attorneys’ 25 fees, interest, and cost.”). There is, therefore, no reason to think that the amount-in-controversy 26 allegation in the state court complaint excluded the value of the civil penalties available under the 27 Song-Beverly Act. Hernandez v. FCA US, LLC, 2025 WL 504366, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2025) 1 (“Given that the obvious purpose of the complaint’s statement of damages is to meet the amount- 2 in-controversy requirement for an unlimited state case, Plaintiff’s claim of damages ‘not less than 3 $35,001’ is not a clear statement of actual damages.”). 4 To be sure, district courts in California have often adopted FCA’s position. See, e.g., Marx 5 v. FCA US LLC, 2025 WL 2446551, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2025) (“[T]he complaint expressly 6 states that the $35,001.00 refers to the minimum amount of ‘damages’ sought, and ‘damages’ are a 7 different type of recovery than civil penalties and attorneys’ fees.”). Valdez v. FCA US LLC, 2025 8 WL 732241, at *2 (“Plaintiff’s separation of damages from civil penalties and attorney’s fees in 9 the Prayer for Relief demonstrates the Complaint’s allegation of $35,001.00 in damages is 10 separate from and in addition to civil penalties and attorney’s fees.”). Those cases are 11 unpersuasive for two reasons. First, they fail to explain why a state court plaintiff would exclude 12 statutorily available civil penalties from the amount-in-controversy calculation. If state law 13 permits the plaintiff to include those penalties in the estimate, it will always work to her advantage 14 to do so. That makes it much more likely that the amount-in-controversy estimate includes the 15 available civil penalties. 16 Second, those cases read the term “damages” in the complaint as exclusive of civil 17 penalties because they conceive of damages and civil penalties as qualitatively different forms of 18 relief. See Valdez, 2025 WL 732241, at *2. However, under the Song-Beverly Act, civil penalties 19 are available whenever the plaintiff “establishes that the failure to comply was willful.” Cal. Civ. 20 Code § 1794(c). In that way, California law’s provision of civil penalties is akin to a statutory 21 allowance for punitive damages, which are—as the name suggests—a variety of “damages.” Both 22 are meant to punish especially egregious conduct by the defendant, and both permit the plaintiff to 23 recover beyond the amount by which she was injured. It is thus perfectly plausible that 24 Weathersby’s use of the term “damages” includes available civil penalties. 25 B. Evidence of the Amount in Controversy 26 Though the amount in controversy is not evident from the face of the complaint, FCA has 27 established by a preponderance of the evidence that it exceeds $75,000. The amount in 1 controversy has three components: actual damages, civil penalties (equal to two times actual 2 damages), and attorney’s fees.1 As noted, FCA estimated actual damages as between $25,000 and 3 $32,880, the minimum purchase price to which Weathersby admitted and the MSRP of the 4 vehicle, respectively. Weathersby argues that either figure is an improper estimate of actual 5 damages because neither accounts for the decline in value attributable to Weathersby’s use of the 6 vehicle prior to the discovery of the defects—the so-called “mileage offset.” 7 On this point, too, district courts in California are divided. Many consider the mileage 8 offset to be “both relevant and important to the calculation of amount in controversy.” Bourland v. 9 Ford Motor Co., 2020 WL 5797915, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2020); see Cox v. Kia Motors Am., 10 Inc., No. 20-CV-02380-BLF, 2020 WL 5814518, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2020) (“This statutory 11 offset, referred to by some courts as the ‘mileage offset,’ properly is considered when determining 12 the amount in controversy for jurisdictional purposes.”).2 Others characterize the mileage offset as 13 a defense which may ultimately reduce the defendant’s liability but which need not be considered 14 when assessing what the plaintiff has placed in controversy. See, e.g., Pristave v. Ford Motor Co., 15 2020 WL 4883878, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2020); Selinger v. Ford Motor Co., 2023 WL 16 2813510, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2023). 17 FCA did not need to account for the mileage offset in calculating the amount in 18 controversy. At bottom, the amount in controversy is what the plaintiff has chosen to put in 19 dispute. The plaintiff is free to draft her complaint in a manner that places less in dispute, thereby 20 circumscribing federal jurisdiction. In Song-Beverly Act cases, the plaintiff often does just that by 21 specifying how many miles she put on the car. In Cox, for example, the plaintiffs alleged that they 22

23 1 Though the amount in controversy does not include attorney’s fees in California state court, they 24 must be included when calculating the amount in controversy for purposes of federal jurisdiction. See Fritsch v. Swift Transportation Company of Arizona, LLC, 899 F.3d 785, 794 (9th Cir. 2018). 25 2 In Schneider v. Ford Motor Company, the Ninth Circuit approved the use of a mileage offset in calculating the amount in controversy. See 756 Fed. App’x 699, 701 n.3 (9th Cir. 2018) 26 (unpublished). However, that case stopped short of holding that a mileage offset must be used when calculating the amount in controversy. Moreover, as an unpublished decision, it is only as 27 useful as its persuasive value. 1 “purchased the vehicle in December 2013 and presented it for repair more than four years later 2 after driving the vehicle approximately 100,000 miles.” WL 5814518, at *4. That limited the 3 maximum recovery “to a legal certainty,” placing the amount in controversy below the 4 jurisdictional threshold. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938); 5 see Cox, WL 5814518, at *5. 6 This case is different. Weathersby’s complaint is devoid of any allegation regarding the 7 number of miles driven on the vehicle. She alleges that she originally purchased the vehicle in 8 2019, but she does not even specify when the defect first arose. See Complaint, ¶ 6. She has, 9 therefore, chosen to place the entirety of the car’s original value in controversy. Without question, 10 the evidence adduced before or at trial may reveal that Weathersby is entitled to less than that 11 original value. That, however, does not retroactively make the amount in controversy smaller. See 12 Arias v. Residence Inn by Marriott, 936 F.3d 920, 927 (9th Cir. 2019 (“[T]he amount in 13 controversy reflects the maximum recovery the plaintiff could reasonably recover.”) (emphasis in 14 original); Lewis v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 627 F.3d 395, 400 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The amount in 15 controversy is simply an estimate of the total amount in dispute, not a prospective assessment of 16 defendant’s liability.”). Therefore, FCA has established that at least $25,000 in actual damages are 17 in controversy. 18 Next, Weathersby objects to FCA incorporating double civil penalties in the amount in 19 controversy. In its view, FCA must provide evidence that Weathersby will receive those penalties. 20 That is wrong. By alleging in her complaint that “FCA’s failure to comply with its obligations 21 under [section 1793.2(d)] was willful,” and that she was therefore “entitled to a civil penalty of 22 two times [her] actual damages,” Weathersby placed that sum in controversy. Complaint ¶ 37; see 23 Wickstrum v. FCA USA LLC, 2021 WL 532257, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2021) (“[T]he test is 24 what amount plaintiff put in controversy, not FCA’s potential liability.”). 25 It is difficult to understand what Weathersby thinks FCA should have done. Weathersby 26 contends that FCA “is required to establish by a preponderance the willfulness that might support 27 such an award,” Mot, at 12 (emphasis in original), but that would require FCA to offer evidence of 1 its own liability. FCA cannot do that because, presumably, it does not think that it did anything 2 wrong. See Arias, 936 F.3d at 927 (rejecting the notion that, in establishing the amount in 3 controversy, a removing defendant must “prove it actually violated the law”). 4 Weathersby points to several district court cases in which civil penalties were excluded 5 from the amount-in-controversy calculation because the defendant made no showing that the facts 6 of the case supported such a penalty. To the extent those cases ask the defendant to “point[] to 7 allegations in the Complaint suggesting award of a civil penalty would be appropriate,” Zawaideh 8 v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 2018 WL 1805103, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2018), FCA has satisfied 9 their requirement. To the extent they ask the defendant to do more—provide evidence—of their 10 own willfulness, those cases are unpersuasive. See, e.g., Quinones v. FCA US LLC, 2020 WL 11 4437482, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2020) (“[W]hile civil penalties are available for willful failure 12 to comply with the Song-Beverly Act, Defendant has not offered any evidence of willfulness 13 which might support such an award.”) (emphasis in original). Again, a removing defendant does 14 not have to prove its own liability just to get into federal court. 15 Finally, Weathersby contests FCA’s estimate of attorney’s fees. FCA estimated the value 16 of attorney’s fees by offering evidence that plaintiffs’ attorneys in similar cases routinely request 17 more than $50,000 in fees. See Sheridan Decl. at 2. Weathersby characterizes this evidence as 18 “unsupported,” arguing that FCA must “mak[e] some effort to set forth the value of attorneys’ fees 19 plaintiff is expected to incur, or that plaintiff has incurred.” Mot. at 15. By comparing this case to 20 like cases, that is precisely what FCA has done. After all, this case has not proceeded past the 21 preliminary stages, so the best estimate of what will be incurred in this case is what has happened 22 in those cases like it. Other courts have endorsed this method of estimating attorney’s fees. See 23 Selinger, 2023 WL 2813510, at *11 (“To determine whether a defendant has satisfied this burden, 24 courts have considered whether the proposed fees match those awarded in similarly situated cases. 25 . .”). 26 In any event, the dispute over the precise calculation of attorney’s fees is unimportant in 27 light of the amount already in controversy. Assuming $25,000 in actual damages are in dispute 1 (the minimum purchase price to which Weathersby admitted) and double civil penalties are at 2 stake, the amount in controversy is already at the $75,000. Even a single dollar in attorney’s fees 3 || is enough to push the total above the jurisdictional threshold. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).3 4 IV. CONCLUSION 5 For the foregoing reasons, Weathersby’s motion to remand is denied. 6 7 || ITISSO ORDERED. 8 9 Dated: October 29, 2025 10 RICHARD SEEBORG Chief United States District Judge a 12

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Z 18 19 20 21 22 23 244 25 || 3 Inthe alternative, FCA argues that Weathersby has consented to federal jurisdiction by “actively participating in this action” post-removal, including by “propounding discovery, serving a 26 || deposition notice, participating in case management proceedings including case management statements, participating in mediation, and engaging in motions practice.” Opp. at 16. Because the 27 || motion to remand is denied on other grounds, this argument is not addressed. 28 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND CASE No. 24-cv-08779-RS