Ayala v. Spokane Teachers Credit Union

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 11, 2025
• Docket: 24-3008
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 11 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ANA AYALA, an individual, on behalf of No. 24-3008 herself and all others similarly situated, D.C. No. 4:23-cv-05172-TOR Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. MEMORANDUM*

SPOKANE TEACHERS CREDIT UNION,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington Thomas O. Rice, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 26, 2025 Seattle, Washington

Before: McKEOWN, GOULD, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

Ana Ayala appeals from the district court’s order dismissing her complaint

against Spokane Teachers Credit Union (“STCU”) under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). We review orders under Rule12(b)(6) de novo. See Starz

Enter., LLC v. MGM Domestic Television Distr., LLC, 39 F.4th 1236, 1239 (9th

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Cir. 2022). For a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),

the complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). In

analyzing whether a complaint has been properly alleged, we “accept all well-

pleaded factual allegations contained in the complaint as true, and decide whether

the complaint articulates ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face[.]’” Starz Enter., LLC, 39 F.4th at 1239 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S.

at 570) (internal citation omitted).

Ayala alleged in her complaint that STCU violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981’s

protections against alienage discrimination by refusing to contract with her to

finance the purchase of a car. Ayala claimed that STCU did so on the basis of her

work-only Social Security Number that is given only to immigrants and that she

obtained through the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program. But Ayala

conceded before the district court that she never applied to STCU for credit

services; rather, she applied to a car dealership for credit. The car dealership gave

Ayala financing to buy a car, and then the dealership tried to sell its financing

contract to STCU. STCU declined to purchase the contract.

2 24-3008 To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under § 1981, a plaintiff

must demonstrate that: “(1) [she] is a member of a protected class, (2) [she]

attempted to contract for certain services, and (3) [she] was denied the right to

contract for those services.” Lindsey v. SLT Los Angeles, LLC, 447 F.3d 1138,

1145 (9th Cir. 2006). The district court held that, because Ayala admits that she

never applied for credit through STCU, she did not attempt to contract under

element two of a claim under § 1981. The district court dismissed Ayala’s

complaint.

Ayala now contends, for the first time on appeal, that the district court erred

in dismissing her complaint for two primary reasons: (1) because applying directly

to STCU for financing would have been an unnecessary “futile gesture” and (2)

because the sale of the car dealership’s contract to STCU would have constituted

the novation of the original contract and the creation of a new contract between

Ayala and STCU. “Absent exceptional circumstances, we generally will not

consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal, although we have discretion

to do so.” El Paso City v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 217 F.3d 1161, 1165 (9th Cir.

2000). And even if we were to consider Ayala’s newly raised contentions, they are

not persuasive. Ayala does not cite any facts in the complaint that support either of

her theories for liability. Nor are such facts evident from a review of the

complaint. We do not consider allegations outside the complaint in evaluating a

3 24-3008 motion under Rule 12(b)(6). See W. Radio Servs. Co. v. Qwest Corp., 678 F.3d

970, 976 (9th Cir. 2012). Any facts Ayala adds for the first time in her briefing are

not sufficient to support her claim. The district court did not err in holding that

Ayala did not allege sufficient facts in her complaint to support element two of a

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

AFFIRMED.

4 24-3008