Ayala Ayala v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 7, 2025
• Docket: 24-1943
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 7 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ANTONIO AYALA AYALA, No. 24-1943 Agency No. Petitioner, A208-055-621 v. MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted April 3, 2025** San Francisco, California

Before: HURWITZ, KOH, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

Antonio Ayala Ayala, a citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of a decision

by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing an appeal from an order

by an immigration judge (“IJ”) denying his application for cancellation of removal.

We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. “[W]e review only the [BIA’s]

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). decision, except to the extent that it expressly adopts the IJ’s opinion.” Budiono v.

Lynch, 837 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). We deny the

petition.

1. The BIA agreed with the IJ that Ayala failed to demonstrate that his

removal would impose the requisite “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”

to his daughter, a United States citizen. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). We have

jurisdiction to review this determination as a mixed question of fact and law, but

because “this mixed question is primarily factual,” our “review is deferential.”

Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 225 (2024). Moreover, “[t]he facts underlying

any determination on cancellation of removal” are “unreviewable.” Id.

To establish the requisite “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship,”

Ayala “must prove that his citizen relatives would suffer hardship substantially

beyond that which would ordinarily be expected to result from” his removal. Chete

Juarez v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 944, 949 n.3 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks

omitted). “[I]n evaluating hardship, the BIA considers the ages, health, and

circumstances of qualifying relatives.” Ramirez-Perez v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 1001,

1006 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).

At the time of the 2019 hearing, Ayala’s daughter was 18 years old,

attending college, a good student, and in good health. Petitioner has other family in

the United States, including his wife, aunt, sister, and brothers. The agency

2 24-1943 acknowledged the daughter’s past mental health issues but found that those issues

were years in the past and not likely to recur. Although Ayala currently provides

financial support to his daughter, the agency found his wife—who intends to

remain in the United States—could return to work. The agency found that Ayala

had substantial assets—including a fully paid-off home and multiple cars—that

could be sold if needed to support his daughter. The agency also found that Ayala’s

daughter could apply for financial aid to pay her college tuition. The agency

permissibly determined that these “established facts” did not “satisfy the statutory

eligibility standard.” Wilkinson, 601 U.S. at 225.

Ayala contends that the agency failed to properly consider various “positive

equities” in evaluating his claim, including his consistent employment in the

United States for 30 years and lack of a serious criminal record. However, the

agency denied cancellation based solely on the finding that he had not shown his

daughter would suffer “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.” 8 U.S.C. §

1229b(b)(1)(D). Ayala does not explain how these “positive equities” have any

bearing on this hardship determination.

2. Ayala argues the agency abused its discretion by failing to terminate

or administratively close his removal proceeding. But, as the government contends,

he failed to raise this argument to the BIA, so it is unexhausted, and it is therefore

not properly before the Court. See Umana-Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 550

3 24-1943 (9th Cir. 2023).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

4 24-1943