IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-1658 Filed September 17, 2025
A.W., on behalf of N.W., Petitioner-Appellee,
vs.
M.T., Respondent-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Monica Zrinyi
Ackley, Judge.
A father contests the Iowa Code chapter 236A (2024) protective order
prohibiting contact with his daughter. AFFIRMED.
Myia E. Steines of Clemens, Walters, Conlon, Runde & Hiatt, L.L.P.,
Dubuque, for appellant.
Stuart G. Hoover of Alliance Law Office, East Dubuque, Illinois, for appellee.
Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Ahlers and Langholz,
JJ. 2
TABOR, Chief Judge.
Four-year-old N.W. told her mother that her father was sexually abusing
her. The mother, A.W., sought a protective order under Iowa Code
section 236A.3(1)(b) (2024) barring the father, M.T., from contact with N.W.
Appealing that order, M.T. contends that A.W. failed to meet her burden of proof.
Finding that the mother proved the sexual abuse allegations by a preponderance
of the evidence, we affirm.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings
N.W. turned five in the summer of 2024. She lives with her mother, A.W.;
her mother’s fiancé; and her two-year-old half-brother. Under a custody decree,
N.W. visited her father, M.T., every other weekend.
In April 2024, A.W.’s family was riding in the car when N.W. complained that
her “gina” hurt.1 In questioning from A.W.—recorded on a cell phone without N.W.
knowing—the child made accusations against her father’s paramour, Alicia. N.W.
said Alicia had locked her in a dark room, hit her with the “pointy end” of a hammer,
threw clothes at her, and tried to “touch her ‘gina.’” N.W. did not implicate her
father in that first disclosure. But in a later interview with a representative of the
Illinois Department of Children and Family Services,2 N.W. said her father touched
her vagina. The girl added that M.T. warned her not to tell her mother or he would
“effing” hurt N.W. A.W. said that N.W. also told her that M.T. held her wrist and
directed her to touch his penis. The girl recalled that when she did so, her father
would tell her: “Good job.”
1 N.W. was referring to her vagina. 2 A.W.’s family relocated to Moline, Illinois, for her fiancé’s work. 3
A.W. also recalled a troubling conversation with N.W. as the child was
getting out of the bathtub. According to A.W., the child said she knew “what the
boy part looks like.” N.W. said: “It looks just like my brother’s, and it sticks straight
out.” A.W. asked: “Whose did you see that sticks straight out?” And N.W.
responded: “My dad.” In her testimony A.W. said, to her knowledge, her daughter
had no exposure to the difference between “an erect versus a flaccid penis”
anywhere else.
Even before N.W.’s revelations, both her mother and grandmother noticed
that she was acting more aggressively toward her little brother and other family
members. A.W. also saw regressive behaviors, such as more “potty” accidents.
N.W. suffered from “night terrors” and wanted her bedroom door left open. And
N.W.’s grandmother noted N.W. was regressing in her speech patterns, “trying to
play the baby.”
Because N.W. expressed fear of her father, A.W. petitioned for relief from
sexual abuse in July 2024. A hearing on the petition started on August 1 but was
continued until September 16 because M.T.’s previous attorney withdrew
suddenly, and he asked to retain new counsel. Ten days later, the district court
issued an order prohibiting M.T. from having contact with N.W.3 The court found
that A.W. proved by a preponderance of the evidence that M.T. committed a sex
act against N.W.4 M.T. appeals.
3 The order was set to expire one year from September 26, 2024. 4 The court also said: “It is unclear why the Illinois report was not founded based
on the child’s revelations to the investigator.” 4
II. Scope and Standards of Review5
Because the district court tried this case at law, ruling on objections as they
were made, we review the proceedings for the correction of legal error rather than
de novo. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.907; T.M. v. C.M., No. 22-1107, 2023 WL
5602660, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2023).
We must decide whether substantial evidence supports the district court’s
ruling. A.N. v. J.G., No. 19-0634, 2020 WL 2061881, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 29,
2020). “Evidence is substantial if reasonable minds would find it adequate to reach
the same finding.” C.S. on behalf of H.S. v. J.C., No. 22-2035, 2023 WL 4752030,
at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. July 26, 2023). Even if the evidence supports different
inferences, we do not substitute our findings for those of the district court. Id.
III. Analysis
M.T. contends that A.W. did not offer sufficient proof that he committed
sexual abuse against N.W. To merit relief under chapter 236A, A.W. “must prove
the allegation of sexual abuse by a preponderance of the evidence.” Iowa Code
§ 236A.6(1).6 The preponderance standard is “the lowest degree of proof upon
which issues of fact are determined.” State v. Beasley, 50 N.W. 570, 570 (Iowa
5 “Scope of review” and “standard of review” are often used interchangeably. But the two terms carry distinct meanings. “Scope of review” means the range of district court actions (or “what”) an appellate court may examine. See B. John Burns, Theory of Appellate Practice, 4A Ia. Prac., Criminal Procedure § 32:1 (2021 ed.). By contrast, “standard of review” refers to our level of deference (or “how”) we conduct that examination. Id. 6 In chapter 236A, the legislature defined “sexual abuse” as “any commission of a
crime defined in chapter 709 or section 726.2 or 728.12.” Iowa Code § 236A.2(5). As the district court found, chapter 709 prohibits sex acts with a child. Contact between the finger or hand of one person and the genitalia of another fits the definition of a sex act under section 702.17(3). 5
1891). A preponderance means the allegation must be “more likely true than not
true.” Holliday v. Rain & Hail L.L.C., 690 N.W.2d 59, 64 (Iowa 2004). This is not
a criminal proceeding where guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See
C.S., 2023 WL 4752030, at *4.
In protesting the protective order, M.T. takes two tacks. First, he maintains
the district court gave too much weight to A.W.’s testimony because she lacked
credibility. Second, he claims insufficient evidence corroborates the daughter’s
allegations of sexual abuse. Neither attack erases the substantial evidence
supporting the district court’s determination that the mother proved the father
sexually abused the child by a preponderance of the evidence.
Credibility. First, M.T. accuses A.W. of pursuing an agenda to prevent him
from having contact with their daughter. For instance, he points to her petition to
terminate his parental rights, filed in response to his custody action in 2021, which
she ultimately dismissed. But on the witness stand, A.W. denied efforts to exclude
M.T. from their daughter’s life. The mother described a smooth custody
arrangement before N.W.’s allegations of abuse: “I thought things were finally
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-1658 Filed September 17, 2025
A.W., on behalf of N.W., Petitioner-Appellee,
vs.
M.T., Respondent-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Monica Zrinyi
Ackley, Judge.
A father contests the Iowa Code chapter 236A (2024) protective order
prohibiting contact with his daughter. AFFIRMED.
Myia E. Steines of Clemens, Walters, Conlon, Runde & Hiatt, L.L.P.,
Dubuque, for appellant.
Stuart G. Hoover of Alliance Law Office, East Dubuque, Illinois, for appellee.
Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Ahlers and Langholz,
JJ. 2
TABOR, Chief Judge.
Four-year-old N.W. told her mother that her father was sexually abusing
her. The mother, A.W., sought a protective order under Iowa Code
section 236A.3(1)(b) (2024) barring the father, M.T., from contact with N.W.
Appealing that order, M.T. contends that A.W. failed to meet her burden of proof.
Finding that the mother proved the sexual abuse allegations by a preponderance
of the evidence, we affirm.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings
N.W. turned five in the summer of 2024. She lives with her mother, A.W.;
her mother’s fiancé; and her two-year-old half-brother. Under a custody decree,
N.W. visited her father, M.T., every other weekend.
In April 2024, A.W.’s family was riding in the car when N.W. complained that
her “gina” hurt.1 In questioning from A.W.—recorded on a cell phone without N.W.
knowing—the child made accusations against her father’s paramour, Alicia. N.W.
said Alicia had locked her in a dark room, hit her with the “pointy end” of a hammer,
threw clothes at her, and tried to “touch her ‘gina.’” N.W. did not implicate her
father in that first disclosure. But in a later interview with a representative of the
Illinois Department of Children and Family Services,2 N.W. said her father touched
her vagina. The girl added that M.T. warned her not to tell her mother or he would
“effing” hurt N.W. A.W. said that N.W. also told her that M.T. held her wrist and
directed her to touch his penis. The girl recalled that when she did so, her father
would tell her: “Good job.”
1 N.W. was referring to her vagina. 2 A.W.’s family relocated to Moline, Illinois, for her fiancé’s work. 3
A.W. also recalled a troubling conversation with N.W. as the child was
getting out of the bathtub. According to A.W., the child said she knew “what the
boy part looks like.” N.W. said: “It looks just like my brother’s, and it sticks straight
out.” A.W. asked: “Whose did you see that sticks straight out?” And N.W.
responded: “My dad.” In her testimony A.W. said, to her knowledge, her daughter
had no exposure to the difference between “an erect versus a flaccid penis”
anywhere else.
Even before N.W.’s revelations, both her mother and grandmother noticed
that she was acting more aggressively toward her little brother and other family
members. A.W. also saw regressive behaviors, such as more “potty” accidents.
N.W. suffered from “night terrors” and wanted her bedroom door left open. And
N.W.’s grandmother noted N.W. was regressing in her speech patterns, “trying to
play the baby.”
Because N.W. expressed fear of her father, A.W. petitioned for relief from
sexual abuse in July 2024. A hearing on the petition started on August 1 but was
continued until September 16 because M.T.’s previous attorney withdrew
suddenly, and he asked to retain new counsel. Ten days later, the district court
issued an order prohibiting M.T. from having contact with N.W.3 The court found
that A.W. proved by a preponderance of the evidence that M.T. committed a sex
act against N.W.4 M.T. appeals.
3 The order was set to expire one year from September 26, 2024. 4 The court also said: “It is unclear why the Illinois report was not founded based
on the child’s revelations to the investigator.” 4
II. Scope and Standards of Review5
Because the district court tried this case at law, ruling on objections as they
were made, we review the proceedings for the correction of legal error rather than
de novo. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.907; T.M. v. C.M., No. 22-1107, 2023 WL
5602660, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2023).
We must decide whether substantial evidence supports the district court’s
ruling. A.N. v. J.G., No. 19-0634, 2020 WL 2061881, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 29,
2020). “Evidence is substantial if reasonable minds would find it adequate to reach
the same finding.” C.S. on behalf of H.S. v. J.C., No. 22-2035, 2023 WL 4752030,
at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. July 26, 2023). Even if the evidence supports different
inferences, we do not substitute our findings for those of the district court. Id.
III. Analysis
M.T. contends that A.W. did not offer sufficient proof that he committed
sexual abuse against N.W. To merit relief under chapter 236A, A.W. “must prove
the allegation of sexual abuse by a preponderance of the evidence.” Iowa Code
§ 236A.6(1).6 The preponderance standard is “the lowest degree of proof upon
which issues of fact are determined.” State v. Beasley, 50 N.W. 570, 570 (Iowa
5 “Scope of review” and “standard of review” are often used interchangeably. But the two terms carry distinct meanings. “Scope of review” means the range of district court actions (or “what”) an appellate court may examine. See B. John Burns, Theory of Appellate Practice, 4A Ia. Prac., Criminal Procedure § 32:1 (2021 ed.). By contrast, “standard of review” refers to our level of deference (or “how”) we conduct that examination. Id. 6 In chapter 236A, the legislature defined “sexual abuse” as “any commission of a
crime defined in chapter 709 or section 726.2 or 728.12.” Iowa Code § 236A.2(5). As the district court found, chapter 709 prohibits sex acts with a child. Contact between the finger or hand of one person and the genitalia of another fits the definition of a sex act under section 702.17(3). 5
1891). A preponderance means the allegation must be “more likely true than not
true.” Holliday v. Rain & Hail L.L.C., 690 N.W.2d 59, 64 (Iowa 2004). This is not
a criminal proceeding where guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See
C.S., 2023 WL 4752030, at *4.
In protesting the protective order, M.T. takes two tacks. First, he maintains
the district court gave too much weight to A.W.’s testimony because she lacked
credibility. Second, he claims insufficient evidence corroborates the daughter’s
allegations of sexual abuse. Neither attack erases the substantial evidence
supporting the district court’s determination that the mother proved the father
sexually abused the child by a preponderance of the evidence.
Credibility. First, M.T. accuses A.W. of pursuing an agenda to prevent him
from having contact with their daughter. For instance, he points to her petition to
terminate his parental rights, filed in response to his custody action in 2021, which
she ultimately dismissed. But on the witness stand, A.W. denied efforts to exclude
M.T. from their daughter’s life. The mother described a smooth custody
arrangement before N.W.’s allegations of abuse: “I thought things were finally
looking all right, and my daughter was happy to go to her dad’s.” But after hearing
N.W. allegations, A.W. believed it was in the child’s best interests to prohibit
contact with M.T.
The district court implicitly accepted A.W.’s testimony as true. And it
rejected M.T.’s disavowal of N.W.’s allegations. Such determinations of witness
credibility are better left to the factfinder than a reviewing court. See State Sav.
Bank v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 431 N.W.2d 383, 386 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988). Here,
an experienced trial judge had the chance to see and hear both parties—A.W. 6
relaying N.W.’s assertions of abuse pitted against M.T.’s denials—and found that
A.W. carried her burden of proof. We decline M.T.’s invitation to rule that the
district court gave A.W.’s testimony more weight than it warranted.
Corroboration. Second, M.T. cautions that N.W.’s allegations are
inconsistent and not corroborated by other evidence. But corroboration is not
necessary to credit accusations of sexual abuse. See State v. Feddersen, 230
N.W.2d 510, 515 (Iowa 1975). True, N.W. did not testify at the hearing on A.W.’s
petition. But the court was entitled to believe the girl’s statements offered through
her mother’s testimony.7 And although it was not necessary, A.W. did offer
evidence of N.W.’s age-inappropriate knowledge and aggressive and regressive
behaviors to corroborate the girl’s allegations of abuse. We find no deficit of
corroboration.
Nor are we compelled to question N.W.’s veracity based on the
inconsistencies that M.T. highlights on appeal. As our supreme court has found:
“Inconsistencies and lack of detail are common in sexual abuse cases and do not
compel a jury to conclude that the victim is not credible or that there is insufficient
evidence to support a guilty verdict.” State v. Donahue, 957 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Iowa
2021). The same is true in this appeal. For example, M.T. points out that N.W.
told a medical provider that he took her to Alicia’s house “all the time” but he
testified that they had only been there four or five times over six months. As A.W.
counters, “all the time” was just a child’s way of saying that something happened
7 Neither at trial nor on appeal does M.T. challenge the second-hand nature of the
evidence. So, for the purposes of our discussion, we will assume N.W. said the things that her mother and the child abuse investigator reported. And for the child’s initial allegations, we have the cell-phone video. 7
often. We find sufficient consistency in N.W.’s reports of sexual abuse by her
father to back the district court’s findings.
As a final note, we address M.T.’s point that Iowa law enforcement has yet
to bring criminal charges against him and the Illinois child abuse investigation led
to an “unfounded” assessment. Neither situation changes our substantial-
evidence review. We are not bound by the evaluations of those agencies.
Because substantial evidence supports the district court’s finding that it is more
likely than not M.T. committed an act of sexual abuse against N.W., we affirm.
AFFIRMED.