Avtech Capital L.L.C. v. MXM NV Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, D. Utah
DecidedNovember 26, 2024
Docket2:24-cv-00131
StatusUnknown

This text of Avtech Capital L.L.C. v. MXM NV Inc. (Avtech Capital L.L.C. v. MXM NV Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Utah primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Avtech Capital L.L.C. v. MXM NV Inc., (D. Utah 2024).

Opinion

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF UTAH

AVTECH CAPITAL, LLC, a Utah limited MEMORANDUM DECISION AND liability company, ORDER GRANTING IN PART [9] PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT Plaintiff, JUDGMENT, WRIT OF REPLEVIN, AND DECREE OF FORECLOSURE v. Case No. 2:24-cv-00131-DBB MXM NV, INC., a Nevada corporation, and ADDE ISSAGHOLI, a citizen of Nevada, District Judge David Barlow

Defendants.

Plaintiff Avtech Capital, LLC (“Avtech”) moves for default judgment, a writ of replevin, and a decree of foreclosure against Defendants MXM NV, Inc. (“MXM”) and the company’s president, Adde Issagholi (collectively “Defendants”).1 For the following reasons, the court grants the motion in part. BACKGROUND On September 26, 2023, Avtech entered into a lease agreement with MXM under which Avtech leased MXM certain laundry-related equipment.2 Under the terms of the lease, MXM agreed to make 30 monthly payments of $10,889.10 beginning October 1, 2023.3 Issagholi guaranteed the lease.4 According to the motion, MXM made the first three payments but failed to make the fourth payment due on or before January 1, 2024.5 The lease contains an acceleration

1 Pl.’s Mot. for Default J., Writ of Replevin, and Decree of Foreclosure (“Pl.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 9. 2 See Compl. ¶¶ 11–12, ECF No. 1; Decl. of Dan Burris (“Burris Decl.”) ¶ 3, ECF No. 9-7; Master Lease Agreement, Lease Sch. No. MXMN_001, Ex. A, ECF No. 9-2. 3 Compl. ¶ 13; Burris Decl. ¶ 4; Lease Sch. No. MXMN_001. 4 Compl. ¶¶ 14–15; Master Lease Agreement, Unconditional Continuing Guaranty ¶ 1, Ex. B. 5 Pl.’s Mot. ¶ 7; Default Notice; Burris Decl. ¶ 5. clause, which provides that upon a default on the January 2024 payment, Avtech may immediately seek a stipulated loss value of $362,720.00 plus interest and fees.6 The lease also provides that Avtech may repossess the leased property upon a default.7 Additionally, the lease states that Avtech has “no duty to mitigate [its] damages,” including by taking legal action to recover the leased property or by selling or releasing the property.8 According to the complaint,

MXM and Issagholi have not returned the leased property to Avtech or otherwise provided full payment required under the lease, despite Avtech providing notice of default and a demand for payment.9 As such, Avtech seeks (1) monetary damages of $362,720.00, plus accrued interest, attorney fees, and costs; (2) a writ of replevin for the return of the leased property; (3) a judgment and decree of foreclosure against all assets of MXM; and (4) a judgment and decree of foreclosure against all assets of Issagholi.10 Avtech filed its complaint on February 22, 202411 and served Defendants on May 22, 2024.12 On June 24, 2024, upon receiving no answer by Defendants, Avtech filed a motion for entry of default,13 which the clerk entered on July 2, 2024.14 On July 25, 2024, Avtech moved for a default judgment.15 To date, Defendants have not appeared or otherwise responded to the

complaint or motion for default judgment.

6 Compl. ¶¶ 17, 19–20; Pl.’s Mot. ¶¶ 7, 12; Master Lease Agreement 6, 10, 19. 7 Compl. ¶ 21; Pl.’s Mot. ¶¶ 18–19; Master Lease Agreement 2, 4. 8 Master Lease Agreement 4. 9 Compl. ¶¶ 22–24; Default Notice, ECF No. 9-2. 10 Compl. ¶¶ 29, 34, 38; Pl.’s Mot. 2. 11 ECF No. 1. 12 ECF Nos. 5, 6. 13 ECF No. 7. 14 ECF No. 8. 15 ECF No. 9. STANDARD Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2), when the plaintiff’s claim is not for a sum certain: [T]he party must apply to the court for a default judgment. . . . If the party against whom default judgment is sought has appeared personally or by a representative, that party or its representative must be served with written notice of the application at least 7 days before the hearing. The court may conduct hearings or make referrals—preserving any federal statutory right to a jury trial—when, to enter or effectuate judgment, it needs to: (A) conduct an accounting; (B) determine the amount of damages; (C) establish the truth of any allegation by evidence; or (D) investigate any other matter.16 “Default judgment is a harsh sanction.”17 It “must normally be viewed as available only when the adversary process has been halted because of an essentially unresponsive party . . . . [T]he diligent party must be protected lest he be faced with interminable delay and continued uncertainty as to his rights.”18 Despite service of process over six months ago, Defendants have failed to appear or defend against Avtech’s claims.19 “Once default is entered, ‘it remains for the court to consider whether the unchallenged facts constitute a legitimate cause of action, since a party in default does not admit mere conclusions of law.’”20

16 Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). 17 M.E.N. Co. v. Control Fluidics, Inc., 834 F.2d 869, 872 (10th Cir. 1987). 18 Curne v. Liberty Mut. Ins., No. 21-3159, 2022 WL 1440650, at *3 (10th Cir. May 6, 2022) (unpublished) (quoting In re Rains, 946 F.2d 731, 732–33 (10th Cir. 1991)). 19 ECF Nos. 5, 6. 20 Bixler v. Foster, 596 F.3d 751, 762 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting 10A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary K. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2688, at 63 (3d ed. 1998)). District courts have “broad discretion in deciding a default judgment question.”21 In order for the court to enter a default judgment, it must have subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction over the party being defaulted, and the unchallenged facts must state a legitimate cause of action.22 DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction “[W]hen entry of a default judgment is sought against a party who has failed to plead or otherwise defend, the district court has an affirmative duty to look into its jurisdiction both over the subject matter and the parties.”23 Avtech asserts that it has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because there is complete diversity of citizenship between Avtech and Defendants, and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.24 Avtech is a Utah limited liability company with all of its members having citizenship in Utah.25 MXM is incorporated and has its principal place of business in Nevada.26 Likewise, Issagholi is a citizen of and resides in Nevada.27 Therefore, complete diversity is satisfied. Additionally, Avtech seeks monetary

damages of $362,720.00, plus accrued interest, attorney fees, and costs, thus satisfying the amount in controversy. Accordingly, the court has subject matter jurisdiction. “In reviewing its personal jurisdiction, the court does not assert a personal [jurisdiction] defense of the parties; rather, the court exercises its responsibility to determine that it has the

21 Grandbouche v. Clancy, 825 F.2d 1463, 1468 (10th Cir. 1987); accord Gomes v. Williams, 420 F.2d 1364, 1367 (10th Cir. 1970); Dennis Garberg & Assocs., Inc. v. Pack-Tech Int’l Corp., 115 F.3d 767, 771 (10th Cir. 1997). 22 Bixler v. Foster, 596 F.3d 751, 762 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing Hukill v. Okla. Native Am.

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Bixler v. Foster
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Avtech Capital L.L.C. v. MXM NV Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/avtech-capital-llc-v-mxm-nv-inc-utd-2024.