Avon Furniture Leasing, Inc. v. Popolizio

116 A.D.2d 280, 500 N.Y.S.2d 1019, 1986 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 50905
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedApril 17, 1986
StatusPublished
Cited by26 cases

This text of 116 A.D.2d 280 (Avon Furniture Leasing, Inc. v. Popolizio) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Avon Furniture Leasing, Inc. v. Popolizio, 116 A.D.2d 280, 500 N.Y.S.2d 1019, 1986 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 50905 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1986).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Ellerin, J.

At issue in this CPLR article 78 proceeding is a finding of an "illusory tenancy” by the New York Conciliation and Appeals Board (CAB) which has been vacated by Special Term.

Proceedings were initiated before the CAB in March 1983 when David Works, who resided in apartment PH-C at 345 East 73rd Street pursuant to a "sublease” with petitioner Avon Furniture Leasing, Inc., filed a complaint alleging a rent and security overcharge and a "phony and illusory sublet”.

The facts are essentially undisputed. The owner of the subject building is a member of the Rent Stabilization Association and the apartment unit involved is subject to the Rent Stabilization Law (Administrative Code of City of New York § YY51-1.0 et seq.). The petitioner, Avon Furniture Leasing, Inc. (Avon), is in the business of leasing, furnishing and subletting residential apartments and it leases at least seven apartments in the building here involved for that purpose.

On June 16, 1980, Avon entered into a lease with the owner for apartment PH-C. The prior tenant’s lease had expired on May 31, 1980 with a stabilized rent at that time of $404.61. Avon’s lease provided for a three-year term, commencing June 15, 1980, with escalating rentals of $695 per month during the first year, $745 per month during the second year and $856 per month during the last year. The standard form lease contained an additional clause specifying that "tenant has the right to sublet notwithstanding paragraph 18 of this lease” and annexed to the lease, and to the leases covering several other apartments in the building rented by Avon, was a letter [282]*282agreement signed by an officer of Avon stating that the apartment "will be our secondary residence * * * It is agreed and understood that this apartment is not subject to the Rent Stabilization Guidelines of New York City”. Avon furnished the apartment and listed it with various brokers, one of whom effected Works’ subsequent rental from Avon of PH-C.

Works took, possession of the furnished apartment in May 1982 pursuant to an extensive written lease with Avon covering a one-year period, from May 7, 1982 through May 6, 1983, at a monthly rental of $1,350 plus a $500 security deposit and prepayment of $1,500, "part of last mos. rent”. The rider attached to the agreement expressly denominated the rental as a "sublease” and reserved to Avon the right to be "the prime tenant” should the building become cooperative or condominium, with the subtenant agreeing to relinquish all rights to the premises in that event. Also appended to the leasing agreement was a listing of the furnishings of the apartment, which may be characterized as modest. Works paid the rent and security directly to Avon in accordance with the "sublease”.

A hearing was held before the CAB on August 8, 1983 at which the complainant Works testified. He asserted that the apartment was used as his primary residence and he described and produced photographs of the furnishings. The attorneys for both Avon and the owner of the building were also present at the hearing and the leases for the various apartments rented by Avon in the subject building were produced. No evidence as to any relationship between Avon and the owner, other than the leases, was adduced. It may be noted that shortly before the hearing, on July 19, 1983, an "eviction” plan for cooperative conversion of the building had been submitted to the office of the Attorney-General.

In an opinion, dated August 25, 1983, the CAB found that the apartment was in fact Mr. Works’ primary residence, that Avon had concededly never occupied nor intended to occupy the subject apartment but had rented it only for purposes of furnishing and "subletting” it at a rent considerably in excess of the lawful stabilized rent, that it was in the business of renting and subletting apartments in this fashion and that, based on the record, the "prime tenancy” was illusory and that the practice constituted an evasion of the Code of the Rent Stabilization Association of New York City, Inc. (Rent Stabilization Code) in violation of section 62 (A). The order of the CAB directed that Works be granted all the rights of a [283]*283"prime tenant” under the Rent Stabilization Law including the right to purchase the shares allocated to the apartment upon the acceptance of a cooperative conversion plan for filing and also directed a rollback of the rent and a refund of excess rent already paid.

Avon commenced the instant article 78 proceeding seeking to annul the CAB’s determination. Special Term granted the petition finding that since the record indicated no collusion, scheme or relationship between Avon and the owner of the building other than landlord and tenant, and there being no privity or relationship whatsoever between Works and the owner, it was not legally justifiable to conclude that Avon’s was an "illusory tenancy” or that the legal tenant of the apartment in question is Works, stressing the express language of the "sublease” which made Works fully aware that he had no right to purchase the shares for the apartment if the building went cooperative. Special Term also found the Board’s determination that Avon was entitled to only a 10% increase in the stabilized rent as compensation for the furnishings was not supported by substantial evidence and was arbitrary and capricious.

We find that Special Term erred in both respects and that the record amply provides a rational basis for the CAB’s determination that Avon was an illusory tenant and that the furnishings did not entitle it to more than the statutorily authorized 10% as compensation for the furnishings.

The rent stabilization laws were enacted within the context of an extremely serious housing shortage, particularly for those only able to afford reasonable rents, and are designed "to prevent exactions of unjust, unreasonable and oppressive rents and rental agreements and to forestall profiteering, speculation and other disruptive practices”. (Administrative Code § YY51-1.0.)

Toward that end the Rent Stabilization Code expressly provides, in section 62 (A) that: "The stabilization rents and other requirements provided in this Code shall not be evaded, either directly or indirectly, in connection with the renting or leasing or the transfer of a lease of dwelling units”. (Emphasis added.)

The provisions of the Rent Stabilization Law represent a pragmatic balance between affording the owners of properties adequate periodic rent increases to enable them to properly maintain their properties in the face of rising costs, while at [284]*284the same time affording to tenants an assurance against unreasonable escalations in rent and also various other rights and protections, including what has become the increasingly valuable right to purchase their apartments in the event of cooperative conversion. The attempts which have been made to upset this balance, and to pervert the beneficial purpose of the law, have been varied and creative and ofttimes cynically cloaked in a mantle of misleading nomenclature and fictitious characterizations of tenancy status. It is in response to such schemes that the law of illusory tenancy evolved. (See, Hutchins v Conciliation & Appeals Bd., 125 Misc 2d 809 [M. Evans, J.], for a most excellent and comprehensive discussion of this development of the law in this area.)

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Bluebook (online)
116 A.D.2d 280, 500 N.Y.S.2d 1019, 1986 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 50905, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/avon-furniture-leasing-inc-v-popolizio-nyappdiv-1986.