Avery v. Studley, Mayor

50 A. 752, 74 Conn. 272, 1901 Conn. LEXIS 57
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
DecidedDecember 20, 1901
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 50 A. 752 (Avery v. Studley, Mayor) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Avery v. Studley, Mayor, 50 A. 752, 74 Conn. 272, 1901 Conn. LEXIS 57 (Colo. 1901).

Opinion

*280 Hamersley, J.

The mayor of New Haven removed the plaintiff from the office of police commissioner. The plaintiff appealed from the order of removal to the Superior Court. The court affirmed the action of the mayor, and this appeal is from that judgment.

The reasons of appeal allege that the court erred in overruling the claims of law made by the plaintiff upon the trial. These claims were that the mayor had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter of removal, and that, if he had jurisdiction, the order of removal was illegal by reason of errors committed by the mayor in the course of the hearing before him. All the errors assigned are based on the assumption that the action of the mayor in removing one of his subordinates, is judicial and strictly analogous to the amotion of a corporate officer by a municipal corporation, for the commission of some offense by which the right to the office is *281 forfeited; or to the deprivation of an officer of an ecclesiastical corporation for the commission of a similar offense. If this assumption is correct, it may he that some of the errors assigned are well taken. We think that it is not correct.

The charter of the city of New Haven as revised in 1899 (13 Special Laws, pp. 388-454) is a wide departure from those grants of franchises by which the municipal corporations of England were formerly established, and which were largely followed by our acts creating cities, first enacted in 1784. It is also a departure from the modern changes in city charters, by which a large portion of corporate and governmental power is assigned to independent boards. The present charter of New Haven seeks to secure good government through the concentration of responsibility and power in the mayor. At the biennial elections the freemen choose the mayor, the legislative body, and a few officers whose duties do not relate to the active conduct of municipal business, such as a clerk and comptroller.

The mayor has a power of veto upon all legislative acts, which can be over-ridden only by a two-thirds vote. With the exceptions named, and excepting also the officers of the legislative body, and of the City Court, every officer and every employee in the government of the city and the conduct of its business is directly or indirectly the appointee of the mayor. The duties of the mayor as set forth in § 11, and throughout the charter, cover the whole range of executive power, and in terms make him “responsible for the good order and efficient government of said city.” He is, for practical purposes, invested with the whole executive power; including, of necessity, the appointment and removal of those subordinate officials for whose conduct he is responsible. He appoints directly the governing body for each municipal department, viz., the boards of finance, of police commissioners, of fire commissioners, a majority of the board of park commissioners, the boards of health, of library directors, of education, of charities and correction, and the director of public works; also the chief executive officer or superintendent, and heads of bureaus in these departments, *282 and the other principal officers not connected with these departments. He appoints indirectly, through these boards and superintendents, the other officers and employees of the city.

But the power of appointment and removal, thus given to the mayor directly, and indirectly through his subordinates, is affected by another main purpose of the charter. It seeks to secure good government, not only through the power and responsibility centered in one chief magistrate, but also by treating fitness and merit as the controlling reason in appointment of municipal officers and agents, and by separating the administration of municipal affairs from the control and influence of party politics ; and to this end requires nearly all appointees, except those directly appointed by the mayor, to be taken from those approved as competent by the civil service board, and provides that appointments and removals shall not be made for political reasons. For this reason certain restrictions are placed on removals made by the governing body of city departments, and bjr the heads of bureaus. And for the same reason, removals by the mayor are to be made in the manner prescribed in § 12, and this mode is repeated in § 213, after the various modes of maldng the mayor’s appointments have been detailed.

We think it evident that this mode of removal is rather a mode of exercising the power of removal incident to executive appointment, than a ^Mim'-judicial power to hear and determine official offenses, punishable by a forfeiture of office. The first step in removal is not to be taken until the mayor has reached a belief that the officer is incompetent, or unfaithful, or that his removal is demanded by public interest. He cannot act on this belief without making a public record of the grounds that have convinced him, and giving the party affected a full hearing. If this hearing is treated as the trial of an officer for the commission of an offense which forfeits his office, then the legislature has provided for a trial and conviction before a judge who must disqualify himself by forming an opinion, before he can act. The opinion, finding, or conclusion which the mayor must reach, after a hearing, is in truth similar in character to that which he must reach *283 before making an appointment. Is he competent? Is he honest ? Can he serve the city’s interest ? The mayor must find an affirmative answer to these questions before he can honestly make an appointment. Before he can legally make a removal he must, after notice and hearing, find an affirmative answer to one or more of these questions: Is he incompetent? Is he unfaithful ? Does the public interest demand his removal? The notice to the officer to be removed must contain a fair statement of the charges or grounds which have influenced the mayor in forming his belief. The hearing given to the officer in reference to the truth of these grounds, as facts, as well as to the broader question of public interest, must be full. When the hearing is finished, the mayor must answer the questions in view of all he has heard, and may remove, or retain in office, in exercise of his official discretion. This view is confirmed by § 139, which specifies some eleven offenses as grounds for removal of any municipal officer, and provides the mode for the judicial trial of an officer charged with the commission of any such offense; and by way of distinguishing such removal from the power of removal belonging to an appointing officer, § 143 expressly excludes any possibility of construing the provisions of this punitive removal as limiting or changing the provisions for removal of his appointees by the appointing officer, as defined in other provisions of the charter.

The foregoing considerations determine the nature of the appeal to the Superior Court. The removal of an officer upon conviction of an offense which forfeits his right to hold the office is an act mainly judicial, and perhaps administrative only as connected with the exercise of the police power.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
50 A. 752, 74 Conn. 272, 1901 Conn. LEXIS 57, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/avery-v-studley-mayor-conn-1901.