Avery v. Stewart

2 Conn. 69
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
DecidedNovember 15, 1816
StatusPublished
Cited by39 cases

This text of 2 Conn. 69 (Avery v. Stewart) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Avery v. Stewart, 2 Conn. 69 (Colo. 1816).

Opinions

Swtvt, Ch. J .

Where a note, or other obligation, is payable in a certain number of days from the date, the day of 1 he date is always excluded in the computation of the time. This note was, then, payable on the sixtieth day after the date, which, it is agreed, was Sunday.

It has been argued, that as tills note was payable within sixty days, the defendant, as it was unlawful for him to tender payment, on the last day, because it was Sunday, was bound to pay it on the preceding day. But where a note is made payable within a certain number of days, the promissor is not bound to tender payment till the last day : and no suit can ever be maintained against him for non-payment prior to the hist day. Of course, a note pnvnhle within a certain number [73]*73yi days, is payable on the last day in the same manner, as if that had been specified to be the day of payment.

If a note should be made payable on Sunday, in express terms, it would be void, because it would be a contract to do an unlawful act. But if it be payable at a future day, which, by calculation, is found tobe Sunday, and the parties did not intend to make it payable on Sunday, then it would not be void. The question, then, is, if a note falls due on Sunday, whether the tender must be on the preceding or succeeding day. The obligor cannot be bound to tender on the preceding day; for no man is bound to perform a contract before the time of payment; and no action can ever lie against him for non-performance before that time. Though he cannot perform the contract on the day it falls due, because it would be an unlawful act, yet that does not exonerate him from his obligation. It would be unjust to subject him to pay damages for the non-performance of a contract when it was unlawful to do it. The only way, then, to do justice to both parties, is, to permit the tender to be made on the succeeding day | and this is conformable to a general principle of law, that where the obligor cannot perform a contract according to the literal terms of it, he shall perform it as nearly as possible. This violates no principle, and does justice to all the parties. I think, then, the correct rule is, that when an obligation falls due on Sunday, the obligor shall be bound to tender a performance of it on the succeeding day.

It is said, in the case of bills of exchange and negotiable notes, where days of grace are allowed, that they are by the custom of merchants, sanctioned by law, payable on the third day of grace $ yet if that day happens to be Sunday, then they are payable on the preceding day ; and that this principle applies to the case in question. But the same custom of merchants, which has indulged three days of grace, after a note is due. if that day is not Sunday, — allows but two where it is Sunday ; and it being an indulgence, it is perfectly consistent to require payment on the second day of grace, to avoid giving four days of grace : but this is a very different thing from requiring a note to be paid before it is due. ■ ■ .

By the words s: wholesale factory price,” could not have been intended the cash price, but must have referred to some [74]*74general rule known to cotton manufacturers. It was, therefore, proper to leave it to the jury to ascertain by the evidence, as a matter of fact, what was the wholesale factory price.

The tender was made at a proper and reasonable time, under all the circumstances.

I would not advise a new trial.

TkumbuIiX, J. was of the same opinion.

Edmond, J.

In this case, sundry exceptions are taken to f-he charge given to the jury ; and there is also a motion in arrest, founded on the supposed insufficiency of the defend ant’s plea in bar.

I am satisfied with the charge given by the court to the jury j and should not advise a new trial on that account.

What is the legal import of the words “ wholesale factory prices” used by the parties in the contract, was not the question ; but, to what standard, by the use of those words, the parties intended to refer, by which to regulate the price of the cotton yarn.

Where there is an ambiguity, which cannot be satisfied without going out of the instrument, as where there is a devise to a person by name, and there is more than one of the same name ; of a farm, and there are several answering to the. same description, &c,, it is a question of fact, not of law s testimony is admissible ; and the quest ion is a proper one to he submitted to a jury.

As to the tender. W here payment is to be made by contract, in specified articles, on a day certain, the creditor is reasonably entitled to such a tender as will enable him, if he chusc to do it, to examine the articles, and see whether they comport: with the articles stipulated to be paid in quantity and quality, before lie is bound to receive them, in satisfaction of bis claim. If, however, the debtor is present at the time and place, ready to deliver the articles corres, ponding in all respects with the terms of the contract, in season for such an examination, and waiting for that purpose, and to make a tender, the creditor cannot have right, by any act or neglect of his own. to deprive the debtor of his privilege to make a tender in satisfaction of his debt in all that day j and that being done in the manner stated, the contract is not only reasonably, but literally, complied with. [75]*75on the debtor's part ; he is not chargeable with a breach of contract; am! if the creditor suffers an inconvenience or loss, it is to be imputed only to his misfortune or negligence.

In respect to ¡ he construction of the words in the obligation, “ in sixty days from dale*’* By the plain import of the words, the day on which it is dated is excluded ; otherwise, a note payable in one day from date, would be a note payable on demand, and a suit thereon might be instituted immediately. With this construction, the sixtieth day from date was the Sabbath : and the question arises whether the note was payable on Saturday or Monday ? If payable on Saturday, the plea in bar is insufficient; otherwise, not.

On which of the days a tender in such cases ought to be made, is not so important, in my view, as that the question should be settled and at rest.

It however appears to me, that Saturday was the day on which a tender ought to have been made, and fhat the rule should be so settled.

In a contract to perform within a stipulated number of days, it is not usual to enter into a minute calculation of the number of Sabbaths that may intervene, and which will go to make up the number of days agreed on. The understanding of parties is, to take the days in succession as they arise, wild her Sabbalk, or not; and there is no more reason for casting the last Sabbath, than the first, out of the number. None, by the terms of the contract, are to be excluded •, nol-is an exclusion necessary to the execution or validity of the contract. The fair intent of the parties to the contract is to be presumed to be (and there is nothing in the contract to rebut the presumption,) that it should he performed at a time when it might be lawfully performed ; and that that time should be in sixty

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Bluebook (online)
2 Conn. 69, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/avery-v-stewart-conn-1816.