By JUDGE COLLIER.
The material inquiry, is, whether the registration of a deed conveying lands, be necessary to give to it validity against the creditors of the vendor. The negative of this inquiry is attempted to be sustained, by a reference to the second member of the second section of the statute of frauds,
The act of 1811, b only restrains the operation of deeds of land, for a failure to have them registered, against subsequent and bona fide purchasers, and mortgagee^ without notice, without saying any thing of creditors. In fact, in the multiplicity of legislation upon this subject, anterior to the date of the deed in question, registration by the vendee seems not to have been made necessary to give title as against the vendor’s creditors. We are therefore of opinion that the creditor derives no advantage from the [490]*490omission of the vendee of his debtor to register such e deed. We may consider the defendant as standing in the situation of Gray, thejudgment creditor, or as a purchaser from the time he became such; and in either point of view the charge of- the Court was erroneous. It should have been left to the jury to determine from the proof offered, whether the defendant, at the time of his purchase, had notice of the existence of the deed. Their inquiry on this point was foreclosed by the instruction given. If the proof professed to be set out in the bill of exceptions, could be considered as all that was offered, we would be prepared to affirm the judgment below, because no consideration appears for the conveyance from the plaintiff to Gaston: but there is nothing in the record which enables us to infer that other evidence was not adduced, and the language employed in the charge of the Court authorizes a different conclusion.
We are accordingly of opinion, that thejudgment must-be reversed, and the cause remanded.
Judge White not sitting.
Laws of Ala. 244.
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