Avaya v. Bryant

105 S.W.3d 811, 82 Ark. App. 273, 2003 Ark. App. LEXIS 427
CourtCourt of Appeals of Arkansas
DecidedMay 21, 2003
DocketCA 02-1122
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 105 S.W.3d 811 (Avaya v. Bryant) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Avaya v. Bryant, 105 S.W.3d 811, 82 Ark. App. 273, 2003 Ark. App. LEXIS 427 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003).

Opinion

Andree Layton Roaf, Judge.

This is an appeal from the Workers’ Compensation Commission’s order affirming and adopting the Administrative Law Judge’s decision, which found that appellee Cleaster Bryant was entitled to a 15% whole body physical impairment rating for his compensable shoulder injury. On appeal, appellant Avaya (Lucent Technologies) challenges the manner in which Bryant’s physician used the AMA Guides in calculating his impairment rating and argues that the Commission’s decision in respect to these calculations is not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.

On June 29, 1999, while employed by Avaya as a repairman, Bryant injured his shoulder when loading a control box onto a truck. In his deposition, Bryant stated that the control box started to fall, and as he was trying to catch it, he felt something pop in his right shoulder. Bryant was diagnosed with a rotator cuff tear and underwent arthroscopic surgery by Dr. Jimmy Tucker on July 26, 1999, to repair the tear. Bryant was released to full duty approximately six months later. After he continued to experience pain in his shoulder, Bryant was referred to Dr. David Collins in August 2000. In his office note of August 28, 2000, Dr. Colhns stated that Bryant had a failed rotator cuff repair and that he was also symptomatic with acromioclavicular arthrosis. Bryant underwent a second surgery on his right shoulder in October 2000 to repair the failed rotator cuff. In addition, Dr. Collins performed an arthrotomy of the acromioclavicular joint (“AC joint”) and a distal clavicle excision. Avaya accepted Bryant’s injury as compen-sable and paid for all of his medical treatment related to the injury, as well as temporary total disability benefits. On February 28, 2001, Dr. Collins stated in an office note:

There is no change in the physical appearance of the shoulder. There is very mild crepitation, although his range of motion with assist is nearly full. He has 4+}/5 external rotation power, 5/5 deltoid and subscapularis.
Mr. Bryant has reached maximum medical improvement following a work-related injury to the right shoulder. He has sustained permanent partial impairment on the basis of injury to the rota-tor cuff, acromioclavicular joint, and surgical treatment of the shoulder environment. This would include alteration of the del-toid process, acromion process, coracoacromial ligament, rotator cuff, greater tuberosity, and acromioclavicular joint. Impairment is equal to 25% to the upper extremity, equal to 15% to the body as a whole.
Mr. Bryant is released to activities without restriction. He will be seen as needed.

Bryant made a claim for permanent partial disability benefits in the amount of 15% to the body as a whole, and Avaya controverted the rating, contending that it was excessive. The matter was submitted to the ALJ without a hearing on stipulated facts, briefs, medical exhibits, and Bryant’s deposition. The parties stipulated that Bryant sustained a compensable shoulder injury on June 29, 1999, and that he earned an average weekly wage sufficient to entitle him to $303 for temporary total disability benefits and $227 for permanent partial disability benefits. In his deposition, Bryant stated that he had returned to work after being released without restrictions on February 28, 2001, and that he was performing the same type of job. Bryant further stated that he had not had any subsequent problems with his shoulder, that he was not currently talcing any medications, and that he could perform his job without any problems.

In its brief, Avaya argued that the 15% impairment rating was invalid and excessive because Dr. Collins failed to properly calculate the extent of Bryant’s disability in accordance with the AMA’s Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (4th ed. 1993) (“AMA Guides”). Avaya contended that a 15% impairment rating to the body as a whole is only appropriate for a 100% loss of function of the AC joint of the shoulder, according to the AMA Guides, and that the evidence showed that Bryant has had no residual problems with his shoulder since his release by Dr. Collins. Using the AMA Guides, Avaya calculated its own impairment rating based on the objective medical findings and alleged that Bryant was entitled to a maximum impairment rating of 6.6% for his shoulder injury.

In its decision of December 19, 2002, the ALJ disagreed with Avaya’s argument and found that the 15% impairment rating assessed by Dr. Collins was not excessive. The ALJ noted that Bryant had to undergo two different surgeries to repair his shoulder injuries and that Dr. Collins was an orthopedist, whose specialty is the treatment of shoulder injuries and who has an excellent reputation in the orthopedic community. Avaya then appealed to the Commission, who affirmed and adopted the ALJ’s findings of fact. The Commission also discussed Avaya’s calculation of its impairment rating pursuant to the AMA Guides and disagreed with its method. The Commission calculated its own impairment rating and concluded that the objective medical findings warranted an impairment rating of 19%, according the AMA Guides. Because this rating was in excess of that assessed by Dr. Collins and requested by Bryant, the Commission found that the 15% impairment rating awarded by the ALJ was not excessive. Avaya now appeals from this ruling.

On appeal, Avaya argues that the decision of the Commission that Bryant was entitled to a 15% impairment rating to the body as a whole is not supported by substantial evidence. When reviewing a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commission, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the findings of the Commission. Rice v. Georgia Pacific Corp., 72 Ark. App. 148, 35 S.W.3d 328 (2000). This court must affirm the decision of the Commission if it is supported by substantial evidence. Id. Substantial evidence is that evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion of the Commission. Id. The issue on appeal is not whether the appellate court might have reached a different result or whether the evidence would have supported a contrary finding; if reasonable minds could reach the Commission’s conclusion, the appellate court must affirm its decision. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. v. Baker, 337 Ark. 94, 989 S.W.2d 151 (1999).

Any determination of the existence or extent of physical impairment must be supported by objective and measurable physical findings. Ark. Code Ann. § 11 — 9—704(c) (1) (B) (Repl. 2002). Pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § ll-9-522(g)(l) (Repl. 2002), the Commission must adopt an impairment rating guide to be used in the assessment of anatomical impairment, and the Commission has adopted the AMA Guides to be used in this assessment. Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission Rule 34. The Commission is authorized to decide which portions of the medical evidence to credit and to translate this medical evidence into a finding of permanent impairment using the AMA Guides. Polk County v. Jones, 74 Ark. App. 159, 47 S.W.3d 904 (2001).

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Bluebook (online)
105 S.W.3d 811, 82 Ark. App. 273, 2003 Ark. App. LEXIS 427, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/avaya-v-bryant-arkctapp-2003.