A.V. v. Superior Court CA6

Opinion

Filed 8/18/26 A.V. v. Superior Court CA6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

A.V., H054369 (Santa Clara County

Petitioner, Super. Ct. No. 24JD028178)

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SANTA CLARA COUNTY,

Respondent,

SANTA CLARA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN’S SERVICES,

Real Party in Interest.

In September 2024, newborn I.V. was taken into protective custody because his mother, A.V., could not meet his basic needs. Consistent with the terms of a settlement between A.V., I.V.’s counsel, and the Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children’s Services (Department), the juvenile court in assuming jurisdiction and ordering I.V.’s removal from his mother found a substantial risk that I.V. would suffer serious physical harm or illness “as a result of [A.V.’s] suspected cognitive delays” and ordered reunification services and a psychological evaluation for A.V. consistent with the parties’ negotiated case plan.

Court-ordered family reunification services for parents of a dependent child under the age of three years “shall be provided for … [six] months from the dispositional hearing … but no longer than 12 months from the date the child entered foster care, … unless the child is returned to the [parent’s] home.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(B); cf. id., § 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(A) [requiring 12 months’ reunification services for parents of older dependent children].)1 At the six-month review hearing (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(1)), and again at the 12-month “permanency hearing” (§ 366.21, subd. (f)(1)), the juvenile court found that I.V. could not be returned to A.V.’s custody but extended the time for reunification and ordered continued services. (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1) [permitting additional reunification services at the 12-month hearing in limited circumstances].) At both review hearings, the court also found by clear and convincing evidence that the services provided to A.V. had been reasonable; A.V. did not appeal those findings. (See § 366.21, subds. (e)(8) & (f)(1)(A).)

At a contested 18-month permanency review hearing, the juvenile court again determined that returning I.V. to A.V.’s physical custody would “create a substantial risk of detriment to [I.V.’s] safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being.” (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(1).) Given that determination—which A.V. does not challenge—the juvenile court had to terminate reunification services to A.V. unless it found a statutory justification for a final extension of the reunification period to a subsequent permanency review hearing no later than 24 months after I.V. was taken from his mother’s custody. (§ 366.22, subd. (b); see also § 366.25, subd. (a)(1).) One such statutory justification would be the failure of the social services agency to provide reasonable reunification services. (§ 366.22, subd. (b)(2)(A).) Another statutory justification requires that (1) the parent belongs to the narrow subset of parents defined under section 366.22,

1 Unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

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subdivision (b)(1), and (2) “there is a substantial probability that the child will be returned … within the extended time period” (§ 366.22, subd. (b)(3)).

In challenging the order terminating family reunification and setting a hearing under section 366.26 for selection and implementation of a permanent plan, A.V. argues that insufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination that neither statutory justification for extending the reunification period applies. Amici curiae Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund, Disability Rights California, the Brooklyn Law School Disability and Civil Rights Clinic, Sarah H. Lorr, Shanta Trivedi, and Public Counsel have filed a brief in support of A.V. Because sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings, we will deny the petition.

I. BACKGROUND

A. I.V.’s Placement in Protective Custody and the Section 300 Petition Just days after his birth in September 2024, I.V. was placed into protective custody. In support of the protective custody warrant, the Department’s social worker declared that hospital staff had raised concerns about A.V.’s cognitive ability and mental health, describing A.V. as “speaking and acting like a 10-year-old child.” The following month, the Department filed a section 300 petition alleging that I.V. came within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction as A.V. could not meet her son’s basic needs due to her “cognitive delays and mental health challenges.”

The Department’s initial hearing report stated that A.V. had a history of methamphetamine abuse and possible mental health needs.2 The residential treatment program where A.V. had been staying reported that they would be referring her to a

2 A.V. provided the name of I.V.’s alleged father but told the Department that she had not spoken to him in months. The alleged father did not participate in the dependency proceeding.

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different program as there were no concerns over her substance abuse,3 and they were not appropriately equipped to support her developmental delays. A.V. had an older child, E.V., who had been removed from A.V.’s care in 2023. Reunification services for A.V. were bypassed in E.V.’s dependency case because A.V. had not engaged with the Department, and A.V.’s parental rights were terminated as to E.V.4 B. Jurisdiction and Disposition In the Department’s October 2024 jurisdiction and disposition report, the social worker identified A.V.’s probable developmental delay as one of the problems requiring the juvenile court’s intervention, reporting that A.V. presented as an eight year old. The social worker concluded that A.V. could benefit from services to address her “developmental needs and mental health,” as well as parenting courses, psychological evaluations, and medical evaluations to rule out “developmental delays, neurological deficits, chronic infections, genetic conditions, or head trauma.”

A.V.’s adoptive mother told the social worker that A.V. had “multiple challenges”

while growing up, including mental health and substance abuse issues.5 A.V.’s mother recalled that A.V., though never assessed for developmental delays, had been diagnosed with “Reactive Attachment Disorder (RAD) [and] Attention Deficit Hyperactive disorder (ADHD)” and had a “504 plan due to speech and behavioral needs.” A.V. had also been “in and out of multiple facilities for her mental health as a minor.” The social worker asked San Andreas Regional Center (SARC) how to have an adult client assessed for

3 According to the social worker’s declaration in support of the protective custody warrant, A.V. had been “incarcerated earlier this year” but was “released to [residential treatment] to address her substance abuse issues.”

4 A.V.’s previous referrals for E.V. involved substance abuse.

5 A.V.’s mother had not spoken to A.V. in several years. There were also substantiated reports that A.V. had been sexually abused by her former adoptive father.

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services related to developmental delays.6 SARC staff explained that an adult seeking to qualify for its services would have to substantiate that a developmental disability—“ ‘one of … [five] eligible conditions’ ”—was present before the age of 18.

A.V. had twice-weekly supervised visits with I.V. for two hours, and during the reporting period had remained consistent with visitation. A.V., however, required verbal cues to respond to I.V.’s needs and needed to be told how to hold his head, when to feed him, and when to change his diaper.

The social worker informed A.V. that she would be referred for parenting education and provided information for a behavioral health assessment. When A.V. told the social worker that she had no food at the residential center where she now resided and did not know where to use her EBT benefits, the social worker advised A.V. on how to get groceries and use public transit.

At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the parties reported having “reach[ed] a full settlement” and agreed to submit on a negotiated first amended petition, which alleged a substantial risk that I.V. would suffer serious physical harm or illness “as a result of [A.V.’s] suspected cognitive delays.” The Department added that it had been “carefully working” with A.V.to “narrowly tailor the case plan” to meet her needs and that “all parties have reached agreement regarding the modified recommendations.” Consistent with the parties’ settlement, the juvenile court found true the jurisdictional allegations in the first amended section 300 petition, adjudged I.V. to be a dependent child, and adopted the recommended case plan.

6 Regional centers such as SARC contract with the state to “provide fixed points of contact in the community for persons with developmental disabilities and their families, to the end that these persons may have access to the services and supports best suited to them throughout their lifetime.” (§ 4620, subd. (a).)

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C. The Sixth-Month Review Hearing In May 2025, the Department filed a status review report recommending that A.V.

be granted another six months of reunification services. A.V. was “participating in all aspects” of her case plan and was “incredibly communicative” with the social worker. But “despite [A.V.’s] active participation and efforts,” the social worker remained “concerned that [A.V.] has not been able to retain information from her services and consistently demonstrate an understanding of safe parenting practices, even during her limited supervised visitation time.” The social worker cited as evidence of A.V.’s inability to retain information that she (1) “did not remember the idea of talking and singing to [I.V.] until this social worker prompted the mother to try singing to him”; (2) “did not remember and was unable to show this social worker any of the positions” for holding I.V. that the parent coordinator had taught her two days earlier (instead holding I.V. with her arms extended, to her own and I.V.’s apparent discomfort); and (3) despite “remember[ing] at the beginning of the visit that the blue line on [I.V.’s] diaper meant that” it was wet, asked the social worker “halfway through the visit … ‘What does a blue line mean?’ ” The social worker also reported that A.V. “often requires intervention and support from this social worker when [I.V.] tantrums”; “has become overwhelmed and asked for a break on more than one occasion during visitation” with I.V.; and “attempted to leave [I.V.] alone on the edge of the couch” even though A.V. had reported that I.V. was now able to roll back and forth. (The social worker explained to A.V. that because I.V. was now able to roll over, he could injure himself by falling off the couch even when left briefly unsupervised.)

The social worker listed multiple services she had provided for A.V., including frequent case plan meetings, assistance to help A.V. navigate her benefits, and coordination with A.V.’s parenting skills class coordinator.7 The social worker had also

7 The social worker also connected A.V. with the adoptive parents of E.V., A.V.’s oldest child, and would go on to support ongoing communication between them. A.V.

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attempted to obtain services for A.V. from SARC: She had obtained A.V.’s written consent to seek SARC services and had collaborated with A.V.’s mother on a letter to SARC about A.V.’s probable developmental delays. (As detailed in later reports, A.V. had been initially resistant to unsealing her adoption records to attempt to qualify for services, so the social worker gathered other available documents for an eligibility assessment. SARC, however, denied A.V. services in June 2025.)

A.V. had engaged in almost daily contact with the social worker over the reporting period. The social worker had observed that A.V.’s attention span was typically limited to around 30 minutes, so the social worker scheduled shorter, more frequent case plan meetings to accommodate A.V.’s needs. A.V. was on a waitlist for a therapist. She had also been engaged in an intensive parenting class for approximately five months, and the coordinator reported that the sessions contained a lot of repetition. During some weeks, A.V. appeared to readily retain information. Other weeks, A.V. had difficulty recalling anything.

The Department filed a confidential addendum that included the court-ordered psychological evaluation for A.V. Based on testing, there was a “significant discrepancy between [A.V.’s] verbal and performance abilities,” as her verbal abilities lagged. As summarized by the social worker, the evaluation found that A.V. “struggles with independent decision-making and following complex instructions.” The psychological evaluation found that A.V. may benefit from parenting classes, mental health treatment, and hands-on support, including in-home parenting support if available.

At the sixth-month review hearing, the juvenile court did not return I.V. to A.V.’s custody. It found that the reunification services the Department had provided were reasonable and ordered that A.V. continue to receive services pending a 12-month

asked after an early video visit with E.V. and her adoptive parents if E.V.’s adoptive parents could adopt I.V., but the social worker reminded A.V. that the goal was for A.V. and I.V. to reunify.

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“permanency hearing.” A.V.’s case plan included parenting classes and a program of counseling or psychotherapy to address any unmet mental health needs. A minimum of twice-weekly supervised visits were ordered between A.V. and I.V., for two hours per visit. D. The 12-Month Hearing In October 2025, the Department prepared a status review report for the 12-month hearing (§ 366.21, subd. (f)), this time recommending that family reunification services be terminated and the matter be set for selection of a permanent plan under section 366.26. The social worker opined that A.V. had made minimal progress in her ability to retain and demonstrate consistent parenting skills. A.V. also lacked the ability to think critically and assess risks for I.V., and A.V. became easily overwhelmed in new situations.

A.V. was receiving psychiatric treatment and reported her medication was helpful.

A.V. had finished her parenting skills course, and the social worker was actively trying to assist A.V. in getting enrolled in another one. The social worker expressed concern over A.V.’s ability to retain information from the parenting courses; for example, A.V. had prepared an unsafe pack and play for I.V. to sleep in during a July 2025 visit, which the social worker pointed out presented a suffocation risk for a child I.V.’s age.

A September 2025 visit also presented safety concerns: A.V. failed to close the childproof gate to a staircase, even though I.V. was mobile enough to climb stairs; she allowed I.V. to pull on a cord connected to a lamp perched on an overhead shelf; and she allowed I.V. to repeatedly put his fingers in the hinges of a cabinet door he was playing with. The social worker opined that these situations demonstrated that A.V. lacked critical thinking skills—that while A.V. might recall from past interventions that she should not leave I.V. on the edge of a couch, she did not understand why this could lead to harm or use that understanding in analogous but not identical circumstances. And in both the lamp incident and cabinet door incident, the social worker before intervening

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had prompted A.V. to check on I.V.; each time, A.V. responded by looking at what I.V. was doing but resumed looking at her phone without recognizing any risk.

A.V. opposed the Department’s recommendations and requested that the matter be set for trial. But in December 2025, the Department relented in a second addendum report, recommending instead that A.V. receive another six months of reunification services pending an 18-month permanency review hearing. The social worker had persuaded the provider of A.V.’s prior intensive parenting education to reconsider its six-month limit on services and to extend instruction to A.V. for a new three-month term. These services included a weekly one-on-one parent education class with a weekly hands-on parenting coaching session during visits with I.V. The social worker had requested additional parenting classes but staff indicated that none were available, though they were open to exploring additional parenting resources for A.V. Although the social worker opined that it was unclear whether A.V. would be able to “independently parent [I.V.] in a safe manner,” the social worker believed that it was in I.V.’s best interest to provide A.V. with more time to engage in her case plan.

At the 12-month hearing, the juvenile court found that the Department had provided reasonable services to A.V. and continued reunification services to an 18-month permanency review hearing. At the time, A.V.’s counsel indicated that A.V. would consent to the unsealing of her adoption files. The juvenile court therefore authorized the social worker to provide any relevant information from the sealed adoption files to SARC. E. The 18-Month Permanency Review Hearing 1. The Status Review Reports In March 2026, the Department filed a status review report in preparation for the 18-month permanency review hearing recommending that family reunification services be terminated and that the matter be set for a hearing under section 366.26.

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The social worker reported that over the past reporting period, A.V. had been referred to a new one-on-one parenting education course (Gardner’s 0-5 program) after completing the maximum nine months of services from her prior course. In a later case plan update, the social worker reported that given A.V.’s difficulties with processing information during parenting coaching sessions, program staff had instituted a phone call to pair with the in-person coaching. The social worker continued to support and monitor A.V.’s weekly therapeutic and psychiatric appointments. The social worker also continued to meet with A.V. more frequently with shorter, more “repetitive” meetings. The social worker provided A.V. with “almost daily communication,” including reminders for meetings and visits and transportation to meetings and visits. The social worker had also connected A.V. with an independent living center and helped her complete an intake form for the center, but A.V. did not follow up with the center afterward. The social worker identified housing workshops for A.V. and attended the workshops with her. A.V. continued to receive psychiatric treatment, though the social worker had concerns over A.V.’s ability to make her psychiatric appointments and obtain medication refills.

The social worker described her efforts to secure services for A.V. through SARC despite SARC’s initial denial: A.V. had initially been unwilling to authorize the release of her sealed adoption records for the purpose of seeking SARC services. In December 2025, however, around the time of the 12-month permanency hearing, A.V. told the social worker that she had changed her mind and was now open to requesting her sealed adoption files for a new SARC assessment. But after the social worker determined how to obtain A.V.’s sealed adoption files (from a different county), A.V. responded that she “ ‘do[esn’t] really want [SARC] services’ ” because she “does not have a disability.” The social worker explained that “disability” encompassed challenges “both big and small” and reminded A.V. that A.V. had once asked if “there was something like ‘special ed[ucation] for adults.’ ” The social worker discussed the issue with A.V. several times,

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who reaffirmed that she did not want her adoption files released and she did not want services from SARC.

A.V. continued her twice-weekly supervised visits with I.V., one at her residential program and another at the Department’s visitation center. A.V. had made “clear improvement overall” in her ability to care for I.V., but despite a “very controlled environment with very limited risk,” A.V.’s visits with I.V. still presented safety concerns. In a recent visit, A.V. watched as I.V. wandered into the midst of teenage boys who were kicking and roughhousing with each other, and the social worker had to intervene. The social worker asked A.V. if she knew why intervention was necessary, but A.V. could not answer. During the same visit, A.V. watched I.V. climb into and out of a wagon. A.V., however, was unable to understand that she needed to check on I.V. when pulling the wagon with I.V. inside—doing so would ensure that I.V. was not standing or climbing on the wagon. One time, A.V. brought grapes for I.V. but had nothing to cut them with and seemed irritable when told that grapes posed a choking hazard at I.V.’s age. These observations led the social worker to doubt A.V.’s ability to independently recognize circumstances potentially harmful to I.V. and to opine that supervision of A.V. was still needed to avoid “significant safety risk” to I.V.

According to a third addendum report dated April 2026, A.V. told the social worker that she was ready to sign the release of information form to obtain her sealed adoption files and to be reassessed for services from SARC. The social worker reminded A.V. about the form during a subsequent visit and told A.V. that she had two copies of the release of information and could ask for another copy when she was ready, if needed. In a supervised visit, A.V. attempted to give I.V. a whole blackberry before she was told that blackberries—like the grapes from the earlier visit—pose a choking hazard. The social worker opined that there were safety risks in A.V.’s inability to critically reason, as there were an “endless multitude of other situations that would arise in an unsupervised and uncontrolled environment.”

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A.V. also tended to “disassociate” by staring into space when she felt overwhelmed, further posing a safety risk to I.V. In one visit, when I.V. ran away from her attempts to put his shoes on him, A.V. appeared overwhelmed and seemed to disassociate for about 30 seconds until the social worker intervened. The social worker then modeled for A.V. how she could redirect or distract I.V. to overcome his resistance. But when A.V. had difficulty dressing I.V. later in the same visit, she again appeared to disassociate for about 30 seconds until the social worker intervened to show how the same approach modeled earlier with I.V.’s shoes could be applied here.

As for A.V.’s mental health, her therapy had been suspended due to A.V.’s repeatedly missing her appointments. The social worker also observed that A.V. had a pattern of noncompliance with her medications—taking her psychiatric medication for several weeks but then stopping the medication, either because she no longer felt she needed it or because she forgot to obtain a refill.

A.V. had also been without housing plans, despite expecting to be discharged from her current residential program. But she became pregnant again in March 2026, and her pregnancy made her eligible to start a new residential program.

2. The Contested Hearing At the contested 18-month permanency review hearing, the trial court found social worker Emma Burke to be an expert in “risk assessment, provision of reunification services and permanency planning.” In addition to the Department’s submission of her reports, Burke testified that A.V. could stay for a time at her current residential treatment program but that the program staff doubted their ability to support A.V. with her parenting, in part because of A.V.’s own schedule. The program also did not provide “parental oversight and support” and was voluntary, so A.V. could leave on her own at any time. Burke believed that A.V. would “at a minimum” need someone on site to check on her and I.V. several times per day. A.V.’s case manager at the residential program told Burke that A.V. was “getting a little bit ahead of herself” by asking for I.V.

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to be returned to her care, particularly when A.V. was enrolled in a full-time high school degree program. A.V. had a boyfriend and also told Burke of a “large network” of sober friends who would help her with transportation and food, so Burke asked A.V. to provide Burke’s contact information to the boyfriend and anyone “who wants to provide support” to contact Burke. None of them made contact with Burke, and A.V. told Burke that the boyfriend did not wish to do so, despite A.V.’s multiple requests.

Burke discussed the timeline of her efforts to get services from SARC for A.V.

Burke had reached out to SARC in January 2025 and was able to send SARC information about A.V.’s school records, including “screenshots” of A.V.’s grades and “[Individualized Education Program] services.” But A.V. was denied services from SARC in June 2025. Burke then tried to get A.V.’s consent to unseal her adoption records, presenting A.V. with information about SARC and a physical release of information. A.V. did not sign the release, stating that she did not think she was disabled. A.V. did not directly say why she was uncomfortable releasing her sealed records. Burke believed information in the sealed files would have qualified A.V. for SARC services. But Burke acknowledged that SARC typically had a long waitlist and there was a “very low likelihood” that A.V. would have had sufficient supportive services in place to be able to parent I.V. by the end of the reunification period even with SARC services.

Burke also addressed the various safety issues that had arisen during A.V.’s visits with I.V. Burke explained that the issue with the wagon involved A.V.’s inability to make the connection that there was a safety issue; A.V. typically learned from frequent repetition, and the wagon incident was an example of a situation involving a new variable that made it difficult for A.V. to appreciate risks to I.V. Referring to the incidents involving grapes and blackberries, Burke expressed concern with A.V.’s ability to apply lessons from past visits to future visits. Burke acknowledged that the dependency had commenced with some concern over A.V.’s substance abuse, but A.V. had not had any recent relapses and her substance abuse was no longer a barrier to her parenting I.V.

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A.V. testified on her own behalf and stated that her current placement provided housing and was specifically designed for mothers with children. The program also provided her with parenting support and classes. A.V. was also told that the program provided “semi-permanent” housing to clients, and clients would be permitted to stay until they find another placement. In support of her argument, A.V. submitted copies of the visitation logs she had with I.V. as well as an e-mail from her parent education provider that said she had made “tremendous progress” and would “continue to progress” with “adequate support and services moving forward.”

3. The Juvenile Court’s Decision In May 2026, the juvenile court terminated reunification services and set the matter for a selection and implementation hearing under section 366.26.

First, the juvenile court determined by a preponderance of the evidence that I.V.

could not be returned to A.V. without a substantial risk of detriment to his safety, protection, physical, or emotional well-being.

Next, as to whether additional reunification services could be ordered pending a final permanency review hearing at 24 months, the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that reasonable services were offered to A.V., observing that A.V. had received a “uniquely tailored, highly customized and hands-on case plan.” The juvenile court also determined that A.V. had not made significant and consistent progress in her parenting skills (§ 366.22, subd. (b)(3)(B)): She continued to lack the ability to recognize and understand risks posed to I.V. and was thus unable to move from supervised visits. A.V. had “not enabled the Department to explore potential sources of support”—whether from her friends or her partner, or from the regional center. The juvenile court thus found that there was no substantial probability that I.V. could be returned to A.V. within 24 months and terminated reunification services.

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A.V. timely notified the juvenile court and petitioned this court for review of the juvenile court’s order.8 II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, A.V. challenges the juvenile court’s order on two grounds: She argues that insufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination that the Department furnished her with reasonable services (§ 366.22, subd. (b)(2)(A)) and that she had not been making significant and consistent progress in addressing the problems that led to the dependency (§ 366.22, subd. (b)(3)(B)). Reviewing the record, we find substantial evidence supports both of the juvenile court’s findings. We accordingly find no error in the juvenile court’s order setting the section 366.26 hearing. A. General Legal Principles and Standard of Review At the reunification stage of the dependency process—when qualifying parents are offered services to address the causes of the dependency proceeding—“the court ordinarily must order child welfare services designed to facilitate the reunification of the family.” (Michael G. v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 609, 624 (Michael G.).) Reunification services are case-dependent and may include “evaluations and assessments, counseling, parent education, substance abuse treatment and testing, and other forms of assistance.” (Ibid.) The reunification services provided by the Department must be “reasonable.” (See, e.g., § 366.21, subds. (e)(3), (e)(8), (f)(1)(A), (g)(8); § 366.22, subds. (a)(3) & (b)(2)(A).)

Reunification services are also meant to be temporary: For children under three years old at the time of removal (like I.V.), reunification services are presumptively limited to six months. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(B).) For younger children like I.V., at the

8 A.V. also requested that we stay the juvenile court proceedings pending this court’s grant or denial of writ relief. Because we are deciding the merits before the scheduled section 366.26 hearing and do not disturb the juvenile court’s findings, we decline to issue the requested stay.

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six-month review hearing, if the child cannot yet be safely returned to the parent, the juvenile court extends reunification services for an additional six months if there is a substantial probability the child can be safely returned to the parents in the extended time, or if reasonable reunification services had not been provided to the parents. (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(3).) When continuing reunification services at the six-month review hearing, the court shall continue the case to a 12-month “permanency hearing” (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(3)) but must inform the parent “that if the child cannot be returned home by the 12-month permanency hearing, a proceeding pursuant to Section 366.26 may be instituted” (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(2)). At this 12-month hearing, if the child is not returned to the parent, the juvenile court may again continue reunification—subject to a “permanency review hearing” within 18 months of the date the child was removed—only if there is a substantial probability that the child can be safely returned to the parent’s physical custody and safely maintained in the home within the extended time period, or if reasonable services were not provided to the parents. (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1).)9 Reunification services are ordinarily limited to a maximum period of 18 months, as that is when the permanency review hearing is statutorily required. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(3)(A) [“court-ordered services may be extended up to a maximum time period not to exceed 18 months”]; see also § 366.22, subd. (a)(1) [permanency review hearing

9 Although each extension of the reunification period typically requires a finding of substantial probability that the child can be safely returned in the extended period, the Legislature has defined “substantial probability” more stringently at succeeding review hearings, narrowing eligibility for additional services. (Compare § 366.21, subd. (e)(1) [six-month review] with § 366.21, subd. (g)(1)(A)–(C) [12-month review] and § 366.22, subds. (b)(1) & (b)(3)(A)–(C); see also Tonya M. v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 836, 845.) In Tonya M. (decided before section 366.22 was amended to permit a subsequent permanency review hearing in limited circumstances), the California Supreme Court described the escalating standards as making “services during these three periods first presumed, then possible, then disfavored.” (Id. at p. 845; cf. Stats. 2008, ch. 482, § 3 [establishing the possibility of the 24-month subsequent hearing which A.V. maintains she was wrongfully denied].)

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“shall occur’” within 18 months of child’s removal].) But there are two limited circumstances in which a juvenile court may extend reunification services a final time beyond the 18-month timeframe for an additional six months.

First, if the juvenile court finds that “reasonable services have not been provided,”

the court shall extend reunification services, unless competent evidence from a mental health professional shows that more reunification services would be detrimental to the child. (§ 366.22, subd. (b)(2)(A) & (B).)

Second, even if the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence that reasonable services were provided (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(3)), the juvenile court may order additional reunification services for “three narrowly defined categories of parents who have faced specified obstacles to reunification.” (Michael G., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 628.)10 Pertinent here, these categories include a parent “who is making significant and consistent progress in a court-ordered residential substance abuse treatment program.” (§ 366.22, subd. (b)(1)).11 Further, the juvenile court must determine by clear and convincing evidence that additional reunification services are in the “best interests of the child” (§ 366.22, subd. (b)(1)) and that there is a “substantial probability that the child will be returned to the physical custody of their parent or legal guardian and safely maintained in the home within the extended period of time” (§ 366.22, subd. (b)(3)).

The substantial probability that a child will be returned to the parent’s physical custody and safely maintained in the home is specially defined for the 18-month hearing

10 Michael G., supra, 14 Cal.5th 609 predates more recent amendments to section 366.22, which, effective January 1, 2024, require extension of reunification services for another six months at the 18-month review hearing if the court determines that reasonable services have not been provided. (Stats. 2023, ch. 458, § 2, p. 5457 [adding subd. (b)(2)(A) to § 366.22].)

11 At the 18-month review hearing, the Department indicated that because A.V.

resided in a residential treatment facility, the Department would “stipulate today” that this requirement under section 366.22, subdivision (b)(1) was met.

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to require the following findings: (1) “[T]he parent or legal guardian has consistently and regularly contacted and visited with the child”; (2) “[T]he parent or legal guardian has made significant and consistent progress in the prior 18 months in resolving problems that led to the child’s removal from the home”; and (3) “The parent or legal guardian has demonstrated the capacity and ability both to complete the objectives of their substance abuse treatment plan as evidenced by reports from a substance abuse provider as applicable, or complete a treatment plan postdischarge from incarceration, institutionalization, or detention, or following deportation to their country of origin and their return to the United States, and to provide for the child’s safety, protection, physical and emotional well-being, and special needs.” (§ 366.22, subd. (b)(3)(A), (B) & (C)(i).)

Generally, “ ‘[w]e review the juvenile court’s findings for substantial evidence, and the juvenile court’s decisionmaking process based on those findings for abuse of discretion.’ ” (B.D. v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1132, 1150 (B.D.); In re A.O. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1061–1062 (A.O.) [challenge to reasonableness of reunification services reviewed for substantial evidence].) At the 18-month permanency review hearing, the juvenile court must determine whether reasonable services were provided to the parent by clear and convincing evidence. (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(3).) “When reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved by clear and convincing evidence, the question before the appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011 (O.B.).) On appeal, “[w]e review the evidence most favorably to the prevailing party and indulge in all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the court’s ruling.” (Tracy J. v. Superior Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1424 (Tracy J.).) The appellant bears the burden to show there is no substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s findings or orders. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.)

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And as to A.V.’s challenge to the reasonableness of the Department’s services at the 18-month permanency review hearing, we note that at both the six-month and 12-month review hearings, the juvenile court found the Department had provided reasonable services to A.V. A.V. did not challenge these findings, and the time to appeal these orders has long-since passed. (§ 395, subd. (a)(1); In re S.B. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 529, 532; In re T.G. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 687, 696 [reasonable services finding made at six-month review hearing is “adverse” to parental interest in reunification and is appealable under § 395]; A.O., supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1061 [accord].) Our focus here is thus on the Department’s provision of services for this relevant review period— between the 12- and 18-month hearings. B. Reasonable Services During the reunification period, the focus of the dependency is on family reunification; when reunification services are terminated, the focus shifts to providing the child with a safe, permanent home. (Tracy J., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1423.) “Reunification services should be tailored to the particular needs of the family.” (Id. at p. 1425.) This includes accommodating the needs of parents who are disabled. (Id. at pp. 1425–1426.) Reviewing the record as a whole, there is substantial evidence from which the juvenile court could conclude that it is highly probable that the Department provided reasonable services to A.V. during the relevant time period. (See A.O., supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1061-1062; O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 1011–1012.)

When providing reunification services, the Department must consider each family’s unique circumstances, and services must be “ ‘ “ ‘specifically tailored to fit the circumstances of each family’ ” ’ and ‘ “ ‘designed to eliminate those conditions which led to the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding.’ ” ’ ” (Patricia W. v. Superior Court (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 397, 420.) The record must show then that the Department identified the problems that led to the dependency and provided the parent with services designed to address these issues, maintaining contact with the parent during the

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reunification period and reasonably assisting parents with compliance with the plan. (Ibid.) When a parent has a “developmental disability, that condition must be the ‘starting point’ for a family reunification plan which should be tailored to accommodate their unique needs.” (Ibid.; In re Victoria M. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1317, 1329 [parent’s developmental disability should have been considered when determining what services to provide].)

Here, the court-ordered psychological evaluation found that A.V. may benefit from parenting classes, mental health treatment, and hands-on support, including in-home parenting support if available. And it appears that the social worker connected A.V. with these recommended services, to the extent that they were available to A.V. Between the 12- and 18-month review hearings, the Department helped A.V. enroll in a new one-onone parenting course after A.V. had completed the additional three months of intensive parenting education and coaching the Department had secured to supplement her original six-month course. The parenting education provided hands-on support every other week during visits.12 And because A.V. was observed to have difficulty processing new information during visits, the program was modified to add regular phone calls “to support [A.V.’s] education and skill building.” The skills learned over the phone were practiced during hands-on visits. The social worker observed that A.V. responded to the repetition and the hands-on coaching that was provided; in a recent visit, the social worker described how A.V. was able to follow the social worker’s example to play with I.V. with a basketball hoop and to help him down a slide. Neither A.V. nor amici identify any specific service recommended by the psychological evaluator that the Department did not provide.

The social worker also supported and monitored A.V.’s therapeutic and psychiatric appointments, keeping “almost daily communication” with her. The

12 The social worker continued to personally supervise some of A.V.’s other visits.

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Department’s assigned social worker “worked outside of the case plan and outside of [the] specified role” to provide A.V. with holistic and long-term stability. The social worker supported A.V. in obtaining her benefits and in other day-to-day needs like getting a bus pass. The social worker also communicated with A.V. multiple times a week to remind her of upcoming appointments. And recognizing A.V.’s decreased attention span, the social worker divided case plan meetings and met with A.V. more frequently to accommodate her needs. The social worker had also connected A.V. with an independent living center and helped her attend housing workshops, though A.V. ultimately did not reach out to the center herself.

And from the outset of the dependency process at the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the Department identified A.V.’s probable developmental delays as one of the bases for the juvenile court’s intervention. The Department undertook several efforts to specifically tailor reunification services to A.V.’s needs and the impact of developmental delays on her ability to reunify with I.V. The Department also recognized that A.V. could benefit from the services of a regional center like SARC. “Regional centers are specifically designed to provide services to persons with developmental disabilities [citation], and ‘the rights of a developmentally disabled parent may not be terminated without first assessing whether the services offered by the state through regional centers may enable the family of a disabled person to remain intact.’ ” (B.D., supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 1153.)

Although the Department did not succeed in establishing A.V.’s entitlement to services from SARC, the record shows that the Department acted promptly and diligently in its efforts. Even before the juvenile court took jurisdiction over I.V., the Department had already asked SARC how A.V. could become eligible for regional center services. And having determined that eligibility required evidence of developmental disability before A.V. reached the age of 18, the social worker in the early months of the dependency proceeding contacted A.V.’s mother and A.V.’s former school districts to

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gather information about A.V.’s childhood development. The social worker drafted a letter to SARC on A.V.’s behalf, with information from A.V.’s mother, and later forwarded A.V.’s school information to SARC.13 A.V., however, argues that the Department essentially delegated to her the responsibility of accessing support services, including services provided by SARC. (In re K.C. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 323, 329–330 (K.C.) [cannot delegate to parent burden of finding and obtaining services].) Not so. The Department did not end its efforts once its initial request for regional center services was denied. Later, recognizing that additional records might show A.V.’s entitlement to services, the Department researched methods to access A.V.’s sealed adoption records, which A.V. later refused to sign. And it is “well settled … that reunification services are voluntary, and an unwilling parent may not be compelled to participate.” (In re Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217, 1224.)

As A.V. observes, her psychological evaluation indicates that she struggles with independent decisionmaking, which may have impacted her ability to understand and consent to releasing her confidential records. But the Department did not merely request that A.V. sign a release of information without further follow-up. The Department spoke with A.V. multiple times about the need to obtain her release to obtain these records, both through conversations and a written letter explaining the probable benefits of receiving SARC services. The Department thus “ ‘made reasonable efforts to assist [her] in areas where compliance proved difficult’ ” when A.V. refused to sign the release of information. (B.D., supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 1154.) For example, in B.D., the appellate court found that the social services agency provided reasonable services when it identified the parent’s need for regional services and submitted an application on the

13 As we have noted, A.V. did not appeal the juvenile court’s six-month or 12-month findings that the Department’s reunification services were reasonable. But the Department’s earlier attempts to obtain SARC services are nonetheless relevant in view of the claim that A.V.’s developmental disability was overlooked.

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parent’s behalf when the parent vacillated on applying for services. (Ibid.) Likewise here, to accommodate A.V.’s difficulty with “auditory processing,” the social worker sent A.V. summaries of what they had discussed over the phone via text message and further provided A.V. with a written letter discussing SARC services.

A.V., however, argues that Burke’s testimony at the 18-month permanency review hearing—that even if A.V. had qualified for SARC services, she would have encountered a long waitlist and that there was a low likelihood she would have been able to reunify with I.V. even with SARC services—demonstrates the Department’s failure in furnishing reasonable services. A.V. argues that the Department, recognizing the futility of SARC services, was required to find a suitable alternative or explore other support options for A.V. Likewise, amici curiae argue that once the regional center denied A.V. benefits, the social worker was obligated to secure alternative, accessible supports for A.V. during the reunification period.

But “[i]n almost all cases it will be true that more services could have been provided more frequently and that the services provided were imperfect. The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.) The social worker’s recognition of the practical limits of SARC services does not vitiate the Department’s good faith efforts at securing reasonable services. (See K.C., supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 332 [social services agency must make a good faith effort to assist parents in reunification plan].) And as described ante, the Department did not limit itself to seeking SARC services—the Department provided A.V. with intensive parenting courses, psychiatric treatment, and assistance by the social worker in exploring housing opportunities and navigating her benefits and case plan.14

14 It is unclear what other available services would have benefited A.V. In fact, amici curiae argue that the Department should have done more with the supportive services it had already identified and secured, as A.V. lived in a residential treatment

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Relying on Tracy J., A.V. and amici curiae argue that the Department’s failure to expand her visitation with I.V. beyond supervised visits constituted a failure to provide reasonable services. But Tracy J. is distinguishable. In Tracy J., the two parents—who were intellectually impaired (Tracy J., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1419–1420)—were given only limited, supervised visits with their child by the social worker, even though the juvenile court had authorized unsupervised visits and specified terms that the respondent agency did not provide. (Id. at pp. 1420, 1426.) The limitations were placed on the parents by the social services agency even though the visitation supervisor indicated that the parents demonstrated a “parental role” with their child and characterized their behavior as “ ‘very protective.’ ” (Id. at p. 1426.) The social worker herself conceded that the Tracy J. parents “had a basic understanding of how to care for” their child but was “ ‘uncomfortable’ ” with supervised visits. (Ibid.) The only specific basis for her opinion, however, was an instance where the child, then learning how to walk, had fallen and bumped his head: The father picked him up, wiped away the child’s tears, and followed the social worker’s advice to apply an ice pack. (Ibid.) In granting the parents’ petition in Tracy J., the reviewing court reasoned, “When the Agency limits visitation in the absence of evidence showing the parents’ behavior has jeopardized or will jeopardize the child’s safety, it unreasonably forecloses family reunification on the basis of the parents’ labeled diagnoses, and does not constitute reasonable services.” (Id. at p. 1427.)

But unlike Tracy J., the social worker here was not guided by a vague “ ‘uncomfortable’ ” feeling about unsupervised visits. (Tracy J., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th

program that provided her with parenting courses and staff on duty at all times, and that I.V. would remain eligible for the Gardner course until he turned five years old. But the recognition that the Department should have done more with what was already provided to A.V. supports a finding that the Department’s provision of services during the relevant timeframe was indeed reasonable.

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at p. 1426.) There were multiple instances that supported the social worker’s concern over unsupervised visits. The social worker described multiple instances throughout the dependency process where I.V. was put at risk when A.V. was unable to apply learned skills to new situations as I.V. developed: After recognizing and reporting that I.V. was able to roll over, A.V. left him at the edge of a couch; A.V. prepared an unsafe “pack and play” for I.V. to sleep in; after I.V. learned to walk, A.V. left a baby gate open on a staircase; A.V. needed the social worker’s intervention despite seeing I.V. pulling on an electrical cord dangling from a lamp perched overhead and putting his fingers in the open hinge of the cabinet door he was playing with; A.V. again needed the social worker to intervene when I.V. wandered into a group of teenagers who, unaware of his presence, were roughhousing; A.V. watched I.V. climb out of a wagon but later, when pulling the wagon, did not check on I.V. to assure he was not standing or climbing; and A.V. was told that uncut grapes were a choking hazard for a child as young as I.V. but then tried to give I.V. a blackberry of similar size.

A.V.’s difficulties building on prior experience, knowledge, and direction persisted even through the most recent review period. And as social worker Burke explained during her testimony, the concern with these individually discrete (and relatively) minor incidents is that the pattern of incidents suggested A.V.’s inability to retain skills or apply learned skills to new environments involving new variables. (See Tracy J., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1427.) There was also the demonstrated safety risk in unsupervised visits given the social worker’s report that A.V. would sometimes disassociate when overwhelmed, requiring the social worker’s intervention—such instances could give rise to risks to I.V. should A.V. disassociate during unsupervised visits.

And unlike in Tracy J., supervision of visits was not merely protective but instructive. During visits, the social worker helped A.V. by modeling certain behavior— for example, showing A.V. how to get I.V. to put his shoes on when he was initially

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reticent, or demonstrating how to play with I.V. The supervised visits provided the repetition and hands-on parenting coaching she needed. Although “ ‘visitation is a key element of reunification, the court must focus on the best interests of the children “and on the elimination of conditions which led to the juvenile court’s finding that the child has suffered, or is at a risk of suffering, harm.” ’ ” (Serena M. v. Superior Court (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 659, 673; § 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(A) [“[v]isitation shall be as frequent as possible, consistent with the well-being of the child”].) Here, the twice-weekly supervised visits permitted A.V. to have relatively frequent contact with I.V. while maintaining his safety and providing A.V. with parenting assistance.15 Amici curae argue that for disabled parents like A.V., there must be reasonable modifications to visitation, such as more frequent visits, tailored training, permitting disability-related supports, and increasing opportunities to visit in more familiar and less restrictive environments, with the goal to transition the family toward reunification. Amici curiae also insist that the Department was not limited to a binary choice between supervised and unsupervised visits and that the social worker could have expanded visits, made drop-in checks during visits, or visits could have occurred while A.V. was at her staffed residential program. But this argument ignores the record—the Department’s status review report prepared in March 2026 indicated that A.V. was already visiting with I.V. in environments aside from the Department’s visitation center, as she was having weekly visits at her residential treatment program as one of her twice-weekly visits. And given the social worker’s concerns over I.V.’s safety, it was reasonable to infer that stepping down—even partially—from fully supervised visits was not in I.V.’s best interest, and the Department’s provision of supervised visits was thus reasonable.

15 At both the six- and 12-month review hearings, A.V. at no point requested either additional visitation or unsupervised visitation.

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Accordingly, we find that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination that the services provided were reasonable under the circumstances. C. Significant and Consistent Progress Next, A.V. challenges the juvenile court’s determination that there is no “substantial probability that the child will be returned to the physical custody of their parent or legal guardian and safely maintained in the home within the extended period of time.” (§ 366.22, subd. (b)(3).) At the 18-month hearing, this determination requires specific findings, including that “the parent or legal guardian has made significant and consistent progress in the prior 18 months in resolving problems that led to the child’s removal from the home” (§ 366.22, subd. (b)(3)(B)). In finding no substantial probability of I.V.’s return to A.V.’s physical custody, the juvenile court expressly found that A.V. had not made significant or consistent progress in the past 18 months. Reviewing the juvenile court’s factual findings for substantial evidence (see B.D., supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 1150), we find sufficient evidence in the record to support this determination. The juvenile court appropriately acknowledged the progress that A.V. had made. But what is “significant and consistent” for purposes of extending reunification services must be informed by the maximum limit for a second permanency review hearing—24 months of the child’s removal from the parent’s custody (§ 366.25, subd. (a)), which here was only five months from the 18-month permanency review hearing.

As indicated in the social worker’s reports, A.V. had difficulty applying her learned parenting skills to new environments, and most of her parenting classes required multiple instances of repetition. To that end, despite months of intensive parenting courses, A.V. was still limited to supervised visits to I.V. given the safety concerns, which the social worker found “apparent even during supervised visits in an extremely repetitive and controlled environment.” There was also evidence that A.V. had not consistently attended therapy appointments. In the third addendum report in preparation

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for the 18-month permanency review hearing, the social worker stated that A.V.’s therapy had been placed on hold due to A.V.’s repeated missed appointments. Furthermore, the social worker described a pattern of A.V. stopping her medication when she felt it was no longer necessary or when she neglected to obtain refills.

That A.V. made positive strides in her case plan does not undermine the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile court’s findings that the progress was not significant or consistent. On substantial evidence review, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s findings. (Tracy J., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1424.) And “ ‘we do not consider whether there is evidence from which the dependency court could have drawn a different conclusion but whether there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion that the court did draw.’ ” (In re J.N. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 767, 774.)

A.V., however, argues that the Department and the juvenile court did not consider her overall progress within the framework of her developmental disability, which requires ongoing parenting support and supervision. But the record shows that the Department engaged A.V. in services in recognition of her disability by offering her intensive parenting classes and assisting her during the supervised visits with I.V. In other words, the Department’s services were aimed at addressing the cause of I.V.’s dependency. That A.V. was still unable to move beyond supervised visits—despite parenting classes, coaching, and mental health treatment—supported the juvenile court’s determination that her progress was not yet consistent or significant. Nor does the juvenile court’s factual finding about the significance or consistency of A.V.’s progress demonstrate that the court failed to account for her disability when assessing her progress.

A.V. and amici curiae also argue that in making its factual finding, the juvenile court improperly considered her inability to verbalize her knowledge despite her psychological evaluation establishing her deficiencies in verbal processing. In support of this argument, A.V. points out that when making its ruling, the juvenile court briefly

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raised the incident where A.V. laid I.V. on the edge of the couch and was unable to “articulate” why this could pose a safety risk to I.V. But we do not read the court’s choice of verb in isolation. As the juvenile court stated, the court’s concern was with A.V.’s ability to “analyze, assess and address risks” to I.V. and to “retain information and then utilize it in new situations or in new environments or under new conditions.”

Given this broader stated concern and the social worker’s account of the couch incident, we do not take the juvenile court’s concern to be with A.V.’s ability to orally explain a safety risk that she nonetheless recognized, but with her incomprehension of the risk even when prompted. As the social worker stated in the October 2025 status report, A.V. “may remember from our conversation that she should not leave [I.V.] on the edge of the couch,” but “if she does not understand why rolling over could lead to harm in that situation, she may very likely leave him on the edge of a table or another surface after changing him without the understanding that this may lead to harm.” The concern was not the gravity of any discrete parenting lapse or the inability to explain the error but A.V.’s struggle to apply her learned parenting skills to similar situations involving different variables. The same concern was raised by the social worker in her reports when she described how A.V. was unable to apply the skills she learned about choking hazards with grapes to the uncut blackberry she later offered to I.V. Or when she was unable to apply the skills the social worker had modeled to A.V. about how to distract or redirect I.V. to put his shoes on when A.V. struggled—and disassociated—when trying to get I.V. to put on his clothes during the same visit.

Nor does the juvenile court’s findings suggest that the court unfairly considered as disqualifying the supportive services that A.V. needs to be able to parent I.V., including her need for repetition and possibly supervision. When evaluating whether A.V. had made both significant and consistent progress in addressing the issues leading to the dependency, which stemmed in part from A.V.’s developmental delays, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude both that A.V. had engaged in her case plan, demonstrated

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basic skills to care for I.V., and had shown improvements in her parenting skills—with accommodations in place—and that the progress made, though commendable, was not significant. Because the permanency review hearing had to conclude within 24 months of I.V.’s removal, the court had no choice but to gauge the significance of A.V.’s progress in relation not only to her starting point but to the likelihood of her safely assuming physical custody of I.V. within the few months that would remain during the reunification period.

And the evidence before the juvenile court was not that supportive services would always be available to A.V. even if I.V. were no longer a dependent of the juvenile court, but that it was possible that supportive services could stop—and A.V., despite guidance and assistance from the Department, would be unable to seek out and obtain services on her own behalf that would permit her to safely parent I.V. The social worker pointed out in her reports that A.V. had been facing homelessness at one point—the social worker had attempted to assist A.V. in obtaining housing through an independent living center but had not been otherwise successful until A.V. was accepted into a residential program due to her recent pregnancy. Although the supportive services available at A.V.’s current residential treatment program included parenting courses and around-the-clock staff, the social worker had consulted with program staff and had come away without any assurances for how long A.V. could stay. Staff at the residential program also expressed concern about being able to support A.V., and the social worker testified that she believed the current residential treatment program did not provide parental supervision or oversight and was also voluntary, which would permit A.V. to leave on her own volition. A.V. told the social worker that she had a network of unidentified “sober friends” and now had a partner, but it is unclear to what extent those friends and her partner would have assisted A.V.—and none of these individuals contacted Burke after Burke advised A.V. to give them her contact information. (Cf. Tracy J., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1427 [noting the parents’ “ability to work as a team and the complementary nature of

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their skills” when concluding that the social services agency unreasonably limited visitation].)

Amici curiae argue that Burke’s testimony about the level of monitoring that A.V.

required was unsupported and that a “lack of disability expert[s]” permits agencies and the juvenile court to merely assume that parents with disabilities require long-term, 24-hour supervision. But Burke was found to be an expert in risk assessment by the trial court with no objections by any party; A.V. did not question Burke about her experience with parents with disabilities or her qualifications to assess risks to I.V. Nor did A.V. rebut Burke’s testimony with any experts of her own. Accordingly, the juvenile court was required to make its decisions based on the evidence before it and was entitled to rely on Burke’s testimony. (In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1159.) And likewise, as the reviewing court, we review “ ‘the correctness of a judgment as of the time of its rendition, upon a record of matters which were before the trial court for its consideration.’ ” (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 405.)

We are sympathetic to A.V.’s dilemma—through no fault of her own, it appears that her developmental disability hampered the progress she made toward reunification. But the Department also faced the practical reality of limited services and resources. And, given the record before us, and taking all reasonable inferences in favor of the judgment, we conclude that A.V. has not met her burden on appeal to demonstrate that no substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination that A.V. had not made significant and consistent progress in addressing the issues that led to the dependency.16

16 In its decision, the juvenile court did not orally state on the record whether it found that A.V. had “demonstrated the capacity and ability both to complete the objectives of [her] substance abuse treatment plan” under section 366.22, subdivision (b)(3)(C)(i). A.V. appears to infer that the juvenile court found she lacked this capacity. We need not address the sufficiency of the evidence to support this finding, as we already find substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s determination as to section 366.22, subdivision (b)(3)(B), and all three factors are required for the juvenile

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D. Nondiscrimination Laws Finally, amici curiae dedicate a significant portion of their brief arguing that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (42 U.S.C. § 12132) and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 794)17 require social services agencies to show that a parent poses a “direct threat” to the health and safety of a child before an agency can restrict a parent’s rights or withhold reunification services. But A.V. never argued in the juvenile court (or in this one) for application of a “direct threat” standard.18 Generally, “ ‘ “[a]micus [c]uriae must accept the issues made and [the] propositions urged by the appealing parties, and any additional questions presented in a brief filed by an amicus curiae will not be considered.” [Citations.] Otherwise, amicus curiae, rather

court to find a substantial probability that a child will be returned to their parent’s physical custody under section 366.22, subdivision (b)(3).

17 The ADA provides in part that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” (42 U.S.C. § 12132.) Likewise, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provides that “qualified individual with a disability” cannot be “solely by reason of his or her disability … excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance ….” (29 U.S.C. § 794(a).)

18 As amici acknowledge, however, California cases have generally held that the federal laws like the ADA do not “suppl[y] a defense to specific, individual dependency proceedings” to bar termination of reunification services. While “a parent may have a separate cause of action under the ADA based on a public entity’s action or inaction, such a claim is not a basis to attack a state court order.” (In re Diamond H. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1139, disapproved on another ground as stated in Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 748, fn. 6; In re Anthony P. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1116 [noting that a Florida appellate court stated that “ ‘dependency proceedings are held for the benefit of the child, not the parent’ ” and thus “ ‘the ADA is inapplicable when used as a defense by the parent(s) in [those] proceedings’ ”].) Nor have amici identified any California authorities applying the “direct threat” standard they would make the touchstone of any restriction of parental rights.

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than the parties themselves, would control the issues litigated.’ ” (City of Palo Alto v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1271, 1291, fn. 3.)

To be sure, we have discretion to consider issues raised by amicus for the first time on appeal, such as an issue that presents “ ‘purely a question of law based on undisputed facts’ ” that “ ‘involves important questions of public policy.’ ” (Lavie v. Procter & Gamble Co. (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 496, 503.) But the issues raised by amici curiae are not questions of law based on undisputed facts. Despite their framing of their argument as merely requiring “objective evidence and accommodations,” their direct threat standard would require additional findings by the juvenile court. Because A.V. has not disputed the legal standards applied by the juvenile court at the 18-month permanency review hearing below, the Department had no occasion to present any pertinent evidence that could have supported such a finding. Likewise, the juvenile court had no occasion to consider it. Even assuming that the “direct threat” contemplated by amici differs from the standards applied in the juvenile court, the arguments are thus arguably forfeited. (In re M.S. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1252 [minor did not raise argument that commitment to the Division of Juvenile Justice violated ADA, forfeiting argument on appeal].)

Furthermore, in our review of the record, we see no basis to conclude that the juvenile court violated nondiscrimination principles. California law already provides that a social services agency must consider the needs of a disabled parent when tailoring reunification services. (Tracy J., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1425.) Amici curiae in fact concede that “California authority is consistent with disability nondiscrimination.” To the extent that amici contend that its “direct threat” analysis merely requires objective evidence and not assumptions, we see no deviation from that principle here.

As Tracy J. illustrated, speculative evidence, such as a social worker’s generalized feeling that she would be “ ‘uncomfortable’ ” with unsupervised visitation, is not evidence that a parents’ behavior jeopardizes the child’s safety. (Tracy J., supra,

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202 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1426–1427.) But here, there was evidence of direct safety risks to I.V. from unsupervised visits based on the social worker’s observations of A.V.’s parenting during controlled, supervised visits. And as discussed ante, the juvenile court’s concern about A.V.’s ability to retain parenting knowledge was a valid concern, separate and apart from A.V.’s inability to articulate learned parenting skills. Thus even applying the standard advanced by amici curiae, we would deny A.V.’s petition.

III. DISPOSITION

The petition for extraordinary writ and the request for a stay are denied. The decision shall be final seven days after its filing. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.452(i), 8.490(b)(2)(A).)

LIE, J.

WE CONCUR:

GREENWOOD, P. J.

DANNER, J.

A.V. v. Superior Court H054369