Autumn Wind Lending, LLC v. Siegel

District Court, W.D. Kentucky·Decided May 18, 2023·No. 3:22-cv-00255·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY LOUISVILLE DIVISION

AUTUMN WIND LENDING, LLC Plaintiff

v. Civil Action No. 3:22-cv-255-RGJ

JOHN J. SIEGEL, et al. Defendants

* * * * *

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Defendants Cecelia Financial Management, LLC (“Cecelia”), Halas Energy, LLC (“Halas”), and Oasis Aviation LLC (“Oasis” together with Cecelia and Halas, “Defendants”) moved the Court to reconsider its Order [DE 46] denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss. [DE 49]. Plaintiff Autumn Wind Lending, LLC (“AWL”) responded. [DE 51]. Defendants did not reply, and the time for doing so has passed. Briefing is complete, and the matter is ripe. For the reasons below, Defendants’ Motion to Reconsider [DE 49] is GRANTED and AWL’s Amended Complaint [DE 24] is DISMISSED. I. BACKGROUND The facts are detailed in the Court’s Order on Defendants’ motion to dismiss. [DE 46]. At issue is the Court’s ruling on Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The Court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss, which was based on res judicata related to non-party Insight Terminal Solutions’ (“ITS”) bankruptcy. [DE 46]. Defendants now move the Court to vacate portions of its Memorandum Opinion & Order denying their motion to dismiss. [DE 49]. II. STANDARD “District courts have inherent power to reconsider interlocutory orders and reopen any part of a case before entry of a final judgment.” In re Saffady, 524 F.3d 799, 803 (6th Cir. 2008). “A district court may modify, or even rescind, such interlocutory orders.” Mallory v. Eyrich, 922 F.2d 1273, 1282 (6th Cir. 1991). Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly provide for “motions for reconsideration,” courts generally construe such motions as motions to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59(e). See Moody v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 915 F.2d 201, 206 (6th Cir.

1990). The Sixth Circuit has consistently held that a Rule 59 motion should not be used either to reargue a case on the merits or to reargue issues already presented, Whitehead v. Bowen, 301 F. App’x 484, 489 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Roger Miller Music, Inc. v. Sony/ATV Publ’g, LLC, 477 F.3d 383, 395 (6th Cir. 2007); Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Engler, 146 F.3d 367, 374 (6th Cir. 1998)), or otherwise to “merely restyle or rehash the initial issues,” White v. Hitachi, Ltd., No. 3:04-CV-20, 2008 WL 782565, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “It is not the function of a motion to reconsider arguments already considered and rejected by the court.” White, 2008 WL 782565, at *1 (citation omitted). When a party views the law in a

light contrary to that of this Court, its proper recourse is not a motion for reconsideration but appeal to the Sixth Circuit. Helton v. ACS Grp., 964 F. Supp. 1175, 1182 (E.D. Tenn. 1997). Moreover, “parties cannot use a motion for reconsideration to raise new legal arguments that could have been raised before a judgment was issued.” United States v. Smith, No. 3:08-cr-31-JMH, 2012 WL 1802554, at *1 (E.D. Ky. May 2012) (quoting Roger Miller Music, 477 F.3d at 395). For these reasons, the Sixth Circuit instructs that a motion for reconsideration should be granted only in four situations: “(1) a clear error of law; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) an intervening change in controlling law; or (4) a need to prevent manifest injustice.” Leisure Caviar, LLC v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 616 F.3d 612, 615 (6th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because there is an interest in the finality of a decision, motions for reconsideration “are extraordinary and sparingly granted.” Marshall v. Johnson, No. CIV.A.3:07- CV-171-H, 2007 WL 1175046, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 19, 2007) (citing Plaskon Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 644, 669 (N.D. Ohio 1995)). III. ANALYSIS

Defendants make three arguments in support of their motion for reconsideration: (1) John J. Siegel (“Siegel”) must be dismissed because he is deceased, (2) AWL’s tortious interference claims are barred res judicata because of an order in Insight Terminal Solutions, LLC v. Cecelia Financial Management, LLC, et al., Adv. No. 21-03013-jal (Bankr. W.D. Ky.) (“Adversary Proceeding”),1 and (3) AWL’s tortious interference claims against Defendants are barred by AWL’s proposed Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization [DE 39-1 (“Plan”)]. [DE 49]. In response, AWL contends that Defendants have not identified a basis for reconsideration and that Defendants cannot satisfy the requirements of res judicata. [DE 51]. The Court will address Defendants’ arguments in the order presented.

A. Siegel Defendants argue for the first time that Count 1 must be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25 because Siegel is deceased. 2 [DE 49 at 527–28]. AWL did not respond to this argument. [DE 51]. Rule 25 provides that [i]f a party dies and the claim is not extinguished, the court may order substitution of the proper party. A motion for substitution may be made by any party or by the decedent's successor or representative. If the motion is not made within 90 days after service of a statement noting the death, the action by or against the decedent must be dismissed.

1 The parties refer to the Adversary Proceeding in their briefs with the incorrect case number. [DE 49 at 529; DE 51 at 597]. This is the same Adversary Proceeding that was noted in the Court’s Order on Defendants’ motion to dismiss. [DE 416 at 513]. 2 Count 1 of the Amended Complaint alleges fraud against Siegel. [DE 24 at 331]. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1). However, “parties cannot use a motion for reconsideration to raise new legal arguments that could have been raised before a judgment was issued.” Smith, 2012 WL 1802554, at *1 (quoting Roger Miller Music, 477 F.3d at 395). “Rule 59(e) motions are aimed at re consideration, not initial consideration. Thus, parties should not use them to raise arguments which could, and should, have been made before judgment issued.” FDIC v. World Univ. Inc.,

978 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 1992). A closer review of the record indicates that this issue is not as clear as Defendants suggest. Defendants filed Siegel’s suggestion of death on April 18, 2022. [DE 18]. Three days later, AWL filed a letter explaining that it “will file an amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1)(B), which will . . . replace Mr. Siegel, who is deceased, with the executor or administrator of his estate (once named)[.]” [DE 21 at 173]. On April 28, 2022, AWL filed an amended complaint naming John Doe, as Executor or Personal Representative of the Estate of John J. Siegel, as a defendant. [DE 24 at 318]. Although parties may be substituted under Rule 25, AWL chose to amend its complaint and add the executor of Siegel’s estate pursuant to Rule

15(a)(1)(B).

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