Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-25-00376-CV
Autumn LEE,
Appellant
v.
Eric LUNDQUIST,
Appellee
From the 150th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2023-CI-25240 Honorable Monique Diaz, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Adrian A. Spears II, Justice
Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice Adrian A. Spears II, Justice H. Todd McCray, Justice
Delivered and Filed: August 26, 2026 AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART Appellant Autumn Lee appeals from the final decree of divorce, arguing that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury’s findings that (1) 100% of 9018 Wellwood LLC is community property, and (2) Appellee Eric Lundquist is entitled to a reimbursement awards of $86,338.15 and $68,863.15. She also argues the trial court erred in giving a jury charge that allowed classification of separate property as community property. Autumn further argues that the trial court erred in modifying the terms of 9018 Wellwood LLC, when the limited liability
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company was not a party before the trial court. Finally, Autumn argues the final decree “constitutes an abuse of discretion by creating a punitive and disproportionate division of the marital estate.” We affirm in part and reverse in part.
FACTS
Autumn and Eric were married on October 3, 2019, and separated on or about November 2023. During the marriage, on July 12, 2022, they formed 9018 Wellwood LLC. Pursuant to the LLC’s Operating Agreement, Autumn acquired a 64% membership interest, and Eric acquired a 36% membership interest. Eight days after the LLC was formed, the parties acquired a duplex located at 9018 Wellwood. On September 22, 2022, they conveyed the property to 9018 Wellwood LLC, making the duplex the LLC’s sole asset.
The divorce was tried to a jury and centered primarily on the characterization of the parties’
interests in the LLC and the duplex. 1 Autumn contended that the Wellwood property was purchased with her separate funds and argued that she could trace her 64% membership interest in the LLC to the duplex, which was purchased with separate property funds. She also argued that she was entitled to one half of Eric’s 36% membership interest as community property. Eric responded that the issue was ownership of the LLC membership interests, not the real property, and that the membership interests were created before the LLC acquired the property.
The jury found that the parties’ membership interests in 9018 Wellwood LLC were entirely community property. The jury also found that Eric’s separate estate conferred a benefit on the community estate in the amount of (1) $68,863.15 for payment of the mortgage on the Palmer View property, and (2) $86,338.00 for payment of federal income tax debt during the marriage. The trial court signed a final decree of divorce, which appointed a receiver for the Palmer View
1 Before trial, the parties agreed to certain stipulations, including the characterization of certain property and the assumption of some debts.
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property and directed the receiver to ensure the property is listed for sale immediately and sold expeditiously. The trial court directed that the proceeds from the sale should be distributed as follows: 35% of the sales price to Autumn and 15% of the sales price to Eric, “off the top, to compensate for their respective separate interests,” with the “remaining net sales proceeds” awarded to Eric. The trial court awarded Eric control of the LLC, directing him to wind up and dissolve the company, satisfy its liabilities, and distribute the remaining net proceeds 60% to Eric and 40% to Autumn. The trial court found that Eric’s separate estate was entitled to reimbursement from the community estate, as determined by the jury and that the “reimbursement claim has been satisfied as part of the just and right division of property set forth” in the decree.
Autumn timely perfected this appeal.
CHARACTERIZATION OF THE LLC AS COMMUNITY PROPERTY In her first issue, Autumn challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the finding that the parties’ membership interests in 9018 Wellwood LLC (“the LLC”) are entirely community property. In a decree of divorce, a trial court must “order a division of the estate of the parties in a manner that the court deems just and right, having due regard for the rights of each party.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 7.001. “All marital property is . . . either separate or community.” In re Marriage of Allbritton, No. 07-24-00119-CV, 2025 WL 1792843, at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo June 27, 2025, no pet.) (quoting Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. 1977)) (alteration in original). Community property is “property, other than separate property, acquired by either spouse during marriage.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 3.002. Property of a spouse owned before marriage, as well as property acquired during marriage by gift, devise, or descent, is the separate property of that spouse. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15; TEX. FAM. CODE § 3.001(1), (2). The court may divide only the spouses’ community property and has no authority to divest a spouse of
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separate property. Jacobs v. Jacobs, 687 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Tex. 1985); Viera v. Viera, 331 S.W.3d 195, 204 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011, no pet.); see also Pearson v. Fillingim, 332 S.W.3d 361, 363 (Tex. 2011) (“Trial courts can only divide community property, and the phrase ‘estate of the parties’ encompasses the community property of a marriage, but does not reach separate property.”).
In reviewing a trial court’s division of the community property, we presume the trial court “properly exercised its discretion.” Viera, 331 S.W.3d at 203. Thus, the party challenging the division of community property “bears the burden of demonstrating from the evidence in the record that the trial court’s division was so unjust and unfair as to be an abuse of discretion.” Id. The factfinder is the exclusive judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given the testimony. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 819-21 (Tex. 2005). An abuse of discretion does not occur where the trial court bases its decisions on conflicting evidence and some evidence supports its decision. See In re Barber, 982 S.W.2d 364, 366 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding).
“Property possessed by either spouse during or on dissolution of marriage is presumed to be community property,” rather than separate property. TEX. FAM. CODE § 3.003(a). At trial, a party claiming that property is separate property must rebut the community property presumption by proving the necessary facts by clear and convincing evidence. Id. § 3.003(b); see Pearson, 332 S.W.3d at 363 (explaining that to rebut community property presumption, a party “must trace and clearly identify the property in question as separate by clear and convincing evidence”). “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ means the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 101.007. Thus, to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in its
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division of the parties’ estate, we begin with the presumption that the property owned by Autumn and Eric upon dissolution of marriage is community property, a presumption that Autumn could overcome only by a showing of clear and convincing evidence. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 3.003; Lara v. Medina, No. 09-25-00011-CV, 2026 WL 2116974, at *7 (Tex. App.—Beaumont July 23, 2026, no pet. h.); Boyd v. Boyd, 131 S.W.3d 605, 612 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.).
In general, characterization of property is determined by the time and circumstances of its acquisition, often referred to as the “inception of title” doctrine. See Garcia v. Mascorro, No. 04- 21-00394-CV, 2023 WL 2588189, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 22, 2023, no pet.); Blair v. Blair, 642 S.W.3d 150, 156 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no pet.); Rivera v. Hernandez, 441 S.W.3d 413, 420 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, pet. denied). Inception of title occurs “when a party first has right of claim to the property by virtue of which title is finally vested.” Rivera, 441 S.W.3d at 420; see Winkle v. Winkle, 951 S.W.2d 80, 88 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 1997, writ denied) (same). In accordance with this doctrine, “[i]f the inception of title predated the marriage, then the property may be characterized as separate property,” but “if the inception of title occurred after the marriage began, then the property is generally” considered to be community property. Willett v. Rodriguez, No. 03-16-00084-CV, 2017 WL 2417831, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin June 2, 2017, pet. denied). “The major consideration in determining the characterization of property as community or separate is the intention of spouses as shown by the circumstances surrounding the inception of title.” Winkle, 951 S.W.2d at 88. Thus, even property purchased during the marriage may be considered separate property if the evidence clearly demonstrates that it was purchased with separate property funds. See Rivas v. Rivas, 452 S.W.3d 49, 54 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, no pet.) (“Where an asset is purchased during marriage with monies traceable to a spouse’s
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separate estate, the asset may appropriately be characterized as separate property.”); Rivera, 441 S.W.3d at 419-20 (same).
To demonstrate that property was purchased with separate property funds during the marriage, the party claiming the property as her separate property shoulders the burden of tracing the source of the funds used to purchase the property, and must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the property used to make the purchase was her separate property. See Rivera, 441 S.W.3d at 419-20, 425; Warriner v. Warriner, 394 S.W.3d 240, 247-49 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, no pet.). In satisfying this burden, a party must typically present some form of documentary evidence to support his claim, as the party’s mere testimony that separate property was used to purchase the property is insufficient without some form of corroboration. See Warriner, 394 S.W.3d at 248 (explaining that party’s testimony about characterization of property “must be supported by other evidence”); see also Graves v. Tomlinson, 329 S.W.3d 128, 139 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied) (“As a general rule, the clear and convincing standard is not satisfied by testimony that property . . . is separate property when that testimony is contradicted or unsupported by documentary evidence tracing the asserted separate nature of the property.”); Zagorski v. Zagorski, 116 S.W.3d 309, 316 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (“Mere testimony that property was purchased with separate property funds, without any tracing of the funds, is generally insufficient to rebut the community presumption.”); Ganesan v. Vallabhaneni, 96 S.W.3d 345, 354 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied) (holding evidence insufficient to overcome presumption of community property where husband’s testimony and exhibits failed to provide account numbers, statements of accounts, dates of transfers, amounts transferred into and from accounts, sources of funds, or any asset tracing).
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The evidence at trial showed that 9018 Wellwood LLC was formed on July 12, 2022. That same day, Eric and Autumn executed an Operating Agreement under which Eric purchased 360 membership units, representing a 36% ownership interest, and Autumn purchased 640 membership units, representing a 64% ownership interest. Because both the LLC and the membership interests were acquired during the marriage, the membership interests are presumed to be community property. See TEX. FAM CODE § 3.003. Accordingly, Autumn bore the burden at trial to rebut that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See id.
Because Autumn had the burden of proof at trial to rebut the community property presumption by clear and convincing evidence, in bringing a legal sufficiency challenge to the factfinder’s implicit finding that she failed to meet that heightened burden at trial, she must show on appeal that the evidence conclusively proves that she, in fact, rebutted the community property presumption as a matter of law. 2 See Rivera, 441 S.W.3d at 425 (explaining that if the appellant challenges the trial court’s characterization of property as community, on appeal the appellant must prove that the separate property status was established as a matter of law); Prosper Florida, Inc. v. Spicy World of USA, Inc., 649 S.W.3d 661, 675 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, no pet.) (explaining that in sufficiency challenges, “the standard of review varies depending on whether [the appellant] or his adversary bore the burden of proof at trial” and that “[i]f the appellant had the burden of proof at trial, then he must show that the evidence conclusively proves the findings required to support the judgment he seeks”). The record reflects that the real property
2 If the factfinder had instead determined the property in question was separate property, the standard of review enunciated in Viera, 331 S.W.3d at 207, would have applied. Under that standard, the appellate court first determines whether the finding of separate property is supported by clear and convincing evidence. Id.; see In re Marriage of Ramsey, 487 S.W.3d 762, 765 (Tex. App.—Waco 2016, pet. denied) (stating that when the finding challenged must be supported by clear and convincing evidence, the appellate court applies a heightened standard of review in its sufficiency analysis). If the finding is not supported by clear and convincing evidence, the appellate court then determines whether the characterization error caused the trial court to abuse its discretion in the overall division of the community estate. Viera, 331 S.W.3d at 207.
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located at 9018 Wellwood was not acquired until July 20, 2022, eight days after the LLC was formed and the membership interests were issued. The property was not conveyed to the LLC until approximately two months later, on September 22, 2022, when Eric and Autumn transferred it to the LLC by Special Warranty Deed. Nevertheless, Autumn argues that she purchased the Wellwood property with her separate funds and that, because the property is the LLC’s sole asset, she has traced her alleged separate property interest into the LLC. In essence, Autumn focuses on ownership of the real property rather than ownership of the LLC membership interests and contends that she is entitled, not only to her 64% membership interest, but also to one-half of Eric’s remaining 36% membership interest.
Autumn’s tracing theory fails for two reasons. First, the chronology of the transactions defeats her argument. The membership interests were issued before the Wellwood property was acquired and more than two months before the Wellwood property was conveyed to the LLC. Accordingly, the Wellwood property could not have been the consideration used to acquire Autumn’s membership interest. Second, even assuming the Wellwood property was Autumn’s separate property before it was conveyed to the LLC, that fact does not establish that her interest in the LLC was separate property.
“[W]hen property is conveyed to an entity such as a partnership or limited liability company, it becomes the property of the entity and loses its separate or community character.” In re Marriage of Hudson, No. 06-18-00011-CV, 2018 WL 4656288, at *3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Sept. 28, 2018, no pet.); see In re Marriage of Nash, 644 S.W.3d 683, 708 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2022, no pet.) (same); see also Lifshutz v. Lifshutz, 199 S.W.3d 9, 27 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, pet. denied). Therefore, “property owned by a limited liability company is neither the community property nor the separate property of its members and, as a result, is not subject to
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award or division in divorce.” Mason v. Mason, No. 03-17-00546-CV, 2019 WL 1967166 at *6 (Tex. App.—Austin May 3, 2019, no pet.). Applying these principles, we conclude that while the Wellwood property is owned by the LLC, it is neither separate property nor community property and cannot be subject to an award or division in a divorce. See Mason, 2019 WL 1967166 at *6; Marriage of Hudson, 2018 WL 4656288, at *3.
For these reasons, Autmn cannot trace her separate property ownership of the Wellwood property through its transfer to the LLC because, upon its transfer to the LLC, Autumn no longer held an ownership interest in the Wellwood property. See Mason, 2019 WL 1967166 at *6 (explaining that “when the funds were transferred from [husband] and [wife]’s community estate to [the LLC], the funds lost their community character and became the property of the LLC”); Lifshutz, 199 S.W.3d at 27 (explaining that “[w]hen an individual partner contributes property into a partnership, the partner loses individual interest in the property and, since the partnership itself is the new owner, the property can no longer be classified as separate or community,” and therefore because the “partnership property does not retain a separate character, distributions from the partnership are considered community property, regardless of whether the distribution is of income or of an asset”). The relevant property interest in the divorce is therefore the parties’ membership interests in the LLC, not direct ownership of the Wellwood property itself. We thus conclude that Autumn has failed to show that the evidence conclusively proves she rebutted the community property presumption. See Rivera, 441 S.W.3d at 425. Therefore, we hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the finding that the LLC is entirely community property.
JURY CHARGE
Autumn argues that “the trial court abused its discretion in giving a defective jury charge that allowed classification of separate property as community property.” She argues the jury
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charged “omitted the fact that the character of property is determined at the time of acquisition by the character of the consideration paid for the property.” She further contends the charge “failed to properly instruct on burden of proof when undisputed tracing evidence was present” and that the charge “lacked adequate limiting instructions regarding irrelevant character evidence and commented on the weight of the evidence by providing specific dollar amounts for reimbursement claims.” Autumn, however, has failed to preserve this issue for appeal.
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 272 requires that before the jury charge is read to the jury, objections to the jury charge be presented to the trial court in writing or dictated to the court reporter in the presence of the trial court and opposing counsel. TEX. R. CIV. P. 272. “All objections not so presented shall be considered as waived. See id. Rue 274 provides that a “party objecting to a charge must point out distinctly the objectionable matter and the grounds of the objection.” Id. R. 274. Under Rule 278, failure to submit a question, definition, or instruction “shall not be deemed a ground for reversal of the judgment” unless its submission, “in substantially correct wording,” was requested in writing and “tendered by the party complaining of the judgment.” Id. R. 278.
Autumn neither filed a proposed jury charge nor offered one for the record. She did not present any proposed questions, definitions, or instructions to the trial court. The record does not reflect that she objected to the jury charge or that she proposed any instructions, definitions, or questions. Indeed, the record does not reflect that Autumn brought any of her complaints about the jury charge to the trial court’s attention. She has thus failed to preserve this issue for appeal. See In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 349 (Tex. 2003) (holding that under procedural rules, “the failure to raise a complaint at trial to a jury charge waives review of that complaint on appeal”); In re K.N.S., No. 12-25-00171-CV, 2025 WL 3724545, at *9 (Tex. App.—Tyler Dec. 23, 2025, pet.
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denied) (holding that appellant waived complaint about jury charge error because appellant “did not object orally or in writing to the jury charge or its instructions during the charge conference”).
THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER OF WIND-UP AND SALE OF LLC Autumn further argues that the trial court erred in modifying the terms of 9018 Wellwood LLC, when the limited liability company was not a party before the trial court. We agree.
The trial court ordered that Eric will assume sole management and control of 9018 Wellwood, LLC for the purpose of winding up the company, selling all company property, paying all company liabilities, and distributing the remaining proceeds in a proportion of sixty percent to Eric and forty percent to Autumn. As stated above, “a limited-liability company is a separate legal entity, and property owned by such a company is neither the community property nor the separate property of its members.” See Bravo v. Bravo, No. 05-24-00419-CV, 2025 WL 2053579, at *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 22, 2025, pet. denied). “The business property that is subject to division is the interest in the limited-liability company itself, not the company’s specific assets.” Id. (emphasis ordered)
As “[a] trial court is authorized to divide only the parties’ community estate,” the trial court had authority only to divide Autumn’s and Lee’s community interest in the LLC. Id. The trial court had no authority to order the wind up and dissolutions of the LLC itself, a separate entity that was not before it. See id. at *8-9; see also Touponse v. Touponse, No. 02-20-00285-CV, 2021 WL 2753504, at * 5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 1, 2021, no pet.) (holding that because a trial court is authorized to divide only the parties’ community estate, the trial court “clearly abused its discretion by characterizing the real properties owned by [the LLC] as part of the community estate and, thereafter, awarding them to [the husband] as his separate property”). For this reason, we find Eric’s argument that Autumn invited error unpersuasive, as the trial court had no authority to order
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the LLC to wind up and dissolve. See Bravo, 2025 WL 2053579, at *8; Touponse, 2021 WL 2753504, at * 5. We hold that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Eric to assume full management and control of the LLC for the purpose of winding up the LLC, selling all the property of the LLC, and paying all of the LLC’s liabilities.
REIMBURSEMENT AWARDS TO ERIC Autmn also challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s finding that Eric was entitled to reimbursement awards, arguing that Eric failed to trace the source of the funds used to his separate property. The jury found that Eric’s separate estate conferred a benefit on the community estate in the amount of $86,338.00 for payments toward tax debt during marriage and in the amount of $68,863.15 for payments made toward the mortgage for the Palmer View property. In the final decree, the trial court, in conformity with the jury’s verdict, found that Eric’s separate estate was entitled to reimbursement from the community estate, and stated that Eric’s “reimbursement claim ha[d] been satisfied as part of the just and right division of property.”
Section 3.402 of the Family Code provides for a claim for reimbursement “when one or both spouses use property of one marital estate to confer on the property of another marital estate a benefit which, if not repaid, would result in unjust enrichment to the benefited estate.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 3.402(a). Section 7.007 further provides that in a decree of divorce, the trial court shall determine the rights of both spouse in a claim for reimbursement and shall apply equitable principles to determine “whether to recognize the claim after taking into account all the relative circumstances of the spouses,” and to “order a division of the claim for reimbursement, if appropriate, in a manner that the trial court considers just and right, having due regard for the rights of each party.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 7.007.
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We review a trial court’s award of reimbursement for abuse of discretion. See Marin v.
Marin, No. 03-22-00013-CV, 2023 WL 2776296, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 5, 2023, no pet.). “If some evidence supports the trial court’s decision, there is no abuse of discretion.” Id. “Great latitude must be given to the trial court in applying equitable principles to a claim for reimbursement.” Id. “An equitable claim for reimbursement is not merely a balancing of the ledgers between the marital estates.” Id. “The discretion to be exercised in evaluating a claim for reimbursement is equally as broad as that discretion subsequently exercised by the trial court in making a ‘just and right’ division of the community property.” Id. “The legal sufficiency of the evidence is a relevant factor in assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion.” Id.
“The rule of reimbursement is purely an equitable one.” Id. at *5. “A right of reimbursement arises when funds of one estate” “are used to benefit another estate” without that estate receiving some benefit. Id. A spouse seeking reimbursement must show (1) that a contribution was made by one marital estate to another, (2) that the contribution was reimbursable, and (3) the value of the contribution. Id.; see Zeptner v. Zeptner, 111 S.W.3d 727, 735 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (“The party claiming reimbursement bears the burden of establishing the net benefit to the payee estate.”). At trial, Eric sought reimbursement, claiming that his separate funds were used to benefit the community estate. On appeal, Autumn argues that no evidence supports the trial court’s decision to award Eric reimbursement based on Eric’s separate funds being used to benefit the community estate.
To establish that his separate property was used to benefit the community estate, Eric had to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the funds used to pay the taxes and the mortgage were derived from his separate property. See In re T.E.R., No. 05-24-00014-CV, 2025 WL 1771837, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 26, 2025, no pet.) (“The party pleading a claim for
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reimbursement has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the expenditures or improvements were made by the party’s separate property and that they are reimbursable.”); Boyd, 131 S.W.3d at 612 (“Tracing involves establishing the separate origin of the property through evidence showing the time and means by which the spouse originally obtained possession of the property”). Because the jury determined that Eric had met his burden at trial to show he was entitled to reimbursement by clear and convincing evidence, in reviewing Autumn’s legal sufficiency challenge to Eric’s reimbursement award, we “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.” In re T.E.R., 2025 WL 1771837, at *7 (citing In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 265-66 (Tex. 2002)); see also Viera, 331 S.W.3d at 207. If we determine there is insufficient evidence to support the finding that Eric’s separate property was used to benefit the community estate, we then determine whether the characterization error caused the trial court to abuse its discretion in the overall division of the community estate. See Viera, 331 S.W.3d at 207.
As noted, to satisfy the clear and convincing burden of tracing, a party must typically present some form of documentary evidence to support his separate property claim, as a party’s mere testimony that separate property was used to purchase the property is insufficient without some form of corroboration. See Warriner, 394 S.W.3d at 248; Graves, 329 S.W.3d at 139; Zagorski, 116 S.W.3d at 316. Additionally, when separate and community property have been commingled so that they cannot be resegregated and identified, the community-property presumption prevails. Goyal v. Hora, No. 03-19-00868-CV, 2021 WL 2149628, at *6 (Tex. App.—Austin May 27, 2021, no pet.) (citing McKinley v. McKinley, 496 S.W.2d 540, 543 (Tex. 1973)); see Rivera, 441 S.W.3d at 423 (explaining that a party may plead that a brokerage account
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is separate property, “but income earned and dividends paid—if not clearly traced—will result in characterization of the account as community property due to commingling”). Further, “[g]aps in account statements can make tracing evidence less than ‘clear and convincing.’” Goyal, 2021 WL 2149628, at *9. “We resolve any doubt as to the character of property in favor of community status.” Id. at *6.
We begin with the presumption that the funds used by Eric toward the tax debt and the Palmer View mortgage are properly characterized as community property. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 3.003(a); Boyd, 131 S.W.3d at 612. Eric argues that he overcame the community presumption by establishing through tracing that the funds used were separate property. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 3.003(a); Boyd, 131 S.W.3d at 612. For the following reasons, we disagree.
According to Eric, the funds that were used to pay the taxes and the Palmer View mortgage originated from a USAA account and were his separate property because they originated from his VA disability benefits and military retirement benefits earned prior to the marriage. At trial, Eric testified that approximately 90% of his earnings from his work in Ukraine were deposited into a separate Wells Fargo account. However, he acknowledged that, because of the nature of his work, some of his Ukraine earnings may have been deposited into the USAA account for emergencies or necessities. Eric explained that while he was working in Ukraine, he was frequently transferring money to pay for medical supplies and that fraud alerts sometimes disrupted those transactions, which created the possibility that some of his Ukraine earnings were deposited into the USAA account. Eric and his father also testified that Eric borrowed $46,000 from his father to pay tax obligations and that Eric contributed an additional $46,000 from his USAA account toward those taxes. Other than testimony, Eric provided no documentation of the tax loan from his father. Thus, the only evidence offered to establish the separate property character of the USAA account
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consisted of Eric’s testimony, corroborated with testimony from his father, and limited documentary exhibits.
The documentary evidence Eric did provide failed to trace the funds in the USAA account to separate property sources. “Respondent’s Exhibit 9,” a December 2024 mortgage statement for the marital residence on Palmer View, established only the existence and status of the mortgage obligation. “Respondent’s Exhibit 10” summarized mortgage payments made from the USAA account, and “Respondent’s Exhibit 11” consisted of the underlying USAA bank statements reflecting those mortgage payments. These exhibits demonstrated that mortgage payments and payments in general were made from the USAA account, but they did not identify the source of the funds deposited into the USAA account. None of the exhibits included records of VA disability payments, military retirement deposits, transfer histories, deposit records, account statements showing the origin of the funds, or any other tracing documentation linking the account balance to Eric’s alleged separate property. Accordingly, neither Eric’s testimony nor his documentary evidence provides the type of clear, specific, and traceable financial evidence necessary to rebut the community property presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See In re T.E.R., 2025 WL 1771837, at *4 (holding that wife “failed to sufficiently trace her separate property and establish she was entitled to reimbursement by clear and convincing evidence”). We therefore conclude the evidence is legally insufficient to show that Eric’s separate funds were used to benefit the community estate in the amounts of $86,338.00 and $68,863.15, and the trial court erred in using those reimbursement awards in its determination of a “just and right” division of the community estate. See In re T.E.R., 2025 WL 1771837, at *10; Marin, 2023 WL 2776296, at *4; Viera, 331 S.W.3d at 207. Further, based on the amount of the reimbursement awards and the record before us, we cannot conclude that the legally insufficient awards had only a minimal
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impact on the “just and right” division of the community estate. See Zeptner, 111 S.W.3d at 741; Viera, 331 S.W.3d at 207.
“Once reversible error affecting the ‘just and right’ division of the community estate is found, the court of appeals must remand the entire community estate for a new division.” Jacobs, 687 S.W.2d at 733; see also Zeptner, 111 S.W.3d at 741 (relying on Jacobs). We therefore reverse the trial court’s division of property and remand this cause to the trial court for a new division of the community estate. See In re T.E.R., 2025 WL 1771837, at *10; Zeptner, 111 S.W.3d at 741. 3 CONCLUSION
Because the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the winding up and dissolution of the LLC, we reverse the portion of the final decree that appointed Eric to assume full management and control of 9018 Wellwood, LLC for the purpose of winding up and selling all property of the LLC. Further, because the trial court erred in considering reimbursement awards to Eric in its determination of a “just and right” division of the community estate, we reverse the trial court’s final decree regarding the community-property division and remand the entire community estate for a new division of the community estate. We affirm that portion of the final divorce decree granting the parties a divorce.
Adrian A. Spears II, Justice
3 Having determined that we must remand for a new division of the community estate, we need not decide Autumn’s issue regarding whether the trial court abused its discretion “by creating a punitive and disproportionate division of the marital estate.”