Automobile Ins. Co. Of Hartford, Conn. v. McBride

Fifth Circuit

Automobile Ins. Co. Of Hartford, Conn. v. McBride

204 F.2d 929, 1953 U.S. App. LEXIS 3841

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

DecidedMay 29, 1953

Docket14308_1

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 204 F.2d 929 (Automobile Ins. Co. Of Hartford, Conn. v. McBride) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Automobile Ins. Co. Of Hartford, Conn. v. McBride, 204 F.2d 929, 1953 U.S. App. LEXIS 3841 (5th Cir. 1953).

Pincite

Opinion

RIVES, Circuit Judge.

Appellant’s insistence is that the amount of a Marine Insurance Policy cannot be held to have been increased when there was no actual meeting of the minds of the parties regarding an oral proposal to increase such amount. Little need be added to what has been so well said by the learned District Judge, McBride v. Home Ins. Co., D.C., 105 F.Supp. 116, 117. The increase was effected in a telephone conversation between Schade the representative of the insured, and Gibson, the insurance agent. The District Judge included in his findings of facts the following:

“5. Schade testified that in his conversation with Gibson he did request an increase in the insurance from $10,000 to $25,000 on the vessel and that Gibson agreed thereto. Schade is supported in his testimony by his secretary who overheard the conversations with each of the insurers’ representatives,

“6.- Both Schade and Gibson are men of unimpeachable veracity and integrity. The court concludes, however, that Schade did advise Gibson of the change in valuation from $10,000 to $25,000 and that Gibson consciously or unconsciously agreed thereto.”

In his conclusions of law the District Judge repeated that:

“ * * * it has been found as a fact that, in his conversation with respondent’s agent, Schade mentioned not only the change in the type of risk but also the increase in the insurance * *

Among such conclusions of law was the following:

“In the circumstances of this case the respondent is bound by the act of its agent agreeing to the insurance at the increased valuation whether that agreement was consciously or unconsciously entered into by him. Restatement of Law of Contracts, § 20. Wil-liston on Contracts, §§ 20, 99, 1535— 1537.”

Schade having actually communicated to Gibson the request to increase the amount of the policy and Gibson having expressed his assent to the increase, the contract between the parties became complete and was not affected by any unexpressed intention or misunderstanding on the part of Gibson. In addition to the authorities cited by the District Judge, see Bach v. Friden Calculating Mach. Co., 6 Cir., 155 F.2d 361, 365; 12 Am.Jur., Contracts, Secs. 19 and 20.

Affirmed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

RIVES, Circuit Judge.

Appellant’s insistence is that the amount of a Marine Insurance Policy cannot be held to have been increased when there was no actual meeting of the minds of the parties regarding an oral proposal to increase such amount. Little need be added to what has been so well said by the learned District Judge, McBride v. Home Ins. Co., D.C., 105 F.Supp. 116, 117. The increase was effected in a telephone conversation between Schade the representative of the insured, and Gibson, the insurance agent. The District Judge included in his findings of facts the following:

“5. Schade testified that in his conversation with Gibson he did request an increase in the insurance from $10,000 to $25,000 on the vessel and that Gibson agreed thereto. Schade is supported in his testimony by his secretary who overheard the conversations with each of the insurers’ representatives,

“6.- Both Schade and Gibson are men of unimpeachable veracity and integrity. The court concludes, however, that Schade did advise Gibson of the change in valuation from $10,000 to $25,000 and that Gibson consciously or unconsciously agreed thereto.”

In his conclusions of law the District Judge repeated that:

“ * * * it has been found as a fact that, in his conversation with respondent’s agent, Schade mentioned not only the change in the type of risk but also the increase in the insurance * *

Among such conclusions of law was the following:

“In the circumstances of this case the respondent is bound by the act of its agent agreeing to the insurance at the increased valuation whether that agreement was consciously or unconsciously entered into by him. Restatement of Law of Contracts, § 20. Wil-liston on Contracts, §§ 20, 99, 1535— 1537.”

Schade having actually communicated to Gibson the request to increase the amount of the policy and Gibson having expressed his assent to the increase, the contract between the parties became complete and was not affected by any unexpressed intention or misunderstanding on the part of Gibson. In addition to the authorities cited by the District Judge, see Bach v. Friden Calculating Mach. Co., 6 Cir., 155 F.2d 361, 365; 12 Am.Jur., Contracts, Secs. 19 and 20.

Affirmed.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

204 F.2d 929, 1953 U.S. App. LEXIS 3841, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/automobile-ins-co-of-hartford-conn-v-mcbride-ca5-1953.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack