Auto-Owners Insurance v. Rucker

Michigan Court of Appeals

Auto-Owners Insurance v. Rucker

469 N.W.2d 1, 188 Mich. App. 125

CourtMichigan Court of Appeals

DecidedMarch 17, 1991

DocketDocket 122929

StatusPublished

Cited by13 cases

This text of 469 N.W.2d 1 (Auto-Owners Insurance v. Rucker) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Auto-Owners Insurance v. Rucker, 469 N.W.2d 1, 188 Mich. App. 125 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).

Pincite

Opinion

Per Curiam.

Defendant Vera Rucker appeals as of right from the entry of a declaratory judgment. The court held that defendants Vernard and Ethel Carter were not entitled to coverage under the automobile insurance policy issued by plaintiff, Auto-Owners Insurance Company. We affirm.

The facts underlying this case are not in dispute. Vera Rucker’s sixteen-year-old daughter, Melody, was waiting in front of a friend’s house for her ride home when defendant, Vernard Carter, drove by in his mother’s car. The front-seat passenger, Damion Todd, held a loaded shotgun. As the car passed Melody, Todd leaned out of the open window and fired several shots, one of which killed Melody. Auto-Owners had issued an insurance policy to Ethel Carter, Vernard’s mother, covering the automobile.

The sole issue before us on appeal is whether Melody Rucker’s death arose out of the use of the motor vehicle. Defendant argues that the use of the automobile was an integral part of the drive-by shooting and that, therefore, coverage exists under plaintiffs policy.

The policy provides coverage for damage in *127 curred by the insured "arising out of the use of an automobile.” For that clause to apply, a causal connection between the use of the vehicle and the injury must be shown. The connection must be more than incidental or fortuitous. It is insufficient to show that, but for the automobile, the incident would not have occurred. The injury must be foreseeably identifiable with the normal use of the vehicle. Thornton v Allstate Ins Co, 425 Mich 643, 660-661; 391 NW2d 320 (1986); DAIIE v Higginbotham, 95 Mich App 213, 222; 290 NW2d 414 (1980); Rangas v Aetna Casualty & Surety Co, 64 Mich App 1, 17; 235 NW2d 42 (1975).

In this case, the death arose from the firing of a shotgun. Although the vehicle made it easier for the criminals to approach the scene and to escape, its use was nonetheless incidental to the injury. One shudders to contemplate whether drive-by shootings have become foreseeable. It is, however, uncontestable that they are not identified with the normal use of a motor vehicle. Melody’s death did not "arise out of the use of an automobile” as that expression was used in plaintiffs policy of insurance. We hold that the trial court did not err.

Affirmed.

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Per Curiam.

Defendant Vera Rucker appeals as of right from the entry of a declaratory judgment. The court held that defendants Vernard and Ethel Carter were not entitled to coverage under the automobile insurance policy issued by plaintiff, Auto-Owners Insurance Company. We affirm.

The facts underlying this case are not in dispute. Vera Rucker’s sixteen-year-old daughter, Melody, was waiting in front of a friend’s house for her ride home when defendant, Vernard Carter, drove by in his mother’s car. The front-seat passenger, Damion Todd, held a loaded shotgun. As the car passed Melody, Todd leaned out of the open window and fired several shots, one of which killed Melody. Auto-Owners had issued an insurance policy to Ethel Carter, Vernard’s mother, covering the automobile.

The sole issue before us on appeal is whether Melody Rucker’s death arose out of the use of the motor vehicle. Defendant argues that the use of the automobile was an integral part of the drive-by shooting and that, therefore, coverage exists under plaintiffs policy.

The policy provides coverage for damage in *127 curred by the insured "arising out of the use of an automobile.” For that clause to apply, a causal connection between the use of the vehicle and the injury must be shown. The connection must be more than incidental or fortuitous. It is insufficient to show that, but for the automobile, the incident would not have occurred. The injury must be foreseeably identifiable with the normal use of the vehicle. Thornton v Allstate Ins Co, 425 Mich 643, 660-661; 391 NW2d 320 (1986); DAIIE v Higginbotham, 95 Mich App 213, 222; 290 NW2d 414 (1980); Rangas v Aetna Casualty & Surety Co, 64 Mich App 1, 17; 235 NW2d 42 (1975).

In this case, the death arose from the firing of a shotgun. Although the vehicle made it easier for the criminals to approach the scene and to escape, its use was nonetheless incidental to the injury. One shudders to contemplate whether drive-by shootings have become foreseeable. It is, however, uncontestable that they are not identified with the normal use of a motor vehicle. Melody’s death did not "arise out of the use of an automobile” as that expression was used in plaintiffs policy of insurance. We hold that the trial court did not err.

Affirmed.

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469 N.W.2d 1, 188 Mich. App. 125, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/auto-owners-insurance-v-rucker-michctapp-1991.

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