Austin v. Mogollon Treatment Center LLC

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: July 24, 2025
• Docket: 2:24-cv-03454
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 McKenna Austin, No. CV-24-03454-PHX-KML

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Mogollon Treatment Center LLC, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Plaintiff McKenna Austin and defendant Dustin Bullard worked together at 16 defendant Mogollon Treatment Center LLC. This case “arises out of the long-term 17 romantic relationship between the[m] which resulted in an ongoing, acrimonious family- 18 court matter in which the custody of the former couple’s three minor children is at issue.” 19 (Doc. 40 at 2.) 20 In this case Austin asserted ten claims against Bullard, Damon Bruns, and Mogollon 21 Treatment Center, and Bullard and Mogollon Treatment Center asserted four 22 counterclaims. The parties settled and all claims were dismissed with prejudice (Docs. 39, 23 43), but Bullard moves to seal the record because Austin included information Bullard does 24 not want to remain publicly accessible.1 Bullard’s motion is denied because his arguments 25 in favor of sealing the record do not overcome the strong presumption in favor of keeping 26 1 Bullard requested in the alternative that the court strike the “inflammatory allegations and 27 exhibits.” (Doc. 40 at 1.) But the request to strike would not accomplish anything because “even stricken documents are publicly accessible.” Abraha v. Colonial Parking, Inc., No. 28 CV 16-680 (CKK), 2019 WL 1559655, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 10, 2019). Because only sealing would provide the relief Bullard seeks, it is the focus of this order. 1 court records public. 2 I. Legal Standard 3 Historically, courts have “recognize[d] a general right to inspect and copy public 4 records and documents, including judicial records and documents.” Nixon v. Warner 5 Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) (footnote omitted). Accordingly, “[u]nless a 6 particular court record is one traditionally kept secret, a strong presumption in favor of 7 access is the starting point.” Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 8 (9th Cir. 2006). “[M]ost judicial records[,]” including complaints, “may be sealed only if 9 the court finds ‘compelling reasons’” for doing so. Oliner v. Kontrabecki, 745 F.3d 1024, 10 1025–26 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 677–78 11 (9th Cir. 2010)); see also In re Google Play Store Antitrust Litig., 556 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 12 1107 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (“compelling reasons” standard applies to sealing complaint). To 13 that end, a party seeking to seal a judicial record bears the burden of overcoming the strong 14 presumption against sealing and “must articulate compelling reasons supported by specific 15 factual findings . . . that outweigh the general history of access and the public policies 16 favoring disclosure[.]” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178–79. 17 II. Analysis 18 Bullard has not put forth a compelling reason to seal the record. He contends the 19 record “contains serious, inflammatory allegations about [his] character and conduct, 20 including the reproduction of disputed, selectively edited text messages.” (Doc. 40 at 3.) 21 Bullard argues allowing these materials to remain publicly available poses “a substantial 22 risk of unfair and lasting reputational harm” that outweighs the public interest in open 23 access “in a case that will never be tried.” (Doc. 40 at 3–4.) But absent from Bullard’s 24 motion to seal is any case law supporting sealing a complaint in a situation similar to the 25 one here. (See Doc. 40.) Nor did he reply to Austin’s response opposing the motion to seal, 26 which discussed the applicable case law in the context of the facts here. (See Doc. 42.) As 27 a result, Bullard concedes many of the arguments Austin put forward. See Ramirez v. 28 Ghilotti Bros. Inc., 941 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1210 & n.7 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (collecting cases holding that failure to respond to an argument in an opposition brief may constitute a || concession of the argument). 3 Most relevant to Bullard’s argument, Austin points out “[t]he mere fact that the 4|| production of records may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure || to further litigation will not, without more, compel the court to seal its records.” Kamakana, 6|| 447 F.3d at 1294. Bullard’s central argument in favor of sealing the record indeed appears || to be embarrassment stemming from the text messages Austin quoted. (See Doc. 40 at 3- 8 || 4.) But parties must often “disclose distressing information in pursuit of their requested 9|| relief’ and even “alarming” “allegations of sexual assault and substance use... are no 10|| different.” Doe v. Alabama Dep’t of Corr., No. 2:24-CV-455-ECM, 2025 WL 942750, at 11 || *8 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 27, 2025). Compelling reasons may justify sealing court records “when 12 || such court files might have become a vehicle for improper purposes, such as the use of 13} records to gratify private spite, promote public scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets[,|’” Krommenhock v. Post Foods, LLC, 334 F.R.D. 552, 586 (N.D. Cal. 15 || 2020), but Bullard does not persuasively argue that is the case here. As a result, Bullard’s 16 || motion to seal the record is denied. 17] II. Conclusion 18 Because Bullard has not provided compelling reasons to overcome the strong || presumption in favor of keeping court records public, his motion to seal the record is 20 || denied. 21 Accordingly, 22 IT IS ORDERED Bullard’s motion to seal (Doc. 40) is DENIED. This order shall 23 || not be sealed. 24 Dated this 24th day of July, 2025. 25 26 Vy, op a | LAA ALAA WO At Honorable Krissa M. Lanham 28 United States District Judge

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