Aurora Loan Services v. Grant

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Aurora Loan Services v. Grant

70 A.D.3d 986, 893 N.Y.S.2d 898

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedFebruary 23, 2010

StatusPublished

Cited by7 cases

This text of 70 A.D.3d 986 (Aurora Loan Services v. Grant) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Aurora Loan Services v. Grant, 70 A.D.3d 986, 893 N.Y.S.2d 898 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2010).

Pincite

Opinion

—In an action, inter alia, to foreclose a mortgage, the defendant Philip Grant appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Rothenberg, J.), dated May 29, 2008, as denied those branches of his motion which were to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) and to vacate an order of the same court (Held, J.), dated March 6, 2008, granting the plaintiffs unopposed motion to dismiss his counterclaims pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) and (a) (7), and granted those branches of the plaintiffs cross motion which were for summary judgment on the complaint and to dismiss his affirmative defenses.

Ordered that the order dated May 29, 2008, is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

“In order to prevail on a motion to vacate a default in opposing a motion, a moving party is required to demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for its default and a meritorious claim” (Montague v Rivera, 50 AD3d 656, 657 [2008]; see Raciti v Sands Point Nursing Home, 54 AD3d 1014 [2008]; St. Rose v McMorrow, 43 AD3d 1146 [2007]). Contrary to the appellant’s contention, he failed to demonstrate that any of his counterclaims had merit.

The plaintiff satisfied its prima facie burden establishing its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see Popular Fin. Servs., LLC v Williams, 50 AD3d 660 [2008]; US. Bank Natl. Assn. TR U/S 6/01/98 [Home Equity Loan Trust 1998-2] v Alvarez, 49 AD3d 711 [2008]). In opposition, the appellant failed to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact as to a bona fide defense to the action (see U.S. Bank Trust N.A. Trustee v Butti, 16 AD3d 408 [2005]; Mahopac Natl. Bank v Baisley, 244 AD2d 466, 467 [1997]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted those branches of the plaintiffs cross motion which were for summary judgment on the complaint and to dismiss the appellant’s affirmative defenses.

The appellant’s remaining contention is without merit. Mastro, J.P., Balkin, Belen and Chambers, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

—In an action, inter alia, to foreclose a mortgage, the defendant Philip Grant appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Rothenberg, J.), dated May 29, 2008, as denied those branches of his motion which were to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) and to vacate an order of the same court (Held, J.), dated March 6, 2008, granting the plaintiffs unopposed motion to dismiss his counterclaims pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) and (a) (7), and granted those branches of the plaintiffs cross motion which were for summary judgment on the complaint and to dismiss his affirmative defenses.

Ordered that the order dated May 29, 2008, is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

“In order to prevail on a motion to vacate a default in opposing a motion, a moving party is required to demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for its default and a meritorious claim” (Montague v Rivera, 50 AD3d 656, 657 [2008]; see Raciti v Sands Point Nursing Home, 54 AD3d 1014 [2008]; St. Rose v McMorrow, 43 AD3d 1146 [2007]). Contrary to the appellant’s contention, he failed to demonstrate that any of his counterclaims had merit.

The plaintiff satisfied its prima facie burden establishing its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see Popular Fin. Servs., LLC v Williams, 50 AD3d 660 [2008]; US. Bank Natl. Assn. TR U/S 6/01/98 [Home Equity Loan Trust 1998-2] v Alvarez, 49 AD3d 711 [2008]). In opposition, the appellant failed to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact as to a bona fide defense to the action (see U.S. Bank Trust N.A. Trustee v Butti, 16 AD3d 408 [2005]; Mahopac Natl. Bank v Baisley, 244 AD2d 466, 467 [1997]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted those branches of the plaintiffs cross motion which were for summary judgment on the complaint and to dismiss the appellant’s affirmative defenses.

The appellant’s remaining contention is without merit. Mastro, J.P., Balkin, Belen and Chambers, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

70 A.D.3d 986, 893 N.Y.S.2d 898, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/aurora-loan-services-v-grant-nyappdiv-2010.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack