Aultman, Miller & Co. v. Leahey

24 Neb. 286
CourtNebraska Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 15, 1888
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 24 Neb. 286 (Aultman, Miller & Co. v. Leahey) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nebraska Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Aultman, Miller & Co. v. Leahey, 24 Neb. 286 (Neb. 1888).

Opinion

Cobb, J.

This action was brought on error from the district court of Cuming county.

The plaintiffs filed their petition December 6, 1884, in the court below, as an incorporated company under the general statutes of Ohio, engaged in manufacturing agricultural implements and machinery at Akron, Ohio.

They allege that, on July 23, 1884, by their agent, J. E. Melcher, they sold and delivered to the defendant, at his instance and request, one Buckeye Cord Binder,” for two hundred and thirty dollars; that the same was worth that sum; that the defendant agreed to pay that sum for the same, which he has failed and' refuses to do, for which suit is brought.

[287]*287The defendant answered, denying, generally and specially, that the plaintiffs were a corporation doing business as alleged, or that the “Buckeye Cord Binder” described was worth the sum alleged, and set up that it was of no value whatever.

There was a trial to a jury, With a verdict for the defendant and judgment against the plaintiffs for costs.

The plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial was heard in the court below and overruled, and the case brought here on the following assignments:

I. The verdict is not sustained by sufficient evidence.

II. The verdict is contrary to law.

III. The verdict is contrary to the first, second, third, and fourth instructions of the court to the jury.

III. Eor errors of law occurring at the trial, which were excepted to by the plaintiff.

The first attention to be paid to the assignments is that of the plaintiffs’ application to the court below for a rehearing.

It appears from the record that the motion was formally made December 15th, after the verdict and before judgment; that on the 18th, following, the plaintiff moved to amend the motion for a new trial, by interlining and inserting the following words and figures: “ III. The verdict is contrary to the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th of the instructions of the court,” which amendment was granted, and which was excepted to by the defendant. It is thus that two separate assignments appear as No. 3, which is only significant of an irregularity to be inquired into, under the exception to it by the defendant. Is it such an irregularity as to preclude its consideration under the motion for a new trial?

Section 316 of the civil code of procedure provides that, “the application for a new trial must be made at the term the verdict is rendered, and, except for the cause of newly discovered evidence, shall be within three days after [288]*288the verdict was rendered, unless unavoidably prevented.”' This amendment embodies a new and definite assignment of error. It was not made until the fourth day after the verdict was rendered, after the expiration of the time limited by the code, without the finding by the court that the plaintiff “was unavoidably prevented” from a compliance with the statute, as a palliation for the amendment. Is it not, therefore, to be rejected? If it may be said that the application was made within the statutory limit, and that the right of amendment to pleadings is inherent in the court, rendering this amendment consubstantial with the original assignments, it may also be suggested that the-amendment was an apparent necessity in bringing the application within the rule that, “ the trial court be specifically called to each alleged error, in a motion for a new trial, and the same be also specifically pointed out to the supreme court in the petition in error,” and without which the original allegations were too incomplete and insufficient to support the vague contentions of error presented to the court. The amendment comprised substantially the whole of error assigned. It does not seem, therefore, to have been competent for the court to have extended the time limited by the code, by the allowance of a substitute, as an amendment, after the expiration of the three days appointed, after the verdict. The authority of the legislature to regulate, by the code, applications for new trials, will not be disputed. It has done so in a mandatory provision. This amendment is no less than an infraction of it. It is an improper suspension of the rule of the code to counsel, “ be ye also ready.”

This opinion was expressed by this court, in a like case, as early as the October term, 1877, in the action of Fox v. Meacham, 6 Neb., 530, when it was held that the statute requiring a motion for a new trial to be made within three days after the rendition of the verdict (except on newly discovered evidence), is mandatory; and if the motion is [289]*289afterwards made, it is of no avail to the party filing it. This authority is deemed sufficient to overrule the third assignment as to the specific errors of the separate instructions to the jury. There is other authority to support it. It was so ruled in Munch v. Williamson, 24 Cal., 170, under section 1182 of the code of that state, and in Williams’ Case, 5 Mo., 254.

But when we further examine the instructions to the, jury, in the light of the evidence adduced, there would seem to be no sufficient grounds for a new trial from error, partiality, or unfairness of instructions.

The cause of complaint is evidently the verdict of the jury rather than the ruling of the court, who charged as follows:

“ I. The plaintiff brings its action to recover the sum of $230 with interest at seven per cent from July 21st, 1884, which it alleges is due it from the defendant for a reaper sold and delivered to defendant. Plaintiff also alleges that it is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the state of Ohio. The defendant denies that the plaintiff is a corporation as alleged, but admits the sale and delivery of the reaper, and at the agreed price as alleged in the petition, but alleges that the reaper was entirely worthless, and hence is not liable for the price agreed upon, and ought not to be required to pay anything because of the worthlessness of the reaper, and these are the issues you are to try and determine.
“II. The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff, and it must satisfy you, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that it was and is a corporation as alleged in the petition, and if it has failed to do so it cannot recover in this action.
“III. The burden of proof is upon the defendant, and he must satisfy you, by a fair preponderance of the evidence,, that the reaper was worthless, before he can defeat a recovery in this action, having admitted the sale and purchase, and price agreed to be paid. The plaintiff is entitled to [290]*290recover unless the defendant has shown by the evidence that the reaper was of no value, as alleged.
“ IY. if you find from the evidence that the defendant had an opportunity to and did inspect and try the reaper before purchasing it, or if after trying the machine he purchased it, then he is liable for the agreed price, whether the machine was good or bad, unless it afterwards proved or turned out to be worthless by reason of some defect that ■was concealed or not perceptible at the time of purchase; but if the purchase was made before trial, then defendant will not be liable for the agreed price, if, upon a fair trial, and without fault of the defendant, the machine proved to be worthless.”

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

State ex rel. Sorensen v. Commercial State Bank
253 N.W. 692 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1934)
Barth v. Lincoln Telephone & Telegraph Co.
240 N.W. 318 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1932)
Hall Oil Co. v. Barquin
237 P. 255 (Wyoming Supreme Court, 1925)
Kirkland v. State
70 So. 592 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1915)
Blonde v. Merriam
133 P. 1076 (Wyoming Supreme Court, 1913)
State ex rel. Thompson v. Donahue
135 N.W. 1030 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1912)
Joiner v. Goldsmith
1910 OK 77 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1910)
Lillie v. State
119 N.W. 476 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1909)
Blue Creek Land & Live Stock Co. v. Anderson
99 P. 444 (Utah Supreme Court, 1909)
Nelson v. Farmland Security Co.
79 N.W. 161 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1899)
In re Estate of James
3 Coffey 130 (California Superior Court, San Francisco County, 1897)
Brown v. Ritner
59 N.W. 360 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1894)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
24 Neb. 286, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/aultman-miller-co-v-leahey-neb-1888.