Ault-Sweeting v. Mayorkas

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedMay 17, 2022
Docket4:21-cv-01510
StatusUnknown

This text of Ault-Sweeting v. Mayorkas (Ault-Sweeting v. Mayorkas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ault-Sweeting v. Mayorkas, (M.D. Pa. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CRYSTAL DAWN AULT- SWEETING, CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:21-cv-01510 Plaintiff, (WILSON, J.) v. (SAPORITO, M.J.)

ALEJANDRO N. MAYORKAS,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM This matter comes before the court on the defendant’s motion for a more definite statement, pursuant to Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 (Doc. 11.) The defendant has filed a short brief in support of the motion, and the pro se plaintiff has filed an even shorter brief in opposition. (Doc. 12; Doc. 16.) The motion is ripe for decision. I. BACKGROUND The plaintiff’s pro se complaint is handwritten on a two-page preprinted form. The complaint itself contains very few factual

1 In the alternative, the defendant has moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Because we grant the motion for a more definite statement and order the plaintiff to file an amended complaint, we need not reach the issue of failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), which is now moot. allegations at all. In the caption and the body of the complaint, she has

identified herself, Crystal Dawn Ault-Sweeting, as the plaintiff, and Alejandro N. Mayorkas, the U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security, as the defendant. She has also provided her home address and an apparent

reference to a U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) case number: “HS-TSA-00484-2018.” In a section requesting her to state the facts of her case, she has written two words:

“Discrimination claim.” In a section designed to elicit a prayer for relief, the only relief she has requested is “resolution of this matter.” Along with the two-page complaint, the plaintiff has filed a 24-page

exhibit, which consists primarily of an administrative decision by the EEOC affirming a decision by a Transportation Security Agency (“TSA”) administrative judge on a workplace discrimination complaint brought

by the plaintiff, a TSA employee, and a subsequent administrative decision by the EEOC denying her request for reconsideration. The captions of both administrative decisions include reference to “Agency

No. HS-TSA-00484-2018.” II. DISCUSSION As this court has previously stated: Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to move for a more definite statement of a pleading “which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). Like Rule 12(b)(6), Rule 12(e) must be read in conjunction with Rule 8, which requires only a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Even after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009), courts have held that “[t]he class of pleadings that are appropriate subjects for a motion under Rule 12(e) is quite small—the pleading must be sufficiently unintelligible for the court to be able to make out one or more potentially viable legal theories on which the claimant might proceed. Lapcevic v. Strive Enterprises, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-564, 2010 WL 1816752, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 2010) (quoting Sun Co. v. Badger Design & Constructors, 939 F. Supp. 365, 368 (E.D. Pa. 1996)). Granting a Rule 12(e) motion is appropriate only when the pleading is “so vague or ambiguous that the opposing party cannot respond, even with a simple denial, in good faith, without prejudice to itself.” Sun Co., 939 F. Supp. at 368. Pozarlik v. Camelback Assocs., Inc., Civil Action No. 3:11-CV-1349, 2012 WL 760582, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 8, 2012); see also Schaedler v. Reading Eagle Publ’n, Inc., 370 F.2d 795, 797–98 (3d Cir. 1967). The defendant argues that the plaintiff’s sparse complaint is insufficient and the court should require the plaintiff to file a more definite statement pursuant to Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. He notes that the complaint identifies the plaintiff and the defendant, asserts a “discrimination claim” without articulating what

sort of discrimination claim is being asserted, and states no request for damages, seeking only “resolution” of an unspecified nature. The defendant further notes that the complaint alleges no facts whatsoever

to suggest a plausible claim of discrimination. Based on this, the defendant asserts that there is simply insufficient factual information in the pro se complaint for him to prepare a response, to determine the

nature of the discrimination claim asserted, or to determine any defenses he could raise in good faith. Under Rule 12(e), “[a] party may move for a more definite statement

of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). While under the federal notice pleading

standard, detailed factual allegations are not necessary, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of [her] entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Thus, a complaint must set forth “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest” the required elements of a cause of action. Id. at 556.

Here, the plaintiff’s pro se complaint fails to give the defendant fair notice of the “discrimination claim” being brought against him. Indeed, the complaint itself is entirely bereft of facts. It asserts only a vague and

conclusory “discrimination claim” without any factual allegations to suggest “that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. For example, despite asserting a vague

“discrimination claim,” the plaintiff has failed to allege her race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, physical or mental disability, veteran status, or any other characteristic that would place her in a protected

class. Similarly, the complaint fails to describe any prohibited conduct in which the defendant allegedly engaged, or how the plaintiff was harmed by that conduct. The inclusion of this factual information is necessary “to

raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” id., and its absence makes the pro se complaint “so vague or ambiguous” that the defnedant “cannot reasonably prepare a response.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e).

Further, while the pro se complaint appears to include an oblique reference to her EEOC administrative appeal proceedings, and she has submitted a copy of selected papers from these proceedings together with her pro se complaint as an exhibit, such a reference is insufficient to cure

the defects of this vague and ambiguous complaint.

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Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Sun Co. v. Badger Design & Constructors, Inc.
939 F. Supp. 365 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1996)

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Ault-Sweeting v. Mayorkas, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ault-sweeting-v-mayorkas-pamd-2022.