Augustin v. Park Slope Associates NY, LLC

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Augustin v. Park Slope Associates NY, LLC

120 A.D.3d 527, 990 N.Y.S.2d 831

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedAugust 13, 2014

Docket2012-11012

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 120 A.D.3d 527 (Augustin v. Park Slope Associates NY, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Augustin v. Park Slope Associates NY, LLC, 120 A.D.3d 527, 990 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2014).

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Opinion

In an action, inter alia, for a judgment declaring the plaintiff to be the owner of certain real property, in effect, to set aside a deed, and to recover damages for fraud, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Schack, J.), dated July 16, 2012, which denied his motion pursuant to CPLR 3215 for leave to enter a default judgment against the defendant Park Slope Associates NY, LLC, upon that defendant’s failure to appear or answer the complaint and, in effect, for summary judgment declaring him to be the owner of certain real property and to set aside a deed, and vacated all stays in the action.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

We affirm the Supreme Court’s denial of the plaintiffs motion, but on grounds different from those relied upon by the Supreme Court. The plaintiff claims that the defendants obtained title to the subject premises from him through fraud. In support of those branches of his motion which were, in effect, for summary judgment declaring him to be the owner of *528 the subject real property and to set aside a deed, the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of fraud so as to satisfy his initial burden (see generally Cash v Titan Fin. Servs., Inc., 58 AD3d 785 [2009]). In light of the plaintiffs failure to satisfy his prima facie burden, these branches of the plaintiffs motion were properly denied, regardless of the sufficiency of the papers submitted by the defendant Steve Casholo, Inc., in opposition (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]; Moore v Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 117 AD3d 695, 696 [2014]).

That branch of the plaintiffs motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3215 for leave to enter a default judgment against the defendant Park Slope Associates NY, LLC, also was properly denied. The plaintiff failed to demonstrate his entitlement to enter a default judgment against that defendant (see GMAC v Minewiser, 115 AB3d 707 [2014]).

Dickerson, J.P, Leventhal, Cohen and Hinds-Radix, JJ., concur.

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In an action, inter alia, for a judgment declaring the plaintiff to be the owner of certain real property, in effect, to set aside a deed, and to recover damages for fraud, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Schack, J.), dated July 16, 2012, which denied his motion pursuant to CPLR 3215 for leave to enter a default judgment against the defendant Park Slope Associates NY, LLC, upon that defendant’s failure to appear or answer the complaint and, in effect, for summary judgment declaring him to be the owner of certain real property and to set aside a deed, and vacated all stays in the action.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

We affirm the Supreme Court’s denial of the plaintiffs motion, but on grounds different from those relied upon by the Supreme Court. The plaintiff claims that the defendants obtained title to the subject premises from him through fraud. In support of those branches of his motion which were, in effect, for summary judgment declaring him to be the owner of *528 the subject real property and to set aside a deed, the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of fraud so as to satisfy his initial burden (see generally Cash v Titan Fin. Servs., Inc., 58 AD3d 785 [2009]). In light of the plaintiffs failure to satisfy his prima facie burden, these branches of the plaintiffs motion were properly denied, regardless of the sufficiency of the papers submitted by the defendant Steve Casholo, Inc., in opposition (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]; Moore v Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 117 AD3d 695, 696 [2014]).

That branch of the plaintiffs motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3215 for leave to enter a default judgment against the defendant Park Slope Associates NY, LLC, also was properly denied. The plaintiff failed to demonstrate his entitlement to enter a default judgment against that defendant (see GMAC v Minewiser, 115 AB3d 707 [2014]).

Dickerson, J.P, Leventhal, Cohen and Hinds-Radix, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

120 A.D.3d 527, 990 N.Y.S.2d 831, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/augustin-v-park-slope-associates-ny-llc-nyappdiv-2014.

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