Audubon Society of Portland v. Oregon Department of Fish & Wildlife

681 P.2d 135, 67 Or. App. 776
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
DecidedApril 18, 1984
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 681 P.2d 135 (Audubon Society of Portland v. Oregon Department of Fish & Wildlife) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Audubon Society of Portland v. Oregon Department of Fish & Wildlife, 681 P.2d 135, 67 Or. App. 776 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).

Opinion

YOUNG, J.

Petitioners appeal from an order of the Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA) remanding an order of the Oregon Fish and Wildlife Commission (Commission)1 that granted intervenors2 a permit to spray a carbaryl pesticide (Sevin)3 on inter-tidal lands of Tillamook Bay which are used by intervenors for oyster cultivation. The permit was issued in an attempt to control mud and ghost shrimp populations, which are inimical to oyster cultivation. LUBA held that the commission failed to comply with Goal 164 in issuing the permit. We affirm.

The crux of LUBA’s order is that “the commission has neither generated enough facts nor made sufficient findings to comply with various Goal 16 provisions, * * * such as a proper inventory * * LUBA concluded that Goal 16’s inventory requirement was not met, because “there was a lack of findings addressing the questions about what organisms exist in the target [spray] area as well as the whole Tillamook Bay estuary,” the effect that application of Sevin would have on those organisms and, if there is an effect, the impact that it would have on the estuary ecosystem as a whole. In the light of the goal’s mandate that “[e]stuary plans and activities shall protect the estuarine ecosystem, including its natural biological productivity, habitat, diversity, unique features and water quality * * *,”5 LUBA held that the commission failed to [779]*779comply with the Goal. Simply put, LUBA concluded that the commission could not protect the estuary or assure minimum adverse affects from the pesticide without determining what organisms live in the estuary and whether the pesticide would adversely affect those organisms.

Petitioners’ contention is that the commission met the requirements of the goal. Specifically, they argue that the commission is not required to make a complete inventory of an estuary’s ecosystem before issuing a permit for the use of a non-specific pesticide. They urge that the commission is only required to make an “impact assessment” and that the impact asssessment made in this case provided the commission with sufficient information to apply the goal. We disagree.

We note first that LUBA’s decision regarding the adequacy of the information upon which the commission issued the permit does not, as petitioners contend, substitute LUBA’s judgment for that of the commission on a question of fact. LUBA’s judgment was not that the facts found by the commission were unsupported by substantial evidence, but that the facts found did not provide sufficient information to assure compliance with the goal. Goal 16’s requirements provide the legal standard against which LUBA reviewed the commission’s action. When LUBA found that the commission “has improperly applied Statewide Goal 16,” it was holding that the commission “[improperly construed the applicable law ***.” Or Laws 1981, ch 748, § 5(4)(a)(D) (now ORS 197.835(8)(a)(B)). Goal 16 requires, inter alia, that “[s]tate agencies with planning, permit, or review authorities affected by this goal shall review their procedures and standards to assure that the objectives and requirements of the goal are fully addressed.”

The commission is a state agency. ORS 496.138; ORS 183.310(1). It has permit authority. ORS 509.140. That authority is affected by the Statewide Planning Goals. ORS 197.180(1). It follows that the commission is required to conform its procedures and standards for issuing permits to the requirements of Goal 16 to assure that the objectives and requirements of the goal are fully addressed. Thus petitioners’ argument that it need not meet the Goal’s inventory requirement is without merit.

Goal 16 sets out “Inventory Requirements”:

[780]*780“Inventories shall be conducted to provide information necessary for designating estuary uses and policies. These inventories shall provide information on the nature, location, and extent of physical, biological, social and economic resources in sufficient detail to establish a sound basis for estuarine management and to enable the identification of areas for preservation and areas of exceptional potential for development.”

The objective of the requirement is spelled out in the requirement itself— “to provide information necessary for designating estuary uses and policy * * * in sufficient detail to establish a sound basis for estuarine management * * *.” The goal also sets out a guideline for meeting the inventory requirement. The guideline is advisory, not mandatory, but it suggests an approach designed to aid agencies and others to comply with the Goal. ORS 197.015(9). It suggests that the inventory should be “ [i]n detail appropriate to the level of development or alteration proposed * * (Emphasis supplied.)

Considering the objective of the inventory requirement and the guideline, we cannot agree with petitioners that the inventory requirement imposes an impossible burden on a state agency’s ability to carry out its statutory obligations in the permitting process. Agency compliance with Statewide Planning Goals is itself a statutory obligation, not a rule imposed on agencies by LUBA or by this court. ORS 197.180. Furthermore, nothing in LUBA’s order, or in Goal 16, suggests that a complete inventory must be made each time an agency makes a permit decision. What is required is that agencies make inventories “in sufficient detail to establish a sound basis for estuarine management.” One way an agency can insure that it meets that requirement is to make an inventory “in detail appropriate to the level of development or alteration proposed.” The bottom line is that, if no inventory has been completed during the local government’s comprehensive planning, an agency proposing to permit activities which may have an impact on the estuary must make an inventory in sufficient detail to demonstrate that the proposed activity will be consistent with the requirements of Goal 16.

In this case the commission proposed to allow a nonspecific and highly toxic pesticide to be applied at low tide on inter-tidal lands within an estuary. There was one finding of [781]*781fact that addressed the impact of this proposed alteration6 in the estuary on non-target life forms and the estuary’s ecosystem as a whole:

“Populations of organisms which are affected by Sevin will regenerate rapidly. Studies by the Washington Department of Fisheries indicate that little, if any differences existed in the number of invertebrates on ground not treated and on ground that was treated a few years earlier.”

LUBA held:

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243 P.3d 830 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 2010)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
681 P.2d 135, 67 Or. App. 776, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/audubon-society-of-portland-v-oregon-department-of-fish-wildlife-orctapp-1984.