Aud v. RRT Enterprises CA2/7

Opinion

Filed 8/26/26 Aud v. RRT Enterprises CA2/7 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

DEREK SKYLAR AUD, as B340727 Successor in Interest, etc., (Los Angeles County

Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct.

No. 22STCV21164)

v.

RRT ENTERPRISES, LP et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Stephanie M. Bowick, Judge. Affirmed.

Lanzone Morgan, Ayman R. Mourad, Elizabeth M. Kim, and Christopher W. Petersen for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Ekpebe Law Group and Vona S. Ekpebe for Defendants and Appellants Boardwalk West Financial Services, LLC, Shlomo Rechnitz, and Rockport Administrative Services, LLC.

Gittler & Berg, Randy A. Berg and Marvin G. Fischler for Defendant and Appellant RRT Enterprises, LP.

INTRODUCTION

Betsy Jentz sued RRT Enterprises LP doing business under the name Country Villa Wilshire Convalescent Center and related entities for violating the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15600 et seq., the Elder Abuse Act), violating the rights of a resident or patient (Health & Saf. Code, § 1430, subd. (b)), and negligence. The jury found in favor of Jentz, and Jentz requested $1,205,196 in attorneys’ fees. The trial court awarded $200,000 in attorneys’ fees under Health and Safety Code section 1430 and denied Jentz’s request for fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 and her request for costs of proof under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420.1 Jentz’s grandnephew, Derek Skylar Aud,2 argues the trial court abused its discretion in awarding only $200,000 in attorneys’ fees under Health and Safety Code section 1430 and in denying Jentz’s requests for fees under sections 1021.5 and 2033.420. Aud also argues the trial court abused its discretion in granting the defendants’ motion to tax costs by $78,256.54. We affirm.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

2 Jentz died while this appeal was pending. We granted Aud’s motion to substitute him for Jentz. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.36(a).)

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Jury Finds for Jentz Jentz filed this action against RRT, Boardwalk West Financial Services LLC, Rockport Administrative Services LLC, and Shlomo Rechnitz (collectively, the defendants). A jury found RRT violated Jentz’s rights as a resident under Health and Safety Code section 1430, committed elder abuse or neglect under the Elder Abuse Act, and was negligent. The jury found RRT did not act with the recklessness, oppression, fraud or malice required to recover enhanced remedies, including attorneys’ fees, under the Elder Abuse Act. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657.) The jury also found that Rockport and Boardwalk were engaged in a joint venture with RRT and that Rockport, Boardwalk, and Rechnitz were alter egos of RRT.

The trial court granted the defendants’ motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial on the amount of damages, alter ego liability, and joint venture liability. We affirmed in part and reversed in part. (See Aud v. RRT Enterprises, LP (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 1231.)

B. The Trial Court Awards Jentz Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Before the defendants filed their posttrial motions Jentz requested $1,205,196 in attorneys’ fees ($602,598 with a multiplier of 2.0) under Health and Safety Code section 1430, section 2033.420, and section 1021.5. The court awarded $200,000 in attorneys’ fees against RRT under Health and Safety Code section 1430 and denied Jentz’s requests under sections 2033.420 and 1021.5.

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Jentz filed a memorandum of costs seeking $166,096.62 in costs. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to tax costs by $78,256.54. Jentz timely appealed from the order awarding fees and the order granting the defendants’ motion to tax costs.

DISCUSSION

A. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Awarding Jentz $200,000 in Attorneys’ Fees Under Health and Safety Code Section 1430 Jentz requested fees under Health and Safety Code section 1430, which states a facility that “violates any rights of the resident or patient . . . [¶] . . . shall be liable . . . for costs and attorney’s fees.” (Health & Saf. Code, § 1430, subd. (b)(1)(A) & (B); see Jarman v. HCR ManorCare, Inc. (2020) 10 Cal.5th 375, 381; Nevarrez v. San Marino Skilled Nursing & Wellness Centre, LLC (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 102, 128.) Aud argues the trial court abused its discretion in awarding only $200,000. The court did not abuse its discretion.

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review The “fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095; see Perry v. Stuart (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 472, 510.) The trial court “may adjust the lodestar figure ‘based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.’ [Citation.] Such factors may include “‘the

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nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.”’” (Perry, at p. 511; see Gunther v. Alaska Airlines, Inc. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 334, 358.)

The trial court “has broad discretion” to reduce a fee request “if the court determines the attorney’s work . . . is duplicative or excessive.” (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 161; see Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132 [“trial courts must carefully review attorney documentation of hours expended; ‘padding’ in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts is not subject to compensation”]; Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 40-41 [trial court did not abuse its discretion in reducing a fee request “to arrive at a reasonable fee based on the factors specific to the case, including the excessive time spent on the ‘not so complex case’”]; Donahue v. Donahue (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 272 [“‘just as there can be too many cooks in a kitchen, there can be too many lawyers on a case’”].)

We review an award of attorneys’ fees for abuse of discretion. “‘The “experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his [or her] court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.”’” (Laffitte v. Robert Half Internat. Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 488; see LCPFV, LLC v. Somatdary Inc. (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 743, 759.) We review the trial court’s factual findings for substantial evidence. (See Riskin v. Downtown Los Angeles Property Owners Assn. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 438, 445.)

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2. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Reducing the Lodestar Amount Jentz requested a lodestar of $602,598.25 for 1,718 hours, with multiplier of 2.0, for a total request of $1,205,196.50. Jentz argued she could not apportion time between her cause of action under Health and Safety Code section 1430 (which entitled her to fees) and her causes of action for negligence and elder abuse (which did not) because all three causes of action were based on understaffing at Country Villa Wilshire.3 The trial court ruled Jentz was entitled to recover fees under Health and Safety Code section 1430 against RRT (the only defendant against whom Jentz asserted that cause of action). The court agreed Jentz’s three causes of action were so intertwined it would be impracticable to separate the attorneys’ time into compensable and non-compensable units, but stated the court could apply a “negative multiplier”4 to account for that “partial success.”

The court stated that the hourly rates for Jentz’s attorneys were reasonable, but that the court needed more information to determine whether the number of hours was reasonable. The court allowed counsel for Jentz to resubmit their summaries “in a ‘day-to-day’ format” or monthly billing statements. After

3 We refer to RRT Enterprises LP dba Country Villa Wilshire Convalescent Center as RRT. We refer to the skilled nursing facility as Country Villa Wilshire. 4 A multiplier that reduces the lodestar figure is not really a “negative multiplier,” but a rational number between 0 and 1, usually expressed or expressible as a terminating decimal, such as 0.5 or 3/4. A “negative multiplier” technically suggests an award of attorneys’ fees from, rather than to, the prevailing plaintiff.

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reviewing supplemental declarations by counsel for Jentz, the court found Jentz’s request for $602,598 for 1,718 hours was “clearly inflated and unreasonable.” The court found that the case was overstaffed and that “there was excessive duplication of tasks.” The court stated that, because Jentz’s request was inflated, the court had discretion to adjust the fee downward or to deny the request.

The court acted within its discretion in denying Jentz’s request for fees charged by two paralegals because Jentz did not provide adequate documentation. Jentz requested $79,404 in fees for a paralegal whose declaration provided a generic description of tasks she performed but did not show how much time she billed for each task. Therefore, the court concluded, it was unable to ascertain whether the time was excessive or duplicative “or whether the tasks were secretarial or clerical in nature.” The court also denied Jentz’s request for $12,765 in fees for the work of another paralegal who assisted in the courtroom during the trial because Jentz did “not provide any breakdown regarding the specific tasks, dates, and time billed.” The court stated that the paralegal possibly performed work that was not legal services, but that because the time records consisted of “block billing”5 rather than “actual billing records,” it was “impossible to fully analyze the fees requested and determine what is reasonable and appropriate.” (See In re Marriage of Nassimi (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 667, 695 [trial courts have

5 “Block billing occurs when ‘a block of time [is assigned] to multiple tasks rather than itemizing the time spent on each task.’” (Mountjoy v. Bank of America, N.A. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 279.)

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discretion “‘to penalize block billing when the practice prevents them from discerning which tasks are compensable and which are not’”].)6 Those adjustments reduced the lodestar from $602,598 to $500,629. ($602,598 - $79,404 - $12,765 - $9,800 = $500,629)

Next, the court acted within its discretion in reducing the fee award to $200,000 to account for overstaffing and duplication of work. (See Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 39 [“it is appropriate for a trial court to reduce a fee award based on its reasonable determination that a routine, noncomplex case was overstaffed to a degree that significant inefficiencies and inflated fees resulted”].) The court found the case was overstaffed because two partners, one senior associate, four associates, and six paralegals or legal assistants worked on the case. The court gave the following examples of duplicative work: three employees performed “duplicative tasks involving medical records,” “four attorneys charged for preparing the opening statement,” “three lawyers charged for attending the mediation,” and there were “numerous duplicative entries for meetings and telephone calls.”

Aud argues the “trial court offered no methodology for how it arrived at the $200,000 figure and failed to articulate why specific reductions were justified.” Regarding the first reduction of $101,169 for the two paralegals’ and one lawyer’s time, the court, as discussed, stated its methodology and reasons. Regarding the second reduction from $500,629 to $200,000 (a 60 percent reduction), Aud is correct the court did not explain how it arrived at $200,000. The court, however, had discretion to

6 The court also reduced Jentz’s request by $9,800.

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reduce the lodestar to an amount that reflected the reasonable value of the legal services provided. Where, as here, the prevailing party submits a “‘“voluminous fee application,”’” the court may “‘“make across-the-board percentage cuts either in the number of hours claimed or in the final lodestar figure.”’” (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc., supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 41; accord, Morris v. Hyundai Motor America, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 40; see Karton v. Ari Design & Construction, Inc. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 734, 746-748 [trial court did not abuse its discretion in reducing the lodestar from $300,000 to $90,000 for several reasons, including that the case was simple, the plaintiff overlitigated a small dispute, and the plaintiff’s briefing displayed incivility].) That the trial court reduced the lodestar by selecting the final amount, rather than by articulating a percentage, does not indicate an abuse of discretion. (See Morris, at p. 40 [where the trial court “could properly have made an across-the-board reduction of 30 percent” to address overstaffing, the court “got to the same result by cutting particular attorneys’ billings,” which was not an abuse of discretion].)

Contrary to Aud’s contention, the trial court did not have to perform a “granular analysis of time entries.” “When confronted with hundreds of pages of legal bills, trial courts are not required to identify each charge they find to be reasonable or unreasonable, necessary or unnecessary. . . . A reduced award might be fully justified by a general observation that an attorney overlitigated a case or submitted a padded bill or that the opposing party has stated valid objections.” (Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 101; see Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America, LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 250.) The trial court stated it agreed with

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the defendants’ objections to Jentz’s fee request and gave examples of duplicative work. That was sufficient.

Nor, as Aud contends, did the trial court have to provide a “detailed explanation of how it arrived at a nearly 70% cut.” The court explained its reasons for reducing the lodestar; it did not have to provide its calculations. (See Save Our Uniquely Rural Community Environment v. County of San Bernardino (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1190 [“Because the record shows that the court acted for legitimate reasons, we cannot find an abuse of discretion simply because it failed to make its arithmetic transparent.”]; see also Taduran v. James R. Glidewell, Dental Ceramics, Inc. (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 197, 210, fn. 3 [trial court did not have to “explain why it chose a 0.70 multiplier instead of another multiplier, such as a 0.75 multiplier”; “[t]here is no legal principle to support such precision in the abuse of discretion standard of review, which contemplates a range of permissible behavior”]; Chavez v. Netflix, Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 64 [“Although it might have been better for the court to provide a separate breakdown of each of the three reductions it made” in calculating the lodestar amount, the trial court was not “required to do so.”].)

Mountjoy v. Bank of America, N.A. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, cited by Aud, is distinguishable. In that case the trial court reduced the time the plaintiffs’ attorneys claimed by 70 percent because the trial court found 70 percent of billing entries were flawed. (Id. at p. 280.) The court in Mountjoy held the trial court abused its discretion because there was “no reasonable basis for the conclusion that the total hours included in the 70 percentplus time entries that were flawed in one or more ways was even reasonably close to 70 percent of the total time claimed. For

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example, it is possible that the hours included in the flawed time entries amounted to only 50 percent of total hours claimed.” (Id. at p. 281.) Thus, the trial court’s ruling in Mountjoy was arbitrary because there was no correlation between the percentage of flawed time entries and the percentage of hours claimed for the flawed entries. (Ibid.) The problem in Mountjoy was not that the trial court imposed a 70 percent reduction; it was that 70 percent was not the right percentage reduction to accomplish what the trial court intended. Here, in contrast, the trial court reduced the lodestar amount to $200,000 because that was the amount the court concluded was the reasonable value of the services Jentz’s lawyers provided. (See Laffitte v. Robert Half Internat. Inc., supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 488.)

Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp., supra, 178 Cal.App.4th 44, also cited by Aud, is distinguishable too. In Gorman the trial court “took the motion [for attorneys’ fees and costs] under submission without asking any questions of the parties or expressing any agreement or disagreement with any of the points made in the motion or opposition.” (Id. at pp. 56-57.) In a 27-word order the trial court awarded $416,581.37 in attorneys’ fees, which was “a little under 61 percent of [the] lodestar amount,” without explaining how the court arrived at that amount or giving any reason for reducing the lodestar. (Id. at p. 57, fn. 7, 99.) Though the amount awarded was “precise and down to the penny,” the court in Gorman could not “recreate [the] result by means of various formulas.” (Id. at p. 99.) Absent any explanation by the trial court, the court concluded, the number appeared “to have been snatched whimsically from thin air.” (Id. at p. 101.)

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Contrary to Aud’s contention, the $200,000 award in this case was not, as in Gorman, whimsical or grabbed out of the air. The court in Gorman stated that, had the trial court given a reason for reducing the fee award “or cited any other factor recognized in case law for reducing the lodestar amount,” the court might have affirmed the order. (Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp., supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 101.) The trial court in this case did those things: It issued a lengthy order explaining its reasons for reducing the award and concluding the reasonable value of the legal services provided by Jentz’s lawyers was $200,000.

3. The Trial Court Did Not Apply an Incorrect Legal Standard or Misunderstand the Jury’s Findings

Aud argues “the trial court abused its discretion by significantly reducing [Jentz’s] requested attorneys’ fees on the false assumption that [Jentz] ‘did not prevail on all causes of action.’” The trial court did not abuse its discretion.

In its order granting Aud’s motion for attorneys’ fees the court stated: “Defendants concede that [Jentz] may recover attorney’s fees pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 1430, but only . . . for work reasonably expended on” that cause of action. The court also stated: “[Jentz] concedes that she did not prevail on her Elder Abuse/Neglect claim pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657, and that her negligence claim cannot support an award of attorney’s fees.” Elsewhere in the order the court stated that Jentz “only prevailed” on the second cause of action under Health and Safety Code section 1430 and that Jentz “did not prevail on” the other two

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causes of action. Read literally, the court’s statements that Jentz “only prevailed” on the cause of action under Health and Safety Code section 1430 and that Jentz “did not prevail” on the other causes of action was incorrect: Jentz prevailed entirely on the negligence cause of action and partially on the elder neglect cause of action. But that is not what the court meant; the court undoubtedly meant Jentz prevailed on only one cause of action that entitled her to recover attorneys’ fees.

We interpret the trial court’s order according to the same “‘rules of construction that apply to any other writing.’” (Smith v. Ogbuehi (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 453, 473.) “Under those rules, the entire order is taken by its four corners and construed as a whole. [Citation.] Also, the order’s language is viewed in light of the facts and the issues before the court, and each statement is considered in its proper context.” (Id. at p. 474.) Construing the trial court’s order as a whole, and in light of the issue before the court—Jentz’s request for attorneys’ fees—we conclude that, when the court stated Jentz “only prevailed” on the cause of action under Health and Safety Code section 1430, the court meant Jentz only prevailed on one fee-bearing cause of action. The trial court was familiar with the case, having presided over the trial. Indeed, in the same order the court correctly stated Jentz’s “negligence claim cannot support an award of attorney’s fees.” Reading the record as a whole, we are confident the trial court understood that Jentz prevailed on three causes of action, but that only one of them authorized recovery of attorneys’ fees.

4. Aud’s Remaining Arguments Lack Merit Aud argues “the trial court used block billing as a blanket justification to apply an arbitrary reduction without any analysis

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of whether it actually obscured the reasonableness of the time billed.” Aud forfeited this argument by not citing to the record. (See Rybolt v. Riley (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 864, 868 [court may “‘disregard any factual contention not supported by a proper citation to the record’”]; Alki Partners, LP v. DB Fund Services, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 574, 589 [an “appellant who fails to cite accurately to the record forfeits the issue or argument on appeal”].) In any event, the record does not support Aud’s argument. As discussed, the trial court denied the fee request for two paralegals’ work because the documents Jentz submitted did not allow the court to determine which fees were reasonable and appropriate. That was within the court’s discretion. (See Morris v. Hyundai Motor America, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 39.)

Aud also challenges the trial court’s findings that the case was overstaffed and that Jentz’s lawyers billed for duplicative work. He contends the trial court should have considered that the case had lasted three years, that one of the attorneys assigned to the case left the firm, and that two of the seven attorneys billed only a few hours. He also argues the court misinterpreted the time records to mean different people performed the same tasks rather than the same type of tasks. But the issue is whether substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings, not whether there was evidence to support a contrary finding. (See In re Marriage of Nelson (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 904, 914 [under the substantial evidence standard of review “‘“the power of an appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the finding of fact”’”]; Slone v. El Centro Regional Medical Center (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1175 [appellant

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“cannot carry his burden on appeal by merely rearguing the ‘facts’ as he would have them and/or reasserting his position at trial”].)

Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings that the case was overstaffed and that there were charges for duplicative work. As discussed, four attorneys charged for preparing the opening statement, for a total of more than 50 hours, and three attorneys attended the mediation. In addition, three attorneys billed time for discussing the case among themselves.

Aud also argues the trial court “erred by denying fees for legal tasks performed by paralegals, erroneously classifying them as clerical work.” But the trial court did not deny the fee request because the paralegals’ work was clerical; the court denied the request for fees charged by one paralegal because the fee request simply listed eight tasks the paralegal performed, for a total of 397 hours, without stating how many times she performed each task or how long she spent on each task. The court stated it could not “‘ascertain whether the time was appropriate/reasonable or excessive; whether there was any overlap or duplication as to such tasks . . . ,’ or whether the tasks were secretarial or clerical in nature.”

To be sure, “paralegal fees may be awarded as attorney’s fees if the trial court deems it appropriate.” (Roe v. Halbig (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 286, 312; see Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp., supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 100.) The trial court, however, had discretion to disallow fees for clerical work. (See Save Our Uniquely Rural Community Environment v. County of San Bernardino, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1186-1187.) Some of the tasks listed in the paralegal’s declaration appeared clerical

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(calendaring, scheduling meetings) while others (drafting discovery and conducting research) did not. And the court had discretion to deny fees for any of the paralegal’s work where her declaration did not allow the court to identify which fees were reasonable and which were not. (See In re Marriage of Nassimi, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 695 [the court “‘“may properly reduce compensation on account of any failure to maintain appropriate time records”’”].)

B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Jentz’s Request for Costs of Proof Under Section 2033.420

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review During discovery a party may serve a written request that another party “admit the genuineness of specified documents, or the truth of specified matters of fact, opinion relating to fact, or application of law to fact.” (§ 2033.010.) Such requests “‘“are primarily aimed at setting at rest a triable issue so that it will not have to be tried. Thus, such requests, in a most definite manner, are aimed at expediting the trial. For this reason, the fact that the request is for the admission of a controversial matter, or one involving complex facts, or calls for an opinion, is of no moment. If the litigant is able to make the admission, the time for making it is during discovery procedures, and not at the trial.”’” (Vargas v. Gallizzi (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 362, 370; accord, Bloxham v. Saldinger (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 729, 752; see Orange County Water Dist. v. The Arnold Engineering Co. (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 96, 115 [requests for admission “‘are not restricted to facts or documents, but apply to conclusions,

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opinions, and even legal questions,’” and “‘serve to narrow discovery, eliminate undisputed issues, and shift the cost of proving certain matters’”].)

If a responding party denies a request for admission the propounding party later proves, section 2033.420, subdivision (a), provides for an award of costs of proof: “‘If a party fails to admit the genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter when requested to do so under this chapter, and if the party requesting that admission thereafter proves the genuineness of that document or the truth of that matter, the party requesting the admission may move the court for an order requiring the party to whom the request was directed to pay the reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, including reasonable attorney’s fees.’” Section 2033.420, subdivision (b), provides: “‘The court shall make this order unless it finds any of the following: [¶] (1) An objection to the request was sustained or a response to it was waived under Section 2033.290. [¶] (2) The admission sought was of no substantial importance. [¶] (3) The party failing to make the admission had reasonable ground to believe that that party would prevail on the matter. [¶] (4) There was other good reason for the failure to admit.’” An award for costs of proof “‘is not a penalty. Instead, it is designed to reimburse reasonable expenses incurred by a party in proving the truth of the requested admission.’” (Vargas v. Gallizzi, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 370; see City of Glendale v. Marcus Cable Associates, LLC (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 344, 353.)

“‘The determination of whether “there were no good reasons for the denial,” whether the requested admission was “of substantial importance,” and the amount of expenses to be awarded, if any, are all within the sound discretion of the trial

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court.’” (Bloxham v. Saldinger, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 753; accord, Vargas v. Gallizzi, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 371.) We review an order denying costs of proof under section 2033.420 for abuse of discretion. (Yoon v. Cam IX Trust (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 388, 391-392; see Spahn v. Richards (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 208, 217.)

2. Jentz Did Not Show the Cost of Proving the Matters the Defendants Denied Jentz requested costs of proof based on the defendants’

failure to admit six requests for admission. Five of the requests asked the defendants to admit factual matters regarding Jentz’s risk of falling, the dates she fell, and Country Villa Wilshire’s failure to update her care plan after she fell. The sixth request asked the defendants to authenticate the management and operations transfer agreement for Country Villa Wilshire. In response to that request, the defendants said they could not authenticate the document, but at trial Rechnitz authenticated it and identified his signature.

The trial court found that the defendants did not have a reasonable ground to believe they would prevail and that Jentz therefore was “entitled to request her reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred in making the proof at issue.” The court continued: “Notwithstanding the above, the Court finds . . . [Jentz] has failed to set forth in a clear and concise manner the additional time incurred or expended in having to prove the matters related to the requests for admission.” The court stated that initially Jentz simply requested fees for 1,718 hours without “a breakdown of time and tasks that would permit the Court to analyze and determine how many hours were

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reasonably expended on proving the particular matters at issue in the requests for admission.” Jentz later submitted “a breakdown for each attorney’s time,” but counsel “block billed” trial time rather than stating “what occurred during the trial that day or who testified.” Therefore, the court ruled, Jentz did not meet her burden under section 2033.420 to provide “sufficient evidence that permits the Court to determine the amount of fees that were reasonably ‘incurred in making that proof.’”

The trial court did not abuse its discretion. To recover costs of proof under section 2033.420, the requesting party “must show [it] spent the amounts claimed to prove the issues [the responding party] should have admitted.” (Grace v. Mansourian (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 523, 529; see Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. Macias (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1031 [trial court has discretion “to exclude any claimed expenses to the extent they relate to issues outside the scope of the requests for admission”].)

Jentz did not make any attempt to specify the amount of time her lawyers spent proving the matters the defendants denied or the cost of that time. She simply submitted records showing the 1,718 hours her lawyers spent on the case over a two-year period. But Jentz was not entitled to recover the costs of factual investigation, discovery, legal research, motion practice, or preparing for trial. She was entitled only to the cost of proving the matters the defendants improperly denied. “[P]reparation for trial or arbitration is not the equivalent of proving the truth of a matter so as to authorize an award of attorney fees under [section 2033.420]. Expenses are recoverable only where the party requesting the admission ‘proves . . . the truth of that matter,’ not where that party merely prepares to do

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so.” (Wagy v. Brown (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1, 6; see Stull v. Sparrow (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 860, 865-866 [“Until a trier of fact is exposed to evidence and concludes that the evidence supports a position, it cannot be said that anything has been proved.”].)

Jentz’s submission fell far short of the required showing.

Her lawyers’ declarations made only one reference to proving one of the matters the defendants denied: The lawyers stated they authenticated the management and operations transfer agreement by questioning Rechnitz during trial, but they did not state how long that took or how much they charged for that work. Jentz’s submission was silent on the cost of proving the other matters—that RRT determined Jentz was at risk of falling, that she fell on certain dates, and that Country Villa Wilshire did not update Jentz’s care plan after she fell. Jentz did not identify the witnesses whose testimony provided that evidence or provide an estimate of how many days of the three-week trial her lawyers spent proving those matters. Indeed, Jentz did not even calculate the total number of hours her lawyers spent in trial. Because Jentz did not identify the cost of proving the matters the defendants denied, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying her request under section 2033.420. (See Grace v. Mansourian, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 529 [the “requested amounts must be segregated from costs and fees expended to prove other issues”]; see also Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. Macias, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 1031 [the “rule is that a party cannot recover costs of proof for other issues”].)

Aud argues for the first time in his reply brief that, because the defendants denied “core facts of liability,” Jentz “was forced to try the entire case,” the “cost of proof is the cost of establishing liability,” and “[i]mpossibility of segregation is not a valid basis to

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deny a mandatory statutory remedy.” Because in the trial court Jentz never argued it was impossible to segregate the costs of proof from other costs, Aud forfeited the argument. (See Jogani v. Jogani (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 823, 840; Ruffier v. Volcano Hills Road Maintenance Assn. (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 899, 910.) Even if not forfeited, the argument is meritless: Some segregation of fees was possible. At a minimum, Jentz could have segregated trial time from the rest of the 1,718 hours. And even at trial there were some issues unrelated to Jentz’s fall risk, falls, and care plan, such as the defendants’ alter ego and joint venture liability, whether Country Villa Wilshire was licensed, and whether Rechnitz threatened Aud in a telephone conversation.

Aud also argues that, because section 2033.420 uses the word “shall,” the statute “imposes a mandatory duty that the trial court failed to perform, and the refusal to award any amount was reversible error.” Had Jentz adequately documented “the reasonable expenses incurred in making [the] proof” of the matters improperly denied (§ 2033.420, subd. (a)), the court would have had a mandatory duty to award costs of proof. But as discussed, the court did not abuse its discretion in determining Jentz did not meet her burden to show the cost of proving the issues the defendants should have admitted. (See Grace v. Mansourian, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 529.)

Aud’s reliance on Samsky v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 517 is misplaced. In Samsky the trial court denied the plaintiff’s request for costs of proof, incorrectly placing the burden on the plaintiff to prove that none of the exceptions to awarding costs under section 2033.420, subdivision (b), applied. (Samsky, at p. 519.) On appeal the defendant argued the court should “uphold the trial court’s denial

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of costs under the doctrine of implied findings” because the plaintiff’s “‘block billing [made] it impossible to determine what would be related to any one (or multiple) denied issues.’” (Id. at pp. 527-528.) The court in Samsky rejected the defendant’s argument, stating the “trial court made clear the basis for its ruling, and there is no reason to believe it also denied the motion on the additional unmentioned ground of problems with cost itemization, particularly since [the defendant] did not raise this argument in the trial court.” (Id. at p. 528.) Unlike this case, in Samsky the trial court did not decide whether the plaintiff adequately demonstrated its costs of proof, and the court did not decide whether the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting the plaintiff’s showing.

Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. Macias, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th 1007 is likewise inapposite. In Macias the plaintiff submitted a motion for costs of proof accompanied by a summary listing specific billing entries counsel for the plaintiff stated were “attributable to [the defendants’] refusal to admit requests for admissions.” (Id. at p. 1026.) The court in Macias held the trial court erred in denying the plaintiff’s motion for failing to “identify ‘the specific attorney’s fees and costs incurred to prove the matters in each, specific request for admission that was denied . . . .’” (Id. at p. 1030.) The court stated section 2033.420 “does not require that fees and costs must be separately allocated to each specific request for admission, particularly not where, as here, virtually all the requests relate to a single issue . . . . The rule is that a party cannot recover costs of proof for other issues.” (Macias, at pp. 1030-1031.) Thus, under Macias the party requesting costs of proof does not need to segregate costs among different requests for admission, but must

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segregate costs of proving the matters improperly denied from other costs.

C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Jentz’s Request for Attorneys’ Fees Under Section 1021.5

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review Section 1021.5 is an exception to the general rule that “‘parties in litigation pay their own attorney’s fees.’” (Grossmont Union High School Dist. v. Diego Plus Education Corp. (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 552, 570; see La Mirada Avenue Neighborhood Assn. of Hollywood v. City of Los Angeles (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1149, 1155.) The statute provides: “‘Upon motion, a court may award attorneys’ fees to a successful party against one or more opposing parties in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement, or of enforcement by one public entity against another public entity, are such as to make the award appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any.’” (See Conservatorship of Whitley (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1206, 1214 & fn. 2; Doe v. Atkinson (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 667, 674.)

The “‘Legislature adopted section 1021.5 as a codification of the “private attorney general” attorney fee doctrine that had been developed in numerous prior judicial decisions. . . . [T]he fundamental objective of the private attorney general doctrine of attorney fees is “‘to encourage suits effectuating a strong [public]

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policy by awarding substantial attorney’s fees . . . to those who successfully bring such suits and thereby bring about benefits to a broad class of citizens.’” [Citation.] The doctrine rests upon the recognition that privately initiated lawsuits are often essential to the effectuation of the fundamental public policies embodied in constitutional or statutory provisions, and that, without some mechanism authorizing the award of attorney fees, private actions to enforce such important public policies will as a practical matter frequently be infeasible.’” (Conservatorship of Whitley, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 1217-1218; see Let Them Choose v. San Diego Unified School Dist. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 953, 961 [section 1021.5 “‘acts as an incentive for the pursuit of public interest-related litigation that might otherwise have been too costly to bring’”].)

“[E]ligibility for section 1021.5 attorney fees is established when ‘(1) plaintiffs’ action “has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest,” (2) “a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons” and (3) “the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement are such as to make the award appropriate.”’” (Conservatorship of Whitley, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1214; accord, Grossmont Union High School Dist. v. Diego Plus Education Corp., supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 572.) “‘“Because the statute states the criteria in the conjunctive, each must be satisfied to justify a fee award.”’” (Save Agoura Cornell Knoll v. City of Agoura Hills (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 665, 708; see People v. Investco Management & Development LLC (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 443, 456.) “Accordingly, we may uphold the trial court’s order denying the attorney fees motion if we determine any one of these elements is missing.”

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(Children & Families Com. of Fresno County v. Brown (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 45, 55.) We review a ruling on a motion for attorneys’ fees under section 1021.5 for abuse of discretion. (Whitley, at p. 1213; see Save Agoura Cornell Knoll, at p. 708.)

2. The Action Did Not Confer a Significant Benefit on the General Public or a Large Class of Persons

The trial court concluded Jentz failed to meet the second requirement of section 1021.5, finding the case “was brought for [Jentz’s] own benefit and did not confer a significant benefit on the general public or for a large class of persons.” The court did not abuse its discretion.

“A benefit need not be monetary to be significant.”

(La Mirada Avenue Neighborhood Assn. of Hollywood v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 1158; accord, Friends of Spring Street v. Nevada City (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1108; see Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc. v. City Council (1979) 23 Cal.3d 917, 939 [“in many cases the important gains or contributions rendered by public interest litigation will be reflected in nonmonetary advances”].) “A significant benefit may result from the ‘effectuation of a fundamental constitutional or statutory policy.’” (Canyon Crest Conservancy v. County of Los Angeles (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 398, 412; see Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc., at p. 939.) “‘Of course, the public always has a significant interest in seeing that legal strictures are properly enforced and thus, in a real sense, the public always derives a “benefit” when illegal private or public conduct is rectified.’ [Citation.] However, not ‘every case involving a statutory violation’ is properly the subject of fees under the

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statute. [Citation.] Instead, the trial court must ‘determine the significance of the benefit, as well as the size of the class receiving benefit, from a realistic assessment, in light of all the pertinent circumstances, of the gains which have resulted in a particular case.’” (Canyon Crest Conservancy, at p. 412; see Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc., at pp. 939-940.)

Aud argues the “action resulted in a significant benefit to a large class of persons because the enforcement of the statutory rights of elders furthers the public policies underlying” the Elder Abuse Act and Health and Safety Code section 1430 “as these statutes depend on private enforcement to protect elderly rights.” But simply enforcing a statute, even a statute designed to further an important public policy, does not create a significant benefit under section 1021.5. Aud does not identify a fundamental statutory policy advanced by this case. Nor does Aud explain how Jentz’s success in this case brought a significant benefit to anyone other than her. Jentz sought damages for her injuries; she did not seek injunctive relief or a declaration of the rights of other Country Villa Wilshire residents. The possibility that, in response to the verdict, Country Villa Wilshire might provide better care to other residents is not sufficient to show a significant benefit under section 1021.5. (See LaGrone v. City of Oakland (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 932, 946 [possibility the plaintiff’s “lawsuit may have conveyed a cautionary message to the [defendants] about their conduct, or that it might cause them to change their practices in the future, is insufficient to satisfy the significant public benefit requirement”]; see also McDoniel v. Kavry Management, LLC (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 949, 978 [“‘Section 1021.5 was not designed as a method for rewarding litigants motivated by their own pecuniary interests who only

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coincidentally protect the public interest.’”]; Roybal v. Governing Bd. of Salinas City Elementary School Dist. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1150 [“Any benefit to the public in the District’s compliance with [statutory layoff rights] in this case was incidental to the primary goal of the lawsuit, to obtain reinstatement and/or damages for petitioners.”].)

Quoting selectively from Bouvia v. County of Los Angeles (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1075, Aud argues this case “resulted in a significant benefit because ‘[a]ll persons are necessarily affected by the nature and extent of the health care they receive and that which is rendered to family and friends.’” The facts in Bouvia were very different than those in this case. In Bouvia the plaintiff obtained an order requiring a hospital to remove a feeding tube inserted against her will. (Id. at p. 1080.) The court held the litigation conferred a significant benefit on the public because it “resulted in the enforcement of a significant right”: the right to refuse medical treatment “independent of the reasons which may motivate the exercise of that right.” (Id. at p. 1084.) This case did not vindicate any comparable right.

Quoting the trial court’s order, Aud argues the trial court improperly denied Jentz’s request for attorneys’ fees under section 1021.5 “on the sole ground that the action was ‘brought for [Jentz’s] own benefit.’” Aud omits the rest of the sentence. The court stated the action “was brought for [Jentz’s] own benefit and did not confer a significant benefit on the general public or for a large class of persons.” (Italics added.) The court did not state the benefit to Jentz disqualified her from recovering fees under section 1021.5.

Similarly, Aud contends the “trial court made no findings that the action failed to confer a significant public benefit, nor

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that the financial burden of enforcement failed to outweigh [Jentz’s] personal interest.” Aud is wrong on the first point: As stated, the court found the action “did not confer a significant benefit on the general public or for a large class of persons.” And on the second point, because the court found Jentz did not meet one of the statutory criteria (significant benefit), it did not have to make findings on the remaining criteria, including the financial burden of private enforcement. (See Millview County Water Dist. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 759, 773; Satrap v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 72, 81.)

D. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Granting the Defendants’ Motion To Tax Costs Aud argues the trial court abused its discretion in taxing costs by $24,328.10 for model enlargements and photocopies of exhibits. Again, there was no abuse of discretion.

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review A prevailing party is entitled to recover costs. (§ 1032, subd. (b).) Section 1033.5, subdivision (a), lists the costs a prevailing party is entitled to recover, and section 1033.5, subdivision (b), lists costs that are not recoverable. Costs neither permitted under section 1033.5, subdivision (a), nor prohibited under section 1033.5, subdivision (b), “may be allowed or denied in the court’s discretion.” (§ 1033.5, subd. (c)(4).) Allowable costs must be “reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation” and must be “reasonable in amount.” (§ 1033.5, subd. (c)(2), & (3); see Vargas v. Gallizzi, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 375.)

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“‘In ruling upon a motion to tax costs, the trial court’s first determination is whether the statute expressly allows the particular item and whether it appears proper on its face. “If so, the burden is on the objecting party to show [the costs] to be unnecessary or unreasonable.” [Citation.] Where costs are not expressly allowed by the statute, the burden is on the party claiming the costs to show that the charges were reasonable and necessary.’” (Rozanova v. Uribe (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 392, 399; see Berkeley Cement, Inc. v. Regents of University of California (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1133, 1139.) “We ‘review a trial court’s determination on which costs are reasonably necessary and reasonable in amount under the abuse of discretion standard.’” (Rojas v. HSBC Card Services Inc. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 860, 892; see Rozanova, at p. 399.)

2. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Taxing Costs for Photocopies and Binders Jentz sought $32,328.10 in costs for enlargements and photocopies of exhibits. The trial court taxed those costs by $24,328.10 and awarded $8,000. The court found charges of $20,089.80 for 167,415 photocopies and $5,385 for 300 binders were unreasonable7 because Jentz also requested $1,303.80 for 13,038 other photocopies and “the majority of the copies and binders were not used at trial.”

The trial court may award costs for “[m]odels, the enlargements of exhibits and photocopies of exhibits . . . if they were reasonably helpful to aid the trier of fact.” (§ 1033.5,

7 $20,089.80 + $5,385 = $25,474.80. The court, however, taxed the costs by only $24,328.10, apparently to make the final cost award a round number of $8,000.

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subd. (a)(13).) Photocopied exhibits not used at trial “‘may be allowed or denied in the court’s discretion.’” (Segal v. ASICS America Corp. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 651, 667; see § 1033.5, subd. (c)(4).)

The trial court acted within its discretion in awarding costs for some, but not all, of the photocopies and binders. (See Rozanova v. Uribe, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 405 [“the trial court is in the best position to evaluate whether . . . exhibits were ‘reasonably helpful to aid’” the trier of fact and whether the costs were “‘reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation’ [citation] and ‘reasonable in amount’”]; see also Rojas v. HSBC Card Services Inc., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 901 [“The court was in the best position to draw these conclusions, including the necessity and reasonableness determinations pertinent to Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subd. (c)(4), and we presume it considered all relevant matters in doing so.”].)

Aud argues the trial court abused its discretion in taxing costs for exhibit photocopies because the courtroom instructions required Jentz to produce three joint exhibit books. The court, however, acted within its discretion in concluding Jentz could have created three joint exhibit books using fewer than 180,000 copies and 300 binders, most of which were not used at trial.8

8 Aud also argues the enlargements were reasonably helpful to aid the trier of fact, but the trial court awarded Jentz the full amount she requested for enlargements ($575.51).

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DISPOSITION

The orders granting Jentz’s motion for attorneys’ fees and granting the defendants’ motion to tax costs are affirmed. The request by RRT, Boardwalk, Rockport, and Rechnitz for judicial notice is granted. RRT, Boardwalk, Rockport, and Rechnitz are to recover their costs on appeal.

SEGAL, J.

We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

FEUER, J.