Auburn Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Sedensky

2025 Ohio 4911

Opinion

[Cite as Auburn Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Sedensky, 2025-Ohio-4911.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT GEAUGA COUNTY

AUBURN TOWNSHIP CASE NO. 2025-G-0012 BOARD OF TRUSTEES,

Plaintiff-Appellee, Civil Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas - vs -

DAVID SEDENSKY, et al., Trial Court No. 2023 M 000172

Defendants-Appellants.

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

Decided: October 27, 2025 Judgment: Affirmed

Tonya J. Rogers and Megan L. Haynam, Baker, Dublikar, Beck, Wiley & Mathews, 400 South Main Street, North Canton, OH 44720 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).

Monica R. Zibbel, Forbes Law, LLC, 166 Main Street, Painesville, OH 44077 (For Defendants-Appellants).

EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.

{¶1} Appellants, David and Molly Sedensky, appeal the judgment of the trial

court that granted summary judgment in favor of Auburn Township Board of Trustees

(“the Board”), enjoined the Sedenskys from using certain property as a short term rental,

and dismissed the Sedenskys’ counterclaims. We affirm.

{¶2} In 2021, the Sedenskys purchased real property in Auburn Township in a

district zoned “R-1.” The Sedenskys acquired the property for personal use and for rental

purposes and thereafter listed the property for rent on the internet platforms Airbnb and VRBO. The Sedenskys rented the property to others through these sites for various

periods of time.

{¶3} On March 21, 2023, the Board filed a complaint for injunctive relief, alleging

that the Sedenskys use of the property as a short term rental violated the Auburn

Township Zoning Resolution (“ATZR”) 4.03(a) and 5.05(b).1

{¶4} The Sedenskys answered the complaint and filed counterclaims seeking

declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. In their counterclaims, the Sedenskys asserted

that the ATZR sections at issue violated their rights under the United States Constitution

and the Ohio Constitution.

{¶5} On December 3, 2024, the Sedenskys moved for partial summary judgment

on their counterclaim for declaratory judgment, and the Board moved for summary

judgment on its claim and on the Sedenskys’ counterclaims.

{¶6} On February 28, 2025, the trial court granted the Board’s motion and

entered judgment enjoining the Sedenskys from using their property as a short term

rental. The trial court dismissed the Sedenskys’ counterclaims with prejudice.

{¶7} In their assigned errors, the Sedenskys contend:

[1.] The trial court erred by finding Auburn Township Zoning Resolutions §§ 4.03 and 5.50(B) are constitutional based upon stare decisis.

[2.] The trial court abused its discretion when it dismissed Appellants-Defendants’ action for Declaratory Judgment with prejudice.

1. The Board’s complaint further requested penalties pursuant to R.C. 519.99. However, the trial court dismissed the claim for penalties prior to summary judgment proceedings, and the issue of penalties is not relevant to this appeal.

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Case No. 2025-G-0012 {¶8} Judgment in this case was entered at the summary judgment stage of

proceedings. “We review decisions awarding summary judgment de novo, i.e.,

independently and without deference to the trial court’s decision.” Hedrick v. Szep, 2021-

Ohio-1851, ¶ 13 (11th Dist.), citing Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 1996-Ohio-336, ¶ 10.

Civ.R. 56(C) specifically provides that before summary judgment may be granted, it must be determined that: (1) No genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party.

Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327 (1977); Allen v. 5125 Peno, LLC,

2017-Ohio-8941, ¶ 6 (11th Dist.), citing Holliman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 1999-Ohio-116. “The

initial burden is on the moving party to set forth specific facts demonstrating that no issue

of material fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Allen at ¶ 6, citing Dresher v. Burt, 1996-Ohio-107. “If the movant meets this burden, the

burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish that a genuine issue of material fact

exists for trial.” Allen at ¶ 6, citing Dresher at ¶ 18.

{¶9} Here, as relevant to this appeal, in the Board’s motion for summary

judgment, it maintained that it was entitled to judgment on the Sedenskys’ claim for

declaratory judgment.

{¶10} The Sedenskys sought declaratory judgment pursuant to R.C. 2721.03,

which provides:

Subject to division (B) of section 2721.02 of the Revised Code, any person interested under a deed, will, written contract, or other writing constituting a contract or any person whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a

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Case No. 2025-G-0012 constitutional provision, statute, rule as defined in section 119.01 of the Revised Code, municipal ordinance, township resolution, contract, or franchise may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, constitutional provision, statute, rule, ordinance, resolution, contract, or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations under it.

{¶11} A “dismissal” of a declaratory judgment action is not warranted based on a

trial court’s determination that the party seeking such judgment has advanced a meritless

position with respect to the validity of a law. Weyandt v. Davis, 112 Ohio App.3d 717, 721

(9th Dist. 1996). Instead, the trial court then should proceed to determine the validity of

the challenged law. Id. Nonetheless, a “trial court’s error in dismissing a complaint by

which a declaratory judgment is sought is harmless” if the trial court declared the rights,

status, and other legal relations in its order dismissing a declaratory judgment claim.

(Citations omitted.) Id. at 721-722.

{¶12} Here, the Sedenskys argued in their claim for declaratory judgment that

ATZR 4.03(a) and 5.05(b) are unconstitutional.

{¶13} ATZR 4.03(a) provides, “Lots and structures shall be used in compliance

with Schedule 4.03(k). Only the permitted main uses defined in the Resolution and

specified on the Schedule under a given district shall be permitted in that district; and only

those conditional uses so defined and specified may be approved.”

{¶14} The property at issue here is located in a district zoned “R-1.” Schedule

4.03(k) of the ATZR sets forth the “Permitted Main Uses” for a property zoned “R-1,” as

relevant here, single family dwellings. A “dwelling single family” under the ATZR is defined

as “[a] dwelling consisting of one (1) detached dwelling unit occupied by one (1) family

only.” ATZR 2.02. In turn, ATZR 2.02 defines a “family” as:

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Case No. 2025-G-0012 One (1) or more persons related by blood, adoption, guardianship or marriage, living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit, exclusive of live-in hired employees. A number of persons but not exceeding two (2) living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit though not related by blood, adoption, guardianship or marriage shall be deemed to constitute a family, exclusive of live-in hired employees. A family shall not include any society, club, fraternity, sorority, association, lodge, federation, coterie, or a like organization; any group of individuals whose association is temporary or seasonal in nature; and any group of individuals who are in a group living arrangement as a result of criminal offenses.

{¶15} Relevant to this appeal, the trial court and this court previously addressed

ATZR 4.03(a) with respect to short term rentals in single family dwellings in the Marra

cases. In Marra v. Auburn Twp. Zoning Inspector, Geauga C.P. No. 19A000662 (May 11,

2020) (“Marra I”), the trial court addressed a property owner’s administrative appeal from

the Board of Zoning Appeals (“BZA”). In that case, the owner of a single family dwelling

in an R-2 district rented her home to others on Airbnb and VRBO. The zoning inspector

notified the property owner that the use of the property for temporary lodging was not

permitted under the ATZR. Marra I. The property owner appealed the zoning inspector’s

determination to the BZA, which denied her request to overturn the zoning inspector’s

determination. Id. The property owner then appealed to the trial court pursuant to R.C.

Ch. 2506. Marra I. The trial court determined that, in an R-2 district the ATZR “does not

permit use of a single family home to provide temporary lodging to the public for a fee.”

Marra I. The trial court therefore affirmed the decision of the BZA. Id.

{¶16} The landowner appealed the trial court’s judgment in Marra v. Auburn Twp.

Zoning Inspector, 2020-Ohio-6678, ¶ 1 (11th Dist.) (“Marra II”). In Marra II, this court

concluded that the property owner did not establish that the use of her home for short

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Case No. 2025-G-0012 term rentals was a permitted use. Id. at ¶ 37. Accordingly, we affirmed the decision of the

trial court. Id. at ¶ 38.

{¶17} While Marra II was on appeal to this court, the Board enacted 5.05(b) of the

ATZR, which states:

Short term rental of a dwelling, in whole or in part, involving transient occupancy for thirty (30) consecutive days or less by persons other than the owner for which the owner receives monetary compensation pursuant to a rental agreement shall be prohibited. This shall not apply to a bed and breakfast for which a conditional zoning certificate has been issued as set forth in this Resolution.

{¶18} Thereafter, the Board brought an action for injunctive relief against the

Marra property owner in Auburn Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Marra, Geauga C.P. No.

21M000174 (Sept. 15, 2022) (“Marra III”). The Board maintained that the property owner

continued to utilize the property for short term rentals in violation of the ATZR. Marra III.

The property owner filed an answer and counterclaim. Id. Although she did not seek

declaratory judgment, the property owner did seek damages and an injunction for four

alleged constitutional violations. Id. On the Board’s motion for summary judgment, the

trial court concluded that the property owner’s claims were “barred by both res judicata

and facts in the record.” Id. Included in its discussion, the trial court determined that the

Board was entitled to summary judgment on the property owner’s claims that the

prohibition on short term rental of her property violated her due process rights and on her

claim that ATZR 5.05(b) violated the property owner’s equal protection rights. Id.

{¶19} In the present case, the Board relied on the Marra decisions in support of

its motion for summary judgment, and the trial court discussed the Marra decisions in its

February 28, 2025 judgment entry, under a heading labeled “stare decisis.” The trial court

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Case No. 2025-G-0012 determined that it had previously found the ATZR constitutional when faced with the same

constitutional challenges raised by the Sedenskys.

{¶20} In their first assigned error, the Sedenskys maintain that the trial court

improperly applied stare decisis because the Marra cases were “determined on issues

distinct from those offered for consideration by the Sedenskys[’] claim for declaratory

judgment.”

{¶21} “The doctrine of stare decisis requires a court to recognize and follow an

established legal decision in subsequent cases in which the question of law is again in

controversy.” See New Riegel Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Buehrer Group

Architecture & Eng., Inc., 2019-Ohio-2851, ¶ 18, citing Clark v. Snapper Power Equip.,

Inc., 21 Ohio St.3d 58, 60 (1986).

{¶22} The Sedenskys maintain that the following constitutional questions were in

controversy which were not decided in the Marra cases: whether the definition of “family”

as contained in ATZR 2.02, and thus incorporated in ATZR 4.03(b) through application of

ATZR 4.03(k), is unconstitutional on its face; and whether ATZR 5.05(b) violates equal

protection of the law by treating landlords who rent their properties on a short term basis

differently than those who rent their properties for longer durations.

{¶23} We agree with the Sedenskys to the extent that the Marra decisions were

not procedurally on point with the present case and did not address the same

constitutional challenges as those raised by the Sedenskys. Marra I was an administrative

appeal from the BZA’s determination, and the trial court’s decision did not reach any

constitutional issues. Marra II involved an appeal to this court from the judgment issued

in Marra I, and this court did not decide any constitutional issues. In Marra III, although

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Case No. 2025-G-0012 the trial court addressed certain constitutional issues raised by the property owner in her

counterclaim for an injunction, those constitutional challenges were not the same as those

raised in the present case.

{¶24} Therefore, the trial court erred in concluding that the Marra cases addressed

the same constitutional challenges as those advanced in the present case. However,

“‘[p]erhaps the most basic rule of appellate procedure is that “in order to secure reversal

of a judgment, [appellants] must not only show some error but must also show that that

error was prejudicial to [them].”’” State ex rel. Yost v. FirstEnergy Corp., 2024-Ohio-101,

¶ 36, quoting State v. Haynes, 2022-Ohio-4473, ¶ 38 (DeWine, J., dissenting), quoting

Smith v. Flesher, 12 Ohio St.2d 107, 110 (1967).

{¶25} Here, prior to, and independent of, its discussion of the Marra cases in the

February 28, 2025 judgment entry, the trial court addressed the Sedenskys’ constitutional

challenges. Therein, the trial court concluded that the zoning regulations were reasonable

and advanced the government’s legitimate interests, which included preserving the rural

character of the township. The trial court held that the Sedenskys “failed their burden to

prove unconstitutionality beyond fair debate.”

{¶26} The trial court then went on to discuss the Marra cases “[i]rrespective of”

the discussion of the Sedenskys’ challenges. Accordingly, the trial court considered the

Sedenskys’ counterclaims independent of the Marra decisions. Given that the trial court

considered the Sedenskys’ constitutional challenges on the merits, we cannot discern

how the trial court’s separate reliance on the Marra cases for application of stare decisis

resulted in prejudice to the Sedenskys.

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Case No. 2025-G-0012 {¶27} In the Board’s answer brief, it also stresses that the trial court’s judgment

did not solely rely on the Marra decisions but, instead, addressed the constitutional issues

relevant to the Sedenskys’ counterclaim.

{¶28} In their reply brief, the Sedenskys maintain that the trial court was precluded

from entering judgment on the merits of the declaratory judgment claim at the summary

judgment stage of proceedings, and they argue that the trial court’s language indicates

that it improperly weighed the evidence in determining that the ATZR was constitutional.

{¶29} However, the Sedenskys did not assign any error or present any argument

in their appellant’s brief that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment to the

Board on their counterclaims; that the Board failed to meet its initial burden of

demonstrating that no triable issue remained as to the Sedenskys’ counterclaims; that the

Sedenskys met their reciprocal burden of establishing a triable issue remained as to the

counterclaims; or that the trial court impermissibly weighed evidence in favor of the Board

when granting its motion for summary judgment. To the extent that the Sedenskys attempt

to raise such arguments in their reply brief, we will not review such arguments, as “[a]n

appellant may not use a reply brief to raise new issues or assignments of error.” (Citation

omitted.) Oko v. Lake Erie Corr. Inst., 2010-Ohio-2821, ¶ 15, fn. 1 (11th Dist.).

{¶30} Accordingly, because the Sedenskys have not established prejudice

resulting from the trial court’s error in relying on the Marra decisions, their first assigned

error lacks merit.

{¶31} In their second assigned error, the Sedenskys maintain that, because the

trial court improperly relied on the Marra cases, a live controversy exists regarding the

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Case No. 2025-G-0012 constitutionality of the ATZR, and thus its claim for declaratory judgment should not have

been dismissed.

{¶32} While we agree that “dismissal” of the declaratory judgment claim was not

warranted, the trial court resolved the controversy by determining that the Sedenskys had

not met their burden of establishing that the ATZR was unconstitutional, and, as

discussed above, its judgment in this regard was independent of its reliance on the Marra

cases. Thus, the trial court entered judgment on the merits with respect to the declaratory

judgment counterclaim, and its later statement that the declaratory judgment counterclaim

was “dismissed” was harmless. See Weyandt, 112 Ohio App.3d at 721.

{¶33} Therefore, the Sedenskys’ second assigned error lacks merit.

{¶34} The judgment is affirmed.

ROBERT J. PATTON, P.J.,

MATT LYNCH, J.,

concur.

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Case No. 2025-G-0012 JUDGMENT ENTRY

For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court, appellants’ assignments of error

lack merit. It is the judgment and order of this court that the judgment of the Geauga

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

Costs to be taxed against appellants.

JUDGE EUGENE A. LUCCI

PRESIDING JUDGE ROBERT J. PATTON, concurs

JUDGE MATT LYNCH, concurs

THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY

A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.

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Case No. 2025-G-0012