Aubrey Carney v. Department of Veterans Affairs

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedFebruary 28, 2023
DocketNY-0752-17-0187-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Aubrey Carney v. Department of Veterans Affairs (Aubrey Carney v. Department of Veterans Affairs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Aubrey Carney v. Department of Veterans Affairs, (Miss. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

AUBREY M. CARNEY, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, NY-0752-17-0187-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: February 28, 2023 AFFAIRS, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Robert C. Laity, Tonawanda, New York, for the appellant.

Amber Groghan, Esquire, Akron, Ohio, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed her constructive removal appeal for lack of jurisdiction without a hearing. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

BACKGROUND ¶2 The appellant was a Grade-2 Food Service Worker for the agency, appointed under 38 U.S.C. § 7802. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 9 at 4. On July 11, 2017, the Assistant Canteen Chief called the appellant into his office and showed her a video of her giving a drink to a customer without remuneration. Id. at 17. According to the appellant, the Assistant Chief gave her an ultimatum — resign immediately, or he would call the agency police. IAF, Tab 1 at 6, Tab 5 at 6. The appellant also stated that the Assistant Chief told her that the agency had been watching her for a long time and had additional unspecified evidence against her. IAF, Tab 3 at 5-6, Tab 5 at 6. She further stated that the union representative, who was not of her own choosing, acted in concert with the agency to pressure her resignation. IAF, Tab 1 at 6, Tab 3 at 5. The appellant relented. She wrote and signed a brief note, stating “I Aubrey Carney quit today on 7/11/17 asap.” IAF, Tab 9 at 18. On July 24, 2017, the agency issued a Standard Form 50 documenting the appellant’s resignation effective July 11, 2017. Id. at 20. 3

¶3 The appellant filed a Board appeal and requested a hearing. IAF, Tab 1 at 2, 4. She claimed that her resignation was involuntary and that the agency coerced her resignation because of her disability and becaus e of her father-in-law’s prior union, equal employment opportunity, and whistleblowing activity at the agency. Id. at 4, 6. The administrative judge issued a show cause order, notifying the appellant that the Board might lack jurisdiction over her appeal, and informing her of how to establish jurisdiction over a constructive removal appeal. IAF, Tab 4. The appellant responded, providing additional support and detail to her allegations of involuntariness. IAF, Tabs 5 -7. The agency also responded, addressing the appellant’s arguments pertaining to voluntariness and also arguing that, as a title 38 employee, the appellant lacked adverse action appeal rights. IAF, Tab 10. The appellant replied to the agency’s response. IAF, Tabs 11-12. ¶4 The administrative judge issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction without a hearing. IAF, Tab 15, Initial Decision (ID) at 15. She found that, because of the nature of her appointment, the appellant lacked a statutory right to appeal her alleged constructive removal. ID at 3. She further found that the appellant failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation that her resignation was involuntary. ID at 3-5. ¶5 The appellant has filed a petition for review, disputing the administrative judge’s findings. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. The agency has fil ed a response to the petition, PFR File, Tab 2, and the appellant has filed a reply to the agency’s response, PFR File, Tab 4. After the close of the record on review, the appellant filed a motion for leave to file additional evidence regarding her “status as a covered union member of [the Service Employees International Union] entitled to appeal rights to the [Merit Systems Protection Board].” PFR File, Tab 5. 4

ANALYSIS The appellant’s motion for leave to file additional evidence is denied. ¶6 Based on the appellant’s description of the additional evidence that she wishes to submit, we find that it would not be material to the outcome of the appeal. PFR File, Tab 5. Contrary to the appellant’s assertion, her union membership has no bearing on whether she is an “employee” with Board appeal rights under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75. The appellant’s motion for leave to file additional evidence is therefore denied.

The appellant lacks Board appeal rights under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75. ¶7 On petition for review, the appellant argues that she has a statutory right to appeal her constructive removal under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75, because she fits the definition of “employee” under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C). PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-5, 7. However, for the reasons explained below, we find that the appellant lacks Board appeal rights not because she fails to meet the basic definition of “employee” under section 7511(a)(1), but because she is specifically excluded from coverage under section 7511(b)(10). See Thomas v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 78 M.S.P.R. 304, 306 (1998). ¶8 Only an “employee” as defined in 5 U.S.C. § 7511 can appeal a constructive adverse action to the Board. Mfotchou v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 113 M.S.P.R. 317, ¶ 8 (2010). This right of appeal does not accrue to an individual “who holds a position within the Veterans Health Administration which has been excluded from the competitive service by or under a provision of title 38, unless such employee was appointed to such position under section 7401(3) of such title.” 5 U.S.C. § 7511(b)(10); Falso v. Office of Personnel Management, 77 M.S.P.R. 207, 210 (1997). ¶9 In this case, it is undisputed that the appellant was an excepted -service employee, appointed under 38 U.S.C.

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Aubrey Carney v. Department of Veterans Affairs, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/aubrey-carney-v-department-of-veterans-affairs-mspb-2023.