Aubert v. Dzurenda

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3 * * *

4 THAD AUBERT, Case No. 2:18-cv-01329-GMN-EJY

5 Plaintiff, ORDER 6 v.

7 JAMES DZURENDA, et al.,

8 Defendants.

9 10 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider Order. ECF No. 95. Also before the 11 Court is Defendants’ Motion for Enlargement of Time (ECF No. 96), which seeks additional time to 12 file a response to Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider Order. 13 On July 20, 2020, the Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions (ECF No. 72), Offer of 14 Judgment (ECF No. 81), Motion for Judicial Notice (ECF No. 82), Motion for Enlargement of Time 15 (ECF No. 87), and Motion for Service Under Sealed Address (ECF No. 90). ECF No. 92. Plaintiff 16 seeks reconsideration of the Court’s Order denying his Motion for Enlargement of Time and his 17 Motion for Service Under Sealed Address. ECF No. 95 at 2-3.

18 Local Rule (“LR”) 59-1(a) provides that:

19 [t]he court possesses the inherent power to reconsider an interlocutory order for cause, so long as the court retains jurisdiction. Reconsideration also may be 20 appropriate if (1) there is newly discovered evidence that was not available when the original motion or response was filed, (2) the court committed clear error or the 21 initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law. 22 23 LR 59-1(b) further states that “[m]otions for reconsideration are disfavored. A movant must not 24 repeat arguments already presented unless (and only to the extent) necessary to explain controlling, 25 intervening law or to argue new facts.” Here, Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider Order does not (i) 26 raise newly discovered evidence that was unavailable to him when he filed his Motion for 27 Enlargement of Time or Motion for Service Under Sealed Address, (ii) allege that this Court 1 committed clear error, (iii) allege the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (iv) introduce an 2 intervening change in controlling law. 3 Specifically, with respect to his Motion for Enlargement of Time, Plaintiff argues that he 4 evidenced the diligence and good cause required for an extension of discovery because he: (1) sent 5 a letter of good faith to the Attorney General before filing a Motion to Compel Discovery; (2) filed 6 a Motion for Sanctions in response to the Attorney General’s discovery objections; and, (3) would 7 have commenced further discovery but was awaiting issuance of a court order on his pending 8 motions. ECF No. 95 at 2. Notwithstanding, the Court addressed Plaintiff’s contentions in its prior 9 Order:

10 [n]ot only was Plaintiff not required to wait for an issuance of an order on his Motion for Sanctions before continuing to propound discovery, but Defendants also 11 properly objected to each of Plaintiff’s discovery requests in March 2020. “Aubert has known of the discovery cut-off date of June 19, 2020, since it was scheduled 12 by this Court on December 19, 2019. . . . However, instead of submitting any discovery requests during this time, Aubert waited almost five (5) months only to 13 file the instant motion requesting an enlargement of time for discovery.” 14 ECF No. 92 at 4 (internal citation omitted). The Court retains wide discretion in controlling 15 discovery (Little v. City of Seattle, 863 F.2d 681, 685 (9th Cir. 1988)), and Plaintiff presents no new 16 argument warranting reconsideration of his Motion for Enlargement of Time. 17 Plaintiff also argues that reconsideration of his Motion for Service Under Sealed Address is 18 appropriate because the Attorney General accepted service on behalf of a proposed defendant, 19 Romeo Aranas (“Aranas”), in another matter. ECF No. 95 at 3. However, as previously explained:

20 the Court must base its decision in each case on the facts applicable thereto. To that end, the Court cannot compel the AG’s Office to accept service for a former 21 state employee. NRS 41.0339; Dunkley v. Shoemate, 505 S.E.2d 442, 444 (N.C. 1999) (citations and brackets omitted). 22 23 ECF No. 77 at 1. In other words, it may be true that the Attorney General accepted service on 24 Aranas’ behalf in another case. In contrast, and as explained in the Court’s July 20, 2020 Order, in 25 this case:

26 [t]he Attorney General has already provided the Court with the last known address for Defendant Aranas and there is no good reason for the Court to Order that 27 disclosure again. Given the Court previously dismissed Aranas without prejudice 1 Order requiring attempted service based on location information provided by the Nevada Attorney General, there is nothing more the Court must do. 2 3 ECF No. 92 at 5. In sum, Plaintiff presents precisely the sort of repeat arguments that LR 59-1(b) 4 disfavors in support of reconsideration. Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider Order is therefore denied. 5 Accordingly, 6 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider Order (ECF No. 95) is 7 DENIED. 8 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Enlargement of Time (ECF No. 9 96) is DENIED as moot. 10 DATED this 11th day of August, 2020.

12 ELAYNA J. YOUCHAH 13 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27